Wierson v. State

903 S.E.2d 792

WIERSON

v.The STATE.

The State

v.Wierson.

A24A0241

A24A0242

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 25, 2024

Sherry Boston, Decatur, Thomas L. Williams, Joshua Mark Geller, for Appellant in A24A0242.

Robert G. Rubin, Decatur, Kristen Wright Novay, Atlanta, for Appellee in A24A0242.

Robert G. Rubin, Decatur, Kristen Wright Novay, Atlanta, for Appellant in A24A0241.

Sherry Boston, Decatur, Thomas L. Williams, for Appellee in A24A0241.

Brown, Judge.

[1–3] In 2019, Michelle Wierson was charged by indictment with first degree vehicular homicide, reckless driving, and battery. After Wierson filed a notice of intent to raise the issue of insanity, the State filed three pretrial motions, two of which are the subject of these appeals. In Case No. A24A0241, Wierson appeals from the trial court’s order granting the State’s motion to present evidence that Wierson was allegedly noncompliant with her prescribed medication in order to argue that her insanity was "selfinduced." In Case No. A24A0242, the State cross-appeals the trial court’s order allowing Wierson to present an insanity defense to the strict liability offenses of reckless driving and vehicular homicide. For the reasons ex- plained below, we reverse in Case No. A24A0241 and affirm in Case No. A24A0242.

On appeal from a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress or a motion in limine, we may consider all relevant and admissible evidence of record introduced at the motion hearing or during trial. While a trial court’s findings as to disputed facts will be reviewed to determine whether the ruling was clearly erroneous, where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review. Furthermore, even if the trial court’s asserted ground for denying a motion to suppress or motion in limine is erroneous, we will affirm the ruling if it is right for any reason.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Finding v. State, 327 Ga. App. 346, 348 (1), 759 S.E.2d 67 (2014). See also State v. Hill, 361 Ga. App. 230, 231, 863 S.E.2d 699 (2021) (an appellate court reviews the trial court’s decisions on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion).

The indictment alleges that on September 27, 2018, Wierson drove a motor vehicle at an excessive speed and caused the death of a child in another vehicle. The battery charge is predicated on Wierson allegedly scratching an off-duty police officer who tried to assist on the scene. It is undisputed that Wierson previously was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was prescribed medication, and that at the time of the collision, Wierson was rushing to her daughter’s school in the belief that her daughter was in danger.

Wierson filed a "Notice of Intention of Defense to Raise Issue of Insanity." See Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1 and 31.5. Following this notice, the trial court granted the State’s motion for an independent psychological evaluation pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-130.1.¹ Both the court-appointed expert and the expert retained by the defense concluded that at the time of the crash, Wierson, because of her mental illness, did not have the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to the alleged offenses and acted as she did because of a delusional compulsion which overmastered her will to resist committing the alleged acts. In short, both experts opined that Wierson met the two statutory definitions of insanity.

The State filed a "Motion in Limine to Determine Pretrial Admissibility of Medication Noncompliance," asking that it be allowed to present evidence that Wierson was noncompliant with her prescribed medications and to argue that her noncompliance should be a factor considered in determining criminal responsibility. The State asked that the jury be allowed to consider medication noncompliance "just as if the issue were voluntary intoxication or other voluntary incapacitation." It further asserted that "the jury should be instructed that while the [experts] were not allowed to consider medication non-compliance, the jury is allowed to do so…." The State specifically sought to introduce the following evidence: (1) a note on Wierson’s intake chart at Ridgeview Institute that Wierson’s family member said Wierson had not taken her medication for a period of time leading up to the incident, and (2) a Grady Hospital urinalysis following the incident showing that at least one of Wierson’s prescribed medications was not detectable in her blood.

Simultaneously, the State filed a motion to restrict Wierson from asserting an insanity defense to the charges of reckless driving and vehicular homicide predicated on reckless driving because they are "strict liability" offenses. Based on this argument, the State filed a third motion to sever the battery charge.

