Wiggins v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 15 C 02769

LORENZO WIGGINS, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY d/b/a AT&T Illinois, Defendant.

No. 15 C 02769

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

October 22, 2015

Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Lorenzo Wiggins brings claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL), 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq., alleging that his employer, Illinois Bell Telephone Company, did not pay him overtime compensation for the time that he worked before his shift started each day and for the time that he worked during what should have been his lunch breaks.¹ Wiggins seeks damages going back to September 6, 2008, arguing that a prior case, litigated initially as an FLSA collective action and as a proposed IMWL class action, tolled the statute of limitations on his claims. Illinois Bell moved to dismiss all claims before February 28, 2011, countering that tolling does not apply because the scope of the claims in this lawsuit exceeds the scope of the claims in theprior action. The Court denies Illinois Bell's motion in part and grants it in part. The statute of limitations is tolled for all of Wiggins's unpaid lunch-hour claims—regardless of the type of work allegedly performed—and these claims extend back to September 6, 2008 at the earliest. Illinois Bell's motion is thus denied as to these lunch claims. The statute of limitations is not tolled, however, for Wiggins's pre-shift work claims, because the claims do not share a common factual basis with the prior action. Thus, Illinois Bell's motion is granted on these pre-shift claims, which extend back to February 28, 2011 at the earliest.

II. Background

Lorenzo Wiggins worked as a technician and hourly employee for Illinois Bell. R. 4, Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 9. He alleges that Illinois Bell did not pay him overtime for work that he performed before he started his shift every morning and during lunch. Id. ¶¶ 9-28. On a typical workday, Wiggins reported to a garage in the morning before heading out to his assigned tasks. Id. ¶¶ 10, 17. Wiggins did not punch a time clock when he arrived at the garage in the morning; rather, employees only reported the time that they spent on each discrete task during the day. Id. ¶¶ 13, 16. When he was at the garage before each shift's start, Wiggins was required to prepare his truck and meet with supervisors and coworkers about his assigned jobs for the day. Id. ¶¶ 18-20. Wiggins alleges that he was not paid overtime for the fifteen minutes he spent every morning on these planning tasks, as his shift would not formally start until shortly before leaving the garage. Id. ¶¶ 13, 17, 20.

Wiggins also alleges that he often worked through lunch. Id. ¶¶ 21-28. During his half-hour break, he had to either complete on-the-job training under a senior technician or drive between job sites. Id. ¶¶ 22, 26. Despite working during his lunch breaks, Illinois Bell automatically deducted a half hour for lunch every day and did not provide a code to report work completed during lunch. Id. ¶¶ 27-28.

Also relevant to this case is an extensive series of events that predated Wiggins's filing of his amended complaint. In January 2011, several Illinois Bell employees filed an FLSA collective action and an IMWL class action in this district in a case called Blakes. Am. Compl. ¶ 2; R. 11, Def.'s Br. at 1-2 (citing Blakes v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 1:11-cv-000336). Blakes involved cable splicers' allegations of unpaid overtime for working during lunch and after their shifts concluded. Def.'s Br., Exh. A, Blakes Compl. On September 6, 2011, Wiggins filed his opt-in consent to the FLSA collective action in Blakes. Am. Compl. ¶ 4; Def.'s Br. at 3. On December 17, 2013, after more discovery and litigation in the case, Judge Kim decertified the collective action as to several claims, Blakes v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 2013 WL 6662831, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2013), but stayed the decertification order until February 28, 2014 to give plaintiffs time to file individual lawsuits, Def.'s Br. at 3 (citing Blakes, R. 239). On February 28, 2014, Wiggins and dozens of other plaintiffs filed their individual FLSA and IMWL claims in Tinoco v. Ill. Bell. Tel. Co., 1:14-cv-01456. Def.'s Br. at 3. On March 24, 2015, Judge Castillo severed the plaintiffs' misjoined claims, permitting plaintiffs to file individual actions by July 30, 2015. Id.(citing Tinoco, R. 147). Wiggins then filed his amended complaint in this case on July 29, 2015. R. 4.

At issue now is whether the original Blakes action tolls the statute of limitations in Wiggins's current case. The FLSA provides a two-year statute of limitations for ordinary claims and a three-year limitations period for willful violations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). The IMWL has a three-year limitations period for all claims. 820 ILCS 105/12(a). The parties agree that Wiggins originally filed this action on February 28, 2014, the date of the first Tinoco complaint. Am. Compl. ¶ 4; Def.'s Br. at 5. Ordinarily, it would be untimely for Wiggins to bring any claims before February 28, 2012 for non-willful FLSA violations, or before February 28, 2011 for willful FLSA violations and for any IMWL violations. Def.'s Br. at 5. But because of the original Blakes action, Wiggins now argues that his "FLSA claim relates back at least two (2) and potentially three (3) years ... from the date of the filing of his written consent in the Blakes Action, September 6, 2011." Am. Compl. ¶ 4. So according to Wiggins, he can reach back and recover for violations as early as September 6, 2008. R. 14, Pl.'s Resp. at 4. Illinois Bell does not dispute that a collective or class action might toll statutes of limitations in later-brought individual cases. Instead, it argues that tolling does not apply in this case because Wiggins's current claims were never part of the original Blakes action. Def.'s Br. at 6. It is on this basis that Illinois Bell filed this motion to dismiss all claims predating February 28, 2011. R. 10.

III. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (citation and quotations omitted). The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule "reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to 'focus litigation on the merits of a claim' rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court." Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).

"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). "[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). These allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And the allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

IV. Analysis

1. Propriety of Motion to Dismiss

As an initial matter, Wiggins argues that "[d]ismissing a complaint as untimely is unusual because a plaintiff need not plead to overcome the statute of limitations affirmative defense." Pl.'s Resp. at 2. It is true that "plaintiffs need not anticipate and attempt to plead around all potential defenses." Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004). And "[s]tatute of limitations defenses are frequently inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss because their application often depends upon factual determinations." Spann v. Cmty. Bank of N. Virginia, 2004 WL 691785, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2004). The Court also acknowledges that judges in this district have denied motions to dismiss (where Illinois Bell made similar arguments) in other cases arising from the Blakes/Tinoco progeny. See Howard v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 1:15-cv-02720, R. 13 (denying Illinois Bell's motion to dismiss because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense not suited for 12(b)(6) resolution); Wright v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 1:15-cv-02770, R. 14 (same).

The Court could do the same here, but it is also appropriate to address an affirmative defense in a motion to dismiss when "the Complaint so thoroughly anticipated" the defense. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 588 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Plaintiffs here chose to anticipate the [ERISA safe harbor] defense in their Complaint explicitly and thus put it in play"); see also, e.g., Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008) ("a party may plead itself out of court bypleading facts that establish an impenetrable defense to its claims."). In Spann, the court addressed the tolling effect of a prior class action in a motion to dismiss because "[i]f a plaintiff alleges facts that show that his action is time-barred, however, he may plead himself out of court." 2004 WL 691785, at *2. Similarly, here, Wiggins chose to anticipate the statute of limitations defense in his amended complaint and thus put it at issue when he alleged that

This lawsuit was initially filed on February 28, 2014, prior to the effective date of decertification in the Blakes action.

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