Wickes v. Westfair Elec. Co.

PATRICIA WICKES, Plaintiff, v. WESTFAIR ELECTRIC CO., et al., Defendants.

19-CV-10673 (PMH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

January 20, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PHILIP M. HALPERN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Patricia Wickes ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings claims of: (1) race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"); (2) race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"); (3) race discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"); (4) age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"); (5) age discrimination under the NYSHRL; (6) sex discrimination under Title VII; (7) sex discrimination under the NYSHRL; (8) retaliation; and (9) violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. ("ERISA").

By motion dated June 15, 2020, defendants West-Fair Electric Contractors (sued herein as "Westfair Electric Co.") ("West-Fair"), Basil Holubis (sued herein as "Basil Holibus") ("Holubis"), Jeffrey D'Aleo (sued herein as "Jeffrey Deleo") ("D'Aleo"), Thomas Gresis (sued herein as "Tom Griesis") ("Gresis"), and George Guerra (sued herein as "George Guererra") ("Guerra") (collectively "Defendants"),¹ moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff's claims of: (1) race discrimination under Title VII, Section 1981, and the NYSHRL; (2) age discrimination under the ADEA and the NYSHRL; and (3) ERISAviolations. (Doc. 29; Doc. 29-7, "Defs. Br."). Defendants also seek dismissal of so much of Plaintiff's claims that concern conduct that allegedly occurred during an apprenticeship with West-Fair in late 2014 and early 2015 upon the grounds that, inter alia, such claims are untimely. (Defs. Br. at 14-16). Defendants further seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claims under Title VII and the ADEA to the extent they are asserted against defendants Holubis, D'Aleo, Gresis, and Guerra (the "Individual Defendants") upon the grounds that these statutes preclude individual liability as a matter of law. (Id. at 9).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' partial motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action on November 18, 2019. (Doc. 2, "Compl."). Plaintiff describes herself as a Native American woman born in 1960. (Id. at 3-4).² She asserts that after she was hired as a fifth-year apprentice mechanic by West-Fair on or about June 18, 2018, she became the sole woman at the worksite and was subjected to pervasive harassment, retaliation, and a hostile work environment because of her race, sex, and age. (Id. at 3-5, 14, 19, 30). Plaintiff relates several incidents with coworkers and supervisors that she claims constitute discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. These incidents include the following acts taken by her coworkers and supervisors: calling her derogatory names (see, e.g., id. at 14, 17, 22-23); singling her out and treating her differently than her male coworkers (see, e.g., id. at 25, 27, 32, 35); sabotaging her work product (see, e.g., id. at 26-27, 31-33); targeting her partner for his association with her (see, e.g., id. at 20, 23, 25, 27); reassigning her partner and forcing her to work alone while male coworkers remained partnered (see, e.g., id. at 23, 34-35); trivializing her complaints (see, e.g., id. at 14-15, 36, 38); giving her assignments below her ability and paygrade (see, e.g.,id. at 22-23, 29-30, 33-34); having her take instructions from apprentices with less experience and seniority (see, e.g., id. at 30-31); and eventually terminating her employment (see, e.g., id. at 5, 15, 36-38).

Plaintiff also claims that her medical insurance was intentionally canceled although she was a member in good standing of her union, Local 3, resulting in the cancellation of her son's surgery. (Id. at 37). Plaintiff alleges that in February 2019 she filed a charge of discrimination against Defendants with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") (id. at 7), and attaches to the Complaint a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC dated August 26, 2019 (id. at 9-13).

By Order dated December 11, 2019, Chief Judge McMahon granted Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 4). On December 17, 2019, Judge Román issued an Order of Service, which directed the U.S. Marshals Service to effectuate service upon Defendants. (Doc. 5). On April 6, 2020, this action was reassigned to me. On April 28, 2020, following the letter exchange required by my Individual Practices, Defendants filed a pre-motion letter in connection with their anticipated motion to dismiss. (Doc. 23). Plaintiff filed two documents in opposition, an "Answer" and a "Response." (Docs. 25, 26). A review of these documents reveals that the substance is identical.

On May 5, 2020, the Court granted Defendants leave to file a motion to dismiss and set a briefing schedule. (Doc. 28). The motion was made on June 15, 2020; Plaintiff's opposition wasfiled on July 13, 2020 (Doc. 30, "Pl. Br.");³ and the motion was fully submitted with the filing of Defendants' Reply on July 27, 2020 (Doc. 32).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion enables a court to consider dismissing a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face "when the ple[d] factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully." Id. The factual allegations pled "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

"When there are well-ple[d] factual allegations [in the complaint], a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, the court must "take all well-ple[d] factual allegations as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996). However, the presumption of truth does not extend to "legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of actions." Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662). Therefore, a plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions" to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

A complaint submitted by a pro se plaintiff, "however inartfully ple[d], must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because pro se plaintiffs are often unfamiliar with the formalities of pleading requirements, courts must apply a more flexible standard in determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint than they would in reviewing the complaint of an individual represented by counsel. Smith v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 218 F. Supp. 2d 357 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). While "[p]ro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, even following Twombly and Iqbal . . . dismissal of a pro se complaint is nevertheless appropriate where a plaintiff has clearly failed to meet minimum pleading requirements." Thomas v. Westchester Cty., No. 12-CV-6718, 2013 WL 3357171, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013) (internal citations omitted); see also Chavis v. Cappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Even in a pro se case, [ ] 'although a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.'" (quoting Harris, 572 F.3d at 72)).

Therefore, while the Court is "obligated to draw the most favorable inferences that [a plaintiff's] complaint supports, [it] cannot invent factual allegations that [the plaintiff] has not pled." Chavis, 618 F.3d at 170. The Court also has a duty to interpret the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).

ANALYSIS

I. Race and Age Discrimination

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims of race discrimination under Title VII, Section 1981, and the NYSHRL, as well as her claims of age discrimination under the ADEA and NYSHRL.

a. Title VII Race Discrimination and ADEA Age Discrimination

Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and thus her Title VII race discrimination and ADEA age discrimination claims must be dismissed. (Defs. Br. at 10-13). Defendants offer a copy of Plaintiff's EEOC Notice of Charge of Discrimination (Doc. 29-1 ¶ 7; Doc. 29-6, "EEOC Charge") in support of this argument.⁴

Before an aggrieved party can assert a Title VII claim in federal court, he or she must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC "within one hundred and eighty days after the allegedunlawful employment practice occurred," or if proceedings were initially instituted with a State or local agency, "within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Plaintiff must then file an action in federal court within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the...