Wiegand v. Wiegand, 31773.

129 Conn.App. 526

21 A.3d 489

Donald K. WIEGAND

v.Corinne M. WIEGAND.

No. 31773.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 18, 2011.Decided June 21, 2011.

Donald K. Wiegand, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).LAVINE, BEAR and WEST, Js.BEAR, J.

The plaintiff, Donald K. Wiegand, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the defendant, Corinne M. Wiegand, and entering certain financial and property distribution orders.¹ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) failed to give him the protection afforded him by Practice Book § 25–5(a)(1), (2) demonstrated prejudice against him, (3) failed to award him alimony, thus leaving him destitute and (4) entered financial and property distribution orders that were one-sided, the language of which would cause further disputes. We reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff and the defendant were intermarried on April 1, 1989. There were no children born of the marriage. On January 16, 2009, the plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a complaint seeking dissolution of the parties' marriage. On January 27, 2009, the defendant, also acting pro se, filed her answer. The plaintiff, the defendant and one additional witness, David Stegmeir, testified during the trial, wherein the court extensively questioned the parties and Stegmeir. After the trial, the court, finding that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, granted the dissolution and entered financial and property distribution orders. It did not award alimony to either party. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

“The standard of review in family matters is well settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented.... In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.... Appellate review of a trial court's findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record or as a whole.... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support it ... or when although there is evidence in the record to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Desai v. Desai, 119 Conn.App. 224, 227–28, 987 A.2d 362 (2010). “A fundamental principle in dissolution actions is that a trial court may exercise broad discretion in awarding alimony and dividing property as long as it considers all relevant statutory criteria.... This standard of review reflects the sound policy that the trial court has the opportunity to view the parties first hand and is therefore in the best position to assess all of the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, in which such personal factors such as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties are so significant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) de Repentigny v. de Repentigny, 121 Conn.App. 451, 460, 995 A.2d 117 (2010).

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court failed to give him the protection afforded him by Practice Book § 25–5(a)(1).² He argues that the defendant and her live-in friend, Stegmeir, violated the automatic orders of the court and disposed of many items of the plaintiff's personal property that had remained in the marital home, and the court improperly denied the plaintiff a full opportunity to question them about the disposal of these items. We are not persuaded.

The following additional facts are relevant to our analysis. The defendant, who has a heart condition, testified that throughout the years the plaintiff had been unwilling to unpack when they moved and that he had left boxes outside, on the patio, in the living room, the den and the sun room. She stated that it was difficult to cope with living out of boxes and that she had tried to explain that to the plaintiff, but he was not responsive; rather, he spent his time playing on the computer. The plaintiff admitted that many boxes were never unpacked, but he alleged that this was because he wanted the defendant to go through the contents of each box with him but that she was unwilling.

Stegmeir, a friend, whom the defendant met via an internet chat room, testified that he first met the defendant in person when he went to the parties' home in mid November, 2008, “because [he had] heard over the telephone the plaintiff threatening [the defendant] and basically threatening to kill himself and her and her dog....” Stegmeir further testified that upon arriving at the parties' home, “[t]he outside of the house was completely stacked with boxes and debris. The inside of the house you could barely walk into. The living room was stacked from floor to ceiling, front to back, with numerous boxes and containers. Basically, every room in the house was that way. So, I volunteered to help them put the stuff away, but it was full of mold, mildew, water, bugs. It was just a horrible mess.” Stegmeir also stated that it took him approximately six months to sort through the items and to separate the plaintiff's belongings from the defendant's belongings. Many of the items, however, were covered in mold and mildew, creating a health hazard, which Stegmeir stated he had to pay a junk man to remove. Stegmeir also stated that he and the defendant are roommates but that they are not romantically involved in any way.

The plaintiff cross-examined Stegmeir, asking him if he was aware that disposing of these belongings was a violation of the automatic orders set forth in Practice Book § 25–5(a)(1). The court interrupted the plaintiff's line of questioning, explaining that Stegmeir was not a party to the litigation. The plaintiff responded that by removing the belongings, Stegmeir had become a party. The court reiterated that Stegmeir was not a party and told the plaintiff to move on.

The record does not reveal that the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt for the defendant's alleged violation of Practice Book § 25–5(a)(1). The record also does not reveal any facts found by the court regarding the disposal of these belongings, nor does the record contain any indication as to the contents of the boxes.³ It seems apparent, however, that the court credited the testimony of Stegmeir that the belongings were moldy and in need of disposal. See generally Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 107 Conn.App. 488, 497, 945 A.2d 1043 (“It is the sole province of the trial court to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass on the credibility of the witnesses.... It has the advantage of viewing and assessing the demeanor, attitude and credibility of the witnesses and is therefore better equipped than we to assess the circumstances surrounding the dissolution action.” [Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.] ), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 948, 960 A.2d 1037 (2008). Furthermore, although the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation asking the court to articulate ten different matters, none of the matters related to the disposal of his belongings.

The plaintiff has pointed to nothing in the record that would convince us that the court acted improperly in directing him to move on with his questioning of Stegmeir, who was not a party to the litigation, regarding his possible violation of the automatic orders in Practice Book § 25–5(a)(1) by the disposal of these belongings. On the basis of the record before us, we conclude that the court handled the matter properly.

II

Although he did not raise the issue at trial, the plaintiff claims on appeal that the court demonstrated prejudice against him during the hearing. He argues that the court treated him in a hostile and unethical manner, while always treating the defendant politely. The plaintiff especially is concerned about the court's alleged disinterest in the defendant's cancellation of the plaintiff's AOL internet account and his efforts to explain the restraining order that had been issued against him. The plaintiff provides no citations to or analysis of case law to support a claim of judicial bias; see Watkins v. Thomas, 118 Conn.App. 452, 455–56, 984 A.2d 106 (2009); nor did he preserve his claim of judicial bias in accordance with Practice Book § 1–23.⁴ Furthermore, the plaintiff has not requested that we review his claim under the plain error doctrine. Nevertheless because claims of judicial bias strike at the very core of judicial integrity and implicate the basic concepts of a fair trial, we will review the plaintiff's claim.

“Accusations of judicial bias ... implicate the basic concepts of a fair trial.... The appearance as well as the actuality of [partiality] on the part of the trier will suffice to constitute proof of bias sufficient to warrant disqualification....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Watrous v. Watrous, 108 Conn.App. 813, 834, 949 A.2d 557 (2008). Canon 3(c)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct (2009), which was in effect when this case was tried,⁵ provides in relevant part: “A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (A) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party....” To prevail on his claim of a violation of this canon, the plaintiff need not show actual bias. The plaintiff has met his burden if he can prove that the conduct in question gave rise to a reasonable appearance of impropriety. See Watrous v. Watrous, supra, at 834, 949 A.2d 557.

“A trial judge, as a...