Whiting v. Merrill Lynch & Co.

1

PAULA VICTORIA WHITING, Plaintiff, v. MERRILL LYNCH & CO., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 23-641 (RDM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

January 23, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RANDOLPH D. MOSS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On March 8, 2023, Plaintiff Paula Victoria Whiting, proceeding pro se, brought this suit against Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc,^[1]asserting claims relating to a Special Needs Trust Fund (“the trust”) that was created for her son, who had been “profoundly disabled since birth.” See Dkt. 1-1 at 9-10, 13. In May 2006, Plaintiffs son passed away, and, since that time, Plaintiff has received no income from the trust. Instead, the remaining funds in the trust reverted to the District of Columbia, see Dkt. 8-1 at 6, consistent with the terms of the trust documents Plaintiff appended to her complaint, see Dkt. 1-1 at 17 (“[T]he District of Columbia shall have a reversionary interest in any of the monies remaining .”); see also Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp., 573 F.Supp.3d 346, 352 (D.D.C. 2021) (“[A] court may consider documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Plaintiff's complaint is far from clear. She alleges that she is suing the trustee, Judy Chase, Esq., “for [l]ost [f]unds,” although Chase is not named as a defendant. Dkt. 1-1 at 9. She also alleges that she is suing “Merrill Lynch & Co. for $705,000.00 . . . that was trusted to them and $100 [m]illion for [p]ain amd suffering that led to los[s] of income spelled out in the Special Need[s] Trust of Jovan Whiting,” including “los[s] of house-homelessness, los[s] of children, put in psycho [w]ard for 3 weeks.” Id. Finally, she alleges that after her son died in 2006, Chase “cut [her] income . . . from $5000.00 a month to $0;” that Chase “said the money went back to the state;” and that Chase nonetheless “continued to get paid from the trust . . . for 3 years after” her son's death, even though the “trust was supposed to [be] closed.” Id. at 10.

On March 15, 2023, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and as barred by the statute of limitations. Dkt. 5. In her opposition brief, Plaintiff asserts that she is suing for “breach of contract and negligence,” and she maintains that she (rather than her disabled son) was the one who “sued and won a case against [t]he District of Columbia” and that, as result, she is the one who is entitled to the benefit of the judgment in that case. Dkt. 9 at 3.

Even when proceeding pro se, the plaintiff bears the burden of alleging facts sufficient to establish a personal stake in a matter sufficient to sustain the Court's jurisdiction. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice”); Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219 (D.C. 2011) (applying federal standing doctrine to actions brought in the D.C. courts).

“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘actual cases or controversies between proper litigants.'” Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)). Establishing standing requires a showing of three elements-injury in fact, causation, and redressability-which together constitute the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.” Siegel v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 304 F.Supp.3d 45, 49 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Here, the complaint fails to allege any facts that might plausibility support Plaintiff's standing to sue. Among other things, the complaint fails to allege a causal connection between any alleged misconduct and any injury Plaintiff has sustained. See L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F.Supp.3d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).

Most notably, Plaintiff seeks relief based on the funds that Merrill Lynch held in the trust and alleges that she has lost her home, lost her children, and was placed in a “Ward” for treatment of a psychiatric condition. But she fails to allege any facts that would support a causal link between any alleged misconduct by Merrill Lynch and these injuries. To the contrary, she alleges that the “trust was supposed to have closed,” Dkt. 1-1 at 10, and, indeed, the trust documentation attached to the complaint indicates that the corpus of the trust reverted to the District of Columbia upon her son's death, Dkt. 1-1 at 17 (“[T]he District of Columbia shall have a reversionary interest in any of the monies remaining . . .”). Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that she was a beneficiary of the trust, and, the attached trust documentation, plainly states that the trust was created “for the sole and exclusive benefit of” Plaintiff's son, id. at 13. In short, neither the complaint nor the attached documentation offers the Court with any basis to conclude-or even infer-that Plaintiff has-or ever had-any interest in the trust or the underlying assets.

Nor can the Court rely on the additional allegations found in Plaintiff's opposition brief. It is well established that a party-including a party proceeding pro se-may not amend a pleading through an opposition brief. See, e.g., Sai v. TSA, 326 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2018).

Moreover even if Plaintiff were to add the details included in her opposition brief to her complaint, she would still fail to satisfy the requirements for pleading jurisdiction. She asserts, for...