Wiggins v. Quesenberry

222 F.Supp.3d 490

Andre L. WIGGINS, Plaintiff,

v.Special Officer QUESENBERRY and Officer Marc A. Ramirez, Defendants.

Civil No. 4:16cv34

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Newport News Division .

Signed December 6, 2016

James S. Ellenson, Elizabeth N. Culpepper, for Plaintiff.

Bradley D. Reeser, for Defendant Quesenberry.

Alan B. Rashkind, James A. Cales, III, for Defendant Ramirez.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Mark S. Davis, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Officer Marc A. Ramirez, ECF No. 15, and a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Special Officer Quesenberry, ECF No. 18. In his Second Amended Complaint,¹ Plaintiff Andre L. Wiggins alleges that Defendants² violated his constitutional rights when Defendant Ramirez used excessive force in searching his person. 2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 27. Plaintiff alleges, as to both Defendant Ramirez and Defendant Quesenberry, two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (one claim under the Fourth Amendment and, alternatively, one claim under the Fourteenth Amendment) and one claim of gross negligence under Virginia law. Id. at ¶¶ 39–40. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Ramirez committed the Virginia common law tort of assault and battery. Id. at ¶ 42(b). Plaintiff seeks ten million dollars ($10,000,00.00) as compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7.

I.

Plaintiff Andrew L. Wiggins is a resident of Hampton, Virginia. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 1. At all relevant times, Defendant Quesenberry and Defendant Ramirez were police officers employed by the City of Hampton. Id. at ¶¶ 4–5. The facts, as alleged by Plaintiff and assumed to be true for the purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Montgomery Cty. , 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012), show the following.

On May 14, 2015, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police on suspicion that the driver was operating the vehicle with a suspended license. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–9. Sergeant Snyder, Defendant Quesenberry, and Defendant Ramirez responded to the scene. Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff was moved to the rear of the vehicle while the officers investigated the driver. Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff was "chatting amiably" with Sergeant Snyder in the back of the vehicle when, according to Plaintiff, Defendant Ramirez "yanked" Plaintiff out of the vehicle "by the crotch," id. at ¶¶ 11–12, causing Plaintiff "a lasting groin injury," id. at ¶ 13.

Defendant Ramirez then handcuffed Plaintiff's hands behind Plaintiff's back in order to search him. Id. at ¶ 17. While Plaintiff was handcuffed, Defendant Ramirez placed Plaintiff against the vehicle door and "ripped [Plaintiff's] foot from the ground" in order to search inside Plaintiff's boot. Id. at ¶¶ 18–19. Plaintiff "repeatedly" told Defendant Ramirez "not to let him fall." Id. at ¶ 20. At some point, Plaintiff fell to the pavement. Id. at ¶ 21. This fall resulted in a mandibular fracture of Plaintiff's jaw and "other injuries," including the loss of several teeth. Id. at ¶¶ 21–22. Plaintiff had multiple surgeries to treat these injuries and "had his jaw wired shut for weeks at a time on three separate occasions." Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff's total medical costs have been over one hundred and thirty thousand dollars, with additional bills and procedures still pending. Id. at ¶ 23.

Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on May 13, 2016, alleging a Section 1983 claim as to all defendants for a violation of his constitutional rights grounded in Defendant Ramirez's use of excessive force (under the Fourth Amendment, and alternatively, under the Fourteenth Amendment), a Virginia law claim of gross negligence as to all defendants, and a claim against Defendant Ramirez for assault and battery under Virginia law.³ See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Defendant Ramirez filed an answer on June 21, 2016. ECF No. 4. On June 22, 2016, Defendant Quesenberry⁴ filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 11. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint under Rule 15(a) on July 1, 2016. ECF No. 13.

On July 13, 2016, Defendant Ramirez filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), ECF No. 15, and filed an answer to the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 17. On July 15, 2016, Defendant Quesenberry filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule (12) (b) (6). ECF No. 18. On July 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint a second time and filed a response to the pending motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 22–23. Defendant Quesenberry filed a rebuttal brief on July 28, 2016. ECF No. 24. On August 8, 2016, the Court granted the motion for leave to amend and ordered the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, with all of Defendants' previous pleadings deemed responsive to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 26. The Second Amended Complaint was filed the same day. ECF No. 27. Thus, before the Court is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Ramirez, ECF No. 15, and the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Quesenberry, ECF No. 18. Having been fully briefed, this matter is ripe for review.

II.

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2). A motion to dismiss may be granted when a complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Though a complaint need not be detailed, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The plausibility requirement is "not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility" that a defendant is liable. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In other words, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint without resolving factual disputes, and a district court " ‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint’ and ‘draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.’ " Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep't , 684 F.3d at 467 (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc. , 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) ). Accordingly, " ‘Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations.’ " Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) ) (omission in original). A complaint may therefore survive a motion to dismiss "even if it appears ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’ " Id. (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) ).

Finally, although the truth of the facts alleged is presumed, district courts are not bound by the "legal conclusions drawn from the facts" and "need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship , 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must include ‘more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.’ " Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC , 781 F.3d 693, 709 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

III.

Plaintiff alleges two main claims: first, a claim under Section 1983 alleging that Defendants' use of excessive force violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment or alternatively his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment,⁵ and second, a claim under Virginia law alleging that the Defendants' gross negligence caused his injuries. Defendant Ramirez moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim, arguing that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff's claim may only arise under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment. Def. Ramirez Opening Br. 3–5, ECF No. 16. Defendant Quesenberry moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible claim for excessive force because Defendant Ramirez's actions were objectively reasonable, and further arguing that Plaintiff has not sufficiently stated a claim against Defendant Quesenberry for bystander or supervisory liability. Def. Quesenberry Opening Br. 11, 14–17, ECF No. 19. Finally, Defendant Quesenberry argues that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to support a claim for gross negligence under Virginia law. Id. at 19–21. The Court will address each argument in turn.

A.

In his motion to dismiss, Defendant Ramirez argues that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff's claim may only arise under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

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