Whitright v. Hartford Public Schools

547 F.Supp.2d 171

Gail WHITRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. HARTFORD PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant.

No. 3:06cv1272 (MRK).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

April 16, 2008.

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Eugene N. Axelrod, Axelrod & Associates, LLC, Woodbridge, CT, for Plaintiff.

Ann F. Bird, Bird and Apostolidis, Middletown, CT, for Defendant.

RULING AND ORDER

MARK R. KRAVITZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Hartford Public Schools' ("HPS") Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 20]. HPS requests summary judgment on Gail Whitright's Complaint [doc. # 1], which in counts one and four, alleges race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its State counterpart, Connecticut General Statute § 46a-60(a)(1); in counts two and six, alleges a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and Connecticut General Statute § 46a-60(a)(1); and in counts three and five, alleges retaliation in violation of Title VII and Connecticut General Statute § 46a-60(a)(4). Ms. Whitright initially pleaded a seventh count alleging a violation of Connecticut General Statute §§ 46a-99 and 46a-70(a) but later withdrew that claim. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 25] at 22. Thus, the Court grants summary judgment to HPS on count seven. In addition, for the reasons discussed below, the Court also grants summary judgment to HPS on counts one, three, four and five, but denies summary judgment on counts two and six.

{{I.}}

The basic facts of this case are not in serious dispute. Ms. Whitright is Caucasian, and from late 2004 through June 2005 when she retired, was a teacher at the Annie Fisher School, a Hartford Public School. During most of her tenure at the Fisher School, Ms. Whitright had responsibility for a pre-kindergarten morning class, and was assisted in her class duties by several individuals including Mrs. Harper, a Child Development Assistant ("CDA"), and Ms. Parnell, a paraprofessional. For a period of time, Mr. Rodriguez a CDA, assisted in the afternoon class. Mrs. Morris is Fisher School's Principal and Mrs. Harrison is Fisher School's Vice-Principal. Mrs. Harper, Ms. Parnell, Mr. Rodriguez, Principal Morris and Vice-Principal Harrison are all non-Caucasian.

Ms. Whitright complains that she was subject to various incidents of insubordinate, rude, and harassing behavior, and was the victim of "racial comments" from the CDAs and paraprofessionals, primarily Mrs. Harper, Ms. Parnell, and Mr. Rodriguez. Ms. Whitright asserts that Mrs. Harper and Ms. Parnell routinely refused to do what she asked of them, disparaged her in front of students, and falsely accused her of using a student's blanket as a mop and of pulling a student's ear. She also asserts that Ms. Parnell would sit in Ms. Whitright's chair and refuse to move. She also accuses Mrs. Harper and Ms. Parnell of destroying Ms. Whitright's classroom materials. At least one parent complained to the school about the harassment of Ms. Whitright. See Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n [doc. # 25] Ex. H ("Letter to Morris from Norma Richards re Whitright").

The comments Ms. Whitright ascribes as being racial are the following: (1) On September 28, 2004, in responding to a note Ms. Whitright left him asking him to move the "milk cartoons," Mr. Rodriguez wrote a note to plaintiff commenting: "[W]here to and what is a milk cartoon? I am getting confused ... I should be relocating back to Puerto Rico, perhaps" (ellipsis in original); (2) On October 14, 2004, Mrs. Harper responded to an instruction from Ms. Whitright with the comment: "I am not a maid"; (3) On April 6, 2005, Ms. Parnell said to parents of some of the students, within Ms. Whitright's hearing, that she could not retire because "George Bush took all her money and gave it to rich white people"; (4) On May 3, 2005, Ms. Whitright said to Mrs. Harper who chaffed at an instruction, "I say black, you say white." In response, Mrs. Harper commented to Ms. Whitright "that was racial!"; (5) On May 3, 2005, Mrs. Harper said "I'm a beautiful, black woman" as she walked by Ms. Whitright during recess. See Def.'s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 22] ¶ 10: Pl.'s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 25-3] (admitting ¶ 10). Though she does not point to these statements in her Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 25-3], from comments by her counsel at oral argument, Ms. Whitright also appears to allege the following additional comments as being racial: (6) On September 14, 2004, Mr. Rodriguez responded to Ms. Whitright's request that he do a task in part with the following request: "Please write my name with a g not a q. I'm not Portuguese"; (7) On another occasion, Ms. Parnell, who knew that Ms. Whitright drove a Mercedes, made comments about people who drive Mercedes and get free cheese. See Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n [doc. # 25] at 4, 6.

Ms. Whitright agrees that she was never the victim of explicit racial slurs. See id. at 6, 8. Most of the incidents Ms. Whitright is alleging are recorded in a diary, see id., Ex. C ("Whitright Daily Diary"), which she began keeping after contacting her union representative, who contacted HPS's Human Resources ("HR") Department. The HR Department then sent the union representative the School's harassment policies with instructions on keeping the diary, and the representative then forwarded the policies to Ms. Whitright.

{{II.}}

The summary judgment standard is a familiar one. Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Williams v. Utica Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir.2006) (quotation marks omitted). "The substantive law governing the case will identify those facts that are material, and `[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.'" Bouboulis v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 442 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (alteration in original)).

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), and the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the moving party carries its burden, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rely merely on allegations or denials...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). Rather, the opposing party must "set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Id. In short, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).

Courts must be "particularly cautious about granting summary judgment to an employer in a discrimination case when the employer's intent is in question. Because direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent will rarely be found, affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination." Schwapp v. Toum of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). However, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate even in discrimination cases," Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.2000), where a plaintiffs argument is "based on conclusory allegations of discrimination and the employer provides a legitimate rationale for its conduct." Tojzan v. N. Y. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 00 Civ. 6105(WHP), 2003 WL 1738993, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2003).

III.

There are material issues in dispute that preclude the Court from granting summary judgment to HPS on Ms. Whitright's hostile work environment claims. But there are no material issues of fact on her race discrimination and retaliation claims, and under governing Second Circuit precedent, HPS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those claims.¹

A. Hostile Work Environment, Counts Two and Six

To prevail on a hostile work environment claim based on the actions of coworkers a plaintiff must establish two elements:

"(1) that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his or her work environment, and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer."

Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.2003) (alteration omitted). "The first element of a hostile work environment claim has both an objective and subjective component: the misconduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment, and the victim must also subjectively perceive that environment to be abusive." Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir.2004) (quotation marks omitted). At oral argument, HPS conceded that Ms. Whitright meets the subjective prong of the analysis. As for the objective prong, the Second Circuit has instructed district courts as follows:

The matter of whether the conduct alleged was so "severe or pervasive" as to create "an objectively hostile or abusive work environment," is to be decided based on the totality of the circumstances, in light of such...