Wierciszewski v. Granite City Ill. Hosp. Co. LLC

MARY WIERCISZEWSKI, Plaintiff, v. GRANITE CITY ILLINOIS HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a Gateway Regional Medical Center, and DAVE SORENSON, Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 11-120-GPM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DATED: April 28, 2011

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MURPHY, District Judge:

I. Introduction

This matter is before the Court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings brought by Defendants Granite City Illinois Hospital Company, LLC ("GCIHC"), d/b/a Gateway Regional Medical Center, and Dave Sorenson (Doc. 5). Plaintiff Mary Wierciszewski was employed as a security guard with GCIHC from July 27, 1975, until March 24, 2009. According to Wierciszewski, although she performed her j ob duties satisfactorily, she was subjected to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation on account of her age and gender, ultimately being terminated and replaced by a younger, less-qualified male; it appears that Wierciszewski was fifty-six years old when she was terminated, and her replacement was a man under the age of forty. Sorenson apparently was Wierciszewski's supervisor during Wierciszewski's employment with GCIHC. Wierciszewski asserts claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and theIllinois Human Rights Act ("IHRA"), 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. Specifically, Wierciszewski's complaint contains the following counts: Count I, alleging age discrimination in violation of the ADEA; Count II, alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title VII; Count III, alleging retaliation in violation of the ADEA; Count IV, alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII; Count V, alleging age discrimination in violation of the IHRA; Count VI, alleging gender discrimination in violation of the IHRA; and Count VII, alleging retaliation in violation of the IHRA.

It appears from the documentation attached to Wierciszewski's complaint that in 2009 Wierciszewski filed two charges of employment discrimination against GCIHC with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") via the Illinois Department of Human Rights ("IDHR"), which has consented to accept charges of employment discrimination on behalf of the EEOC. The EEOC dismissed Wierciszewski's charges, Charge No. 560-2009-01052 and Charge No. 560-2009-03213, on September 28, 2010, and December 3, 2010, respectively, and advised Wierciszewski of her right to sue under the ADEA and Title VII within ninety days of receipt of notice of the dismissal of the charges. On December 27, 2010, Wierciszewski filed this suit in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Madison County, Illinois, against GCIHC and Sorenson, who timely removed the case to this Court. Federal subject matter jurisdiction exists as to Wierciszewski's ADEA and Title VII claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, while Wierciszewski's IHRA claims are within the Court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. GCIHC and Sorenson now seek judgment on the pleadings as to Wierciszewski's claims against Sorenson, Wierciszewski's IHRA claims, and Wierciszewski's retaliation claims under the ADEA and Title VII. The Court rules as follows.II. Analysis

As an initial matter, the Court notes the standard under which it must evaluate a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may seek a judgment on the pleadings, meaning the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached to the pleadings as exhibits. See Northern Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)). The main difference between a Rule 12(c) motion and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that the latter may be filed before an answer to a complaint is filed, whereas a Rule 12(c) motion may be filed "after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial." Id. at 452 n.3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)) (brackets omitted). In all other respects, however, a Rule 12(c) motion is evaluated under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009); Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus, a court, in ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Finch v. Peterson, 622 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2010); Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000). Also, the court must "view the facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." GATX Leasing Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 64 F.3d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir. 1995). To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

In general, a person wishing to sue for unlawful discrimination under the ADEA and Title VII must first exhaust administrative remedies by filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 202 F.3d 913, 920 (7th Cir. 2000); Cheek v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994). The IHRA also requires exhaustion of administrative remedies as a predicate to seeking judicial review of a final order of the Illinois Human Rights Commission ("IHRC") concerning a charge of discrimination. See 775 ILCS 5/8-111; Talley v. Washington Inventory Serv., 37 F.3d 310, 312-13 (7th Cir. 1994); Mein v. Masonite Corp., 485 N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ill. 1985). The requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under the ADEA and Title VII is not jurisdictional. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982); Stearns v. Consolidated Mgmt., Inc., 747 F.2d 1105, 1111 (7th Cir. 1984). However, the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies in IHRA cases is deemed to be jurisdictional. See Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 602 (7th Cir. 2006); Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 458-59 (7th Cir. 1994). The purpose of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before bringing suit under the ADEA or Title VII is to provide notice to a party claimed to have acted in violation of the statutes and to afford that party an opportunity to participate in conciliation in an effort to comply voluntarily with the statutory requirements. See Bright v. Roadway Servs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 693, 696 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (citing Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 905 (7th Cir. 1981)). Similarly, requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in the IHRA context serves several purposes, including: allowing the administrative agency to develop fully and consider the facts of the cause before it; allowing the agency to utilize its expertise; allowing the aggrieved party ultimately to succeed before the agency, making judicialreview unnecessary; protecting agency processes from impairment by avoidable interruptions; allowing the agency to correct its own errors; and conserving valuable judicial time by avoiding piecemeal appeals. See Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 547 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ill. 1989).

In their motion for judgment on the pleadings, GCIHC and Sorenson seek dismissal of Sorenson from this action, as well as dismissal of Wierciszewski's retaliation claims under the ADEA and Title VII and her claims under the IHRA for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Concerning Sorenson, then, the parties agree that he is not a proper party to this case. The Court concurs. First, Sorenson was never named as a respondent in the discrimination charges Wierciszewski filed with the EEOC and, in general, a party not named as a respondent in an EEOC charge may not be sued under the ADEA or Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1991); Secrist v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 926 F. Supp. 823, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1996). Second, there is no individual supervisory liability under the ADEA, Title VII, or the IHRA. See Sattar v. Motorola, 138 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir. 1998); Thelen v. Marc's Big Boy Corp., 64 F.3d 264, 267 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995); Washington v. University of Ill. at Chicago, No. 09 C 5691, 2010 WL 1417000, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2010); In re Kuna-Jacob &Roesch, Charge No. 2006 SF 3501, 2009 WL 2382456, at *5 (Ill. Human Rights Comm'n Mar. 17, 2009) (citing 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A)). Finally, Wierciszewski's complaint is devoid of substantive allegations of wrongdoing by Sorenson, and "[a] plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant [merely] by including the defendant's name in the caption" of a complaint. Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). Sorenson will be dismissed from this action.

With respect to Wierciszewski's claims under the IHRA, the Court agrees with GCIHC and Sorenson that these claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In general, courts cannot entertain IHRA claims directly and may only conduct review of a final order of the IHRC. See 775 ILCS 5/8-111(B); Garcia v. Village of Mount Prospect, 360 F.3d 630, 640 & n.10 (7th Cir. 2004); Shah v. Inter-Continental Hotel Chicago Operating Corp., 314 F.3d 278, 281-82 (7th Cir. 2002); Cavalieri-Conway v. L. Butterman & Assocs., 992 F. Supp. 995, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Furthermore, while it is the case, as already has been noted, that the IDHR has consented to receive charges of employment discrimination on behalf of the EEOC, a...