Wierzbicki v. City of Jersey City

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants City of Jersey City (“JC”), Jersey City Police Department (“JCPD”), Ameer Alateek (“Alateek”), Humberto Portuondo (“Portuondo”), and Joseph Larkins (“Larkins”) (collectively, “Defendants”) seeking to dismiss Plaintiff Miroslaw Wierzbicki's (“Wierzbicki”) Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 40.) Wierzbicki opposed the motion. (ECF No. 41.) Defendants replied. (ECF No. 42.) Having reviewed the submissions filed in connection with the motion and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause appearing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Background

For the purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the Court “accept[s] as true all factual allegations in the [Second Amended Complaint] and draw all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to” Wierzbicki. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F.3d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 2003)). Furthermore,

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the Court also considers any “document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996)).

The factual details of this dispute are explained in this Court's Opinion dated May 7, 2021 (the “May Opinion”) (ECF No. 15), ^[1] which the Court incorporates by reference. The dispute stems from an alleged incident that occurred on September 8, 2017, at around 12 pm (the “Incident”), in which several police officers injured Wierzbicki, who was riding his bicycle on Martin Luther King Boulevard in Jersey City, New Jersey. (Id. at 2.) The May Opinion dismissed Wierzbicki's original Complaint without prejudice. (Id. at 1.)

On January 26, 2021, Wierzbicki filed the Second Amended Complaint, asserting claims under: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jersey City Police Officers Alateek, Portuondo, and Larkins (collectively, the “Officer Defendants”) in Count I, against JC in Count II, and against JCPD in Count III; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 in Count IV;^[2] (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1986 in Count V; (4) the New Jersey Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-1 et seq.,

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against all Defendants in Count VI and against JC in Count VII; (5) New Jersey common law for assault and battery in Count VIII; (6) New Jersey common law for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Count IX; and (7) New Jersey common law for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention against JC and JCPD in Count X. (ECF No. 34.) On April 28, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 40.) Wierzbicki opposed the motion (ECF No. 41), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 42).

II. Legal Standard

“[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). However, the plaintiff's “obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286 (citations omitted). Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the complaint are true, those “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged.” Id. This “plausibility standard” requires the complaint to allege “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully, ” but it “is not akin to a

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probability requirement.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Detailed factual allegations” are not required, but “more than an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation” must be pled; it must include “further factual enhancement” and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). However, courts are “not compelled to accept ‘unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, '” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Schuylkill Energy Res. Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997)), nor “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286 (citations omitted).

While, as a general rule, the court may not consider anything beyond the four corners of the complaint on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Third Circuit has held that “a court may consider certain narrowly defined types of material without converting the motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion, including items that are integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” Coulter v. Doerr, 486 Fed.Appx. 227, 228 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999)).

III. Decision

As a threshold matter, the Court finds a separate analysis for some of Wierzbicki's state claims could be unnecessary. First, the NJCRA “mirrors § 1983 and ‘creates a private cause of action for violations of civil rights secured under the New Jersey Constitution.'” Conte v. Goodwin,

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Civ. A. No. 19-8333, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8618, at *29 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2021) (citations omitted). “The analysis under § 1983 for alleged violations of the United States Constitution is the same as the analysis under the NJCRA for alleged violations of the New Jersey Constitution.” Panarello v. City of Vineland, 160 F.Supp.3d 734, 747 (D.N.J. 2016) (citations omitted). Therefore, “the Court's analysis on the § 1983 claims applies to plaintiff's claims under the NJCRA.” Monroe v. City of Hoboken, Civ. A. No. 11-2556, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50096, at *31 (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2012). Second, “because [§] 1986 is expressly conditioned upon the existence of a [§] 1985 conspiracy which is about to occur, ” “[t]he failure to establish any right to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 justifies the dismissal of the dependent cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1986.” Perry v. Bernardin, Civ. A. No. 04-6102, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18115, at *20 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2005) (citations omitted). Third, a “plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 depend on the success of [his] claim under [§] 1983.” Reynolds v. Atl. City Convention Ctr. Auth., Civ. A. No. 88-4232, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17016, at *57-58 (D.N.J. May 21, 1990); see also Nanya-Nashut ex rel. Hand v. Centex Home Equity Corp., Civ. A. No. 03-3661, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25174, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2003) (“[T]he absence of a section 1983 deprivation of rights precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim predicated on the same allegations. . . . Without a properly pled claim under § 1985, a plaintiff cannot bring a § 1986 claim.” (citations omitted)). Therefore, if Wierzbicki's § 1983 claim against a Defendant is inviable, his § 1985, § 1986, and NJCRA claims against that Defendant must also fail. Moreover, if Wierzbicki's § 1985 claim against a Defendant is inviable, his § 1986 claim against that Defendant must also fail.

A. Wierzbicki's Claims Against JCPD Are Inviable

Defendants maintain JCPD has no independent existence as an entity that can sue or be sued. (ECF No. 40-1 at 23.) Defendants argue JCPD must be dismissed as a defendant, because a

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suit against the police department should be regarded as a suit against JC. (Id.) The Court agrees.

“A police department, and similarly a unit within a police department, are not proper parties to a § 1983 action because they are merely sub-units of government that are not distinct from the municipality of which they are a part.” McIntosh v. Atl. City Police Dep't, Civ. A. No. 19-9889, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175938, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2019) (citing Jackson v. City of Erie Police Dep't, 570 Fed.Appx. 112, 114 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014)); see also McGovern v. City of Jersey City, Civ. A. No. 98-5186, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38644, at *23 n.4 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2005) (“In Section 1983 actions, police departments cannot be sued in conjunction with municipalities, because the police department is merely an administrative arm of the local municipality, and is not a separate judicial entity.” (quoting DeBellis v. Kulp, 166 F.Supp.2d 255, 264 (E.D. Pa. 2001))). Here, JC is already a Defendant for Wierzbicki's § 1983, § 1985, §...