Following a hearing on the State’s motions, the trial court issued three orders: an order granting the State’s motion with regard to medication noncompliance; an order denying the State’s motion to preclude Wierson from asserting an insanity defense to the charges of reckless driving and vehicular homicide; and an order granting the State’s motion to sever and try separately the battery charge.

The trial court granted a certificate of immediate review of its first order, and this Court granted Wierson’s application for interlocutory review. The State then filed a crossappeal from the trial court’s second order pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1 (c). In Case No. A24A0241, Wierson appeals the first order, and in Case No. A24A0242, the State appeals the second order.

Case No. A24A0241

Wierson contends that evidence of medication noncompliance² is not relevant to whether she meets the statutory definition of insanity. The State counters that "[t]he trial court correctly found the issue of medication compliance will be relevant to the jury’s determination [of] whether [Wierson’s] delusions were the result of ‘circumstances beyond the actor’s control or if they were selfinduced.’ "³

[4] Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." OCGA § 24-4-401. "Although this relevance standard is a liberal one, it is not meaningless or without boundaries. Any evidence that fails to meet this standard will be barred by OCGA § 24-4-402 … which provides, without exception, that ‘evidence which is not relevant shall not be admissible.’ " (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McIver v. State, 314 Ga. 109, 145 (3) (a), 875 S.E.2d 810 (2022). Thus, "evidence that does not bear directly or indirectly on the questions being tried should be excluded as irrelevant." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Saulsbury, 286 Ga. App. 322, 325 (2), 649 S.E.2d 344 (2007). Accord Mark v. Agerter, 332 Ga. App. 879, 775 S.E.2d 235 (2015). We should "begin our analysis of this [evidence] by identifying the ‘fact that is of consequence’ under [OCGA § 24-4-401]." Martinez-Arias v. State, 313 Ga. 276, 285 (3), 869 S.E.2d 501 (2022).

According to the trial court’s order, the State "indicated that it does not intend to call an expert to rebut" the experts’ findings that Wierson met the two statutory definitions of insanity. In granting the State’s motion to introduce evidence of Wierson’s alleged medication noncompliance, the trial court reasoned:

[I]t is clear that there is likely to be evidence that the Defendant may have brought about the mental health episode and delusions through a willful failure to adhere to her medication regimen. Further, the Defense has already secured evidence to rebut the State’s claims of noncompliance…. Any evidence of medication noncompliance or compliance by either the State or Defense is relevant to the question of whether the Defendant’s mental health episode and delusions were brought upon by circumstances beyond the actor’s control or if they were selfinduced. Having found that the evidence is relevant, the [c]ourt further finds that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

In other words, the trial court considered only whether evidence of Wierson’s medication noncompliance was relevant to the question of whether Wierson’s insanity was self-induced.

For the first time on appeal, the State asserts that "[e]vidence of medication non-compliance will be highly probative to the jury’s inquiry into [Wierson’s] state of mind at the time of the collision" and relevant to Wierson’s intent in connection with the charges against her. Thus, there are two potential facts of consequence at issue in this case: (1) whether Wierson’s delusional compulsion or mental incapacity was "self-induced" and (2) Wierson’s intent. We address each in turn.

(a) Whether Wierson’s delusional compulsion or mental incapacity was "self-induced."

[5] Georgia law recognizes two insanity defenses, codified in OCGA §§ 16-3-2 and 16-3-3. See OCGA § 17-7-131 (a) (1) (defining "[i]nsane at the time of the crime" as "meet- ing the criteria of Code Section 16-3-2 or 16-3-3"); In the interest of T. B., 313 Ga. 846, 849 (2), 874 S.E.2d 101 (2022). The former recognizes an insanity defense based on mental incapacity, providing:

A person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person did not have mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act, omission, or negligence.

The latter recognizes an insanity defense based on delusional compulsion, providing:

A person shall not be found guilty of a crime when, at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person, because of mental disease, injury, or congenital deficiency, acted as he did because of a delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his will to resist committing the

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