Widmaier v. City of Newark

MICHAEL WIDMAIER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEWARK, et al, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 16-2533

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

July 14, 2017

Not for Publication

OPINION

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before the Court by way of motions to dismiss filed by the City of Newark ("Newark") and Defendants Newark Police Chief Eugene Venable, Detective Silas Smith, Jr., Lieutenant John Rodrigues, Detective Rui Domingues, Sergeant Joseph Frost and Anthony Campos (the "Officer Defendants"). D.E. 42, 46. Plaintiff Michael Widmaier opposed both motions to which Defendants filed a single brief in reply. D.E. 47, 51, 53. The Court reviewed the submissions made in support and opposition to the motions, and considered the motions without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff alleges that in the morning on July 21, 2015, he purchased breakfast, which was placed into a shopping bag, at an Exxon Station in Newark. Amended Compl. ("FAC") ¶¶ 15-17, D.E. 15. While returning to the nearby Riviera Hotel, where he was staying, Plaintiff ran into an acquaintance, Kadeem, and invited Kadeem to the Riviera. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. As they walked back to the hotel, a Jeep Cherokee and minivan approached them. Id. ¶ 20. The driver of the Jeep rolled down his window and stated, "Drop the f***ing gun!" Id. ¶ 21. The Plaintiff asked Kadeem if he had a gun and Kadeem stated that "he did not know what the driver was talking about." Id. ¶ 22. "Fearing for their safety and thinking that they were about to get accosted," Plaintiff and Kadeem fled. Id. ¶ 23.

While running, the Plaintiff dropped the shopping bag with his breakfast. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff also heard the driver of the Jeep say, "I'm gonna kill you." Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff scaled multiple fences and ran through parking lots to escape from the Jeep. While fleeing, Plaintiff observed the Jeep drive the wrong way down a one-way street and over grass during its pursuit of Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 26-28. Eventually, as Plaintiff was running towards an opening in a fence, the Jeep accelerated towards him at an angle "attempting to block his exit." Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff raised his hands in an attempt to brace himself and "the Jeep struck him, knocked him to the ground on his back and dragg[ed] him while driving over his leg" before coming to a stop over Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. The driver opened the door, looked down, and saw the Plaintiff under the vehicle. The driver then put the Jeep in reverse and drove backward over the Plaintiff's torso with the left front tire, coming to a stop several feet from Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 32-34. The driver, later identified as Detective Silas Smith Jr., exited the Jeep and began yelling, "Where's the f***ing gun?" Id. ¶ 35.

Plaintiff told Smith that he did not have a gun and asked for help, to which Smith responded that Plaintiff would get help when he told Smith the location of the gun. Id. ¶ 36-37. Plaintiff continued to ask Smith for help to no avail, explaining that he did not have a gun. Id. ¶¶ 38-43. Eventually, the minivan arrived. An unidentified white male exited the car and spoke with Smith. Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff also asked this man for assistance, but he did not offer any help. The unidentified man eventually got back into the minivan and left the scene. Id. ¶¶ 45, 49.

At some point, an ambulance arrived, and Smith told the rescue workers that Plaintiff was robbing drug dealers with a gun and ran into the Jeep while trying to flee. Id. ¶ 50. Plaintiff attempted to lift his leg off the ground but could not do so due to multiple severe fractures. Smith refused to help the medics. Id. ¶¶ 51-52. At the hospital, Smith insisted to the attending physician that Plaintiff ran into the Jeep while fleeing. Id. ¶ 55. The attending physician noted that it appeared from Plaintiff's injuries and marks that Plaintiff was run over by a vehicle. Id. ¶ 56. Smith departed the hospital and did not return. Id. Plaintiff was under police guard at the hospital from his admittance until his release, and underwent four surgeries during his stay. Id. ¶¶ 57, 60.

Plaintiff was not informed that he was charged with any offense until receiving a notice to appear from the Newark Municipal Court. Id. ¶ 61. Plaintiff's legal counsel then obtained copies of the arrest and incident reports, which indicated that he was charged with wandering to obtain a controlled dangerous substance ("CDS") and resisting arrest. The report stated that Plaintiff was seen ingesting a suspected CDS orally and admitted to purchasing a bundle, or ten bags, of heroin. Id. ¶ 62. The charges, however, were subsequently dropped prior to the municipal court trial without notice to Plaintiff's attorney. Id. ¶ 65.

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on May 5, 2016, and filed the FAC on July 25, 2016.¹ D.E. 15. In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for excessive force, wrongful arrest and Monell liability; assault and battery; violations of the New Jersey Constitution; gross negligence and negligence; intentional infliction of emotional distress; respondeat superior liability; and false imprisonment. Plaintiff sued the City of Newark, the Newark Police Department, and a number of individual police officers.² Plaintiff also asserts claims against unidentified John Doe Officers. FAC ¶¶ 6-14. The City of Newark and the Officer Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss; both motions seek dismissal of all counts of the FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).³ D.E. 42, 46.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Further, a plaintiff must "allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims." Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district courts must separate the factual and legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009). Restatements of the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and therefore, not entitled to a presumption of truth. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court, however, "must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.

III. ANALYSIS

1. CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY

a. Claims Against the Newark Police Department

At the outset, Newark argues that Plaintiff's claims against the Newark Police Department must be dismissed because a city and its police departments cannot be sued separately. Newark Br. at 11. Although Plaintiff does not address this issue, the Court agrees with Newark. Consequently, the claims against the Newark Police Department are dismissed with prejudice. See Godley v. Newark Police Dep't, No. 05-806, 2007 WL 269815, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2007) (dismissing Section 1983 and tort claims against the Newark Police Department because it was not an entity that was subject to suit).

b. Supervisory Liability Claims (Counts III and X)

Newark argues that Count III, a Monell liability claim,⁴ must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to identify a municipal policy or custom that led to Plaintiff's injuries. Newark Br. at 26. The Officer Defendants in a supervisory role join this argument. Officers' Br. at 26. Plaintiff contends that he should be given leave to amend this claim and have an opportunity to take limited discovery so that he can ascertain "the needed details to allege such claim." Newark Opp. Br. at 12.

A municipality cannot be liable under Section 1983 for the acts of its employees on the basis of respondeat superior. Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). Rather, to hold a municipality liable, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the violation of rights was caused by a municipal policy or custom. Id. To sufficiently state a claim based on a municipal policy or custom, a plaintiff must identify a policy or custom that "violates the Constitution or . . . while not unconstitutional itself, is the moving force behind the constitutional tort of one of its employees." Id. (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991)). Moreover, if a plaintiff relies on a policy or custom that does not violate federal law on its face, "causation can only be established by 'demonstrating that the municipal action was taken with deliberate indifference as to its known or obvious consequence.'" Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000).

Here, the FAC does not cite to any policy or custom. Instead, the FAC speaks only of "an intended plan of action," failing to provide any further details as to what this plan entailed or how it impacted Plaintiff. FAC ¶¶ 80-81. Threadbare recitations of the elements of a Monell claim, such as this, are insufficient. As a result, the claim is dismissed. See, e.g., Benjamin v. E. Orange Police Dep't, 937 F. Supp. 2d 582, 595 (D.N.J. 2013) (dismissing claim against city because plaintiff failed to plead facts demonstrating the existence of a policy or custom).

In addition, Newark and the Individual Defendant who are sued based on their supervisory role contend that Plaintiff's supervisory liability claim against them must also be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to plead that that they knew of the alleged wrongdoing and acquiesced. Newark Br. at 36-37; Officers' Br. at 38-39. "A defendant in a civil rights...