Wilcox v. Wheatley

342 Mich.App. 551

995 N.W.2d 594

Steven J. WILCOX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Damian WHEATLEY, Ronald Allen Smith, Vincent Ovalle, and Michael Scott Barber, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 358630

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted August 2, 2022, at Lansing.

Decided August 11, 2022, 9:05 a.m.

Steven J. Wilcox in propria persona.

Before: Swartzle, P.J., and Ronayne Krause and Garrett, JJ.

Garrett, J. Plaintiff Steven Wilcox, a prisoner at Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility, alleges that defendants, four other prisoners, conspired to steal $500 worth of property from his cell. The trial court dismissed Wilcox's complaint because he failed to state whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies, as required by Michigan's prison litigation reform act (PLRA), MCL 600.5501 et seq. , for any "action concerning prison conditions." See MCL 600.5503(1). The PLRA defines this type of action as "any civil proceeding seeking damages or equitable relief arising with respect to any conditions of confinement or the effects of an act or omission of government officials, employees, or agents in the performance of their duties ...." MCL 660.5531(a). Wilcox alleges no "act or omission" by any government officials. Thus, the question here is whether Wilcox's complaint constitutes a civil proceeding involving "conditions of confinement."

We hold that the plain language of this phrase, informed by its ordinary meaning and its consistent usage under federal law, shows that a purely private tort lawsuit between prisoners is not a civil proceeding arising with respect to "conditions of confinement." Therefore, Wilcox's lawsuit was not an "action concerning prison conditions" and was not subject to the PLRA's administrative-exhaustion requirement. Because the trial court erred by dismissing Wilcox's complaint on that basis, we reverse and remand.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 26, 2021, Wilcox sued his fellow inmates, Damian Wheatley, Ronald Smith, and Vincent Ovalle, for civil conspiracy, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Soon after, Wilcox amended his complaint to add another inmate, Michael Barber, as a defendant and to add a count for statutory conversion. Wilcox's complaint alleges that on April 12, 2021, Ovalle crept up behind him and began to repeatedly punch him. According to Wilcox, while Ovalle was attacking him, Smith stole Wilcox's personal property from his cell. Wilcox also alleges that Wheatley and Barber recruited Ovalle to attack Wilcox to allow Smith to commit this theft.

Without holding a hearing or receiving a motion to dismiss, the trial court sua sponte ordered the dismissal of Wilcox's complaint without prejudice. The trial court noted that MCL 600.5503(1) required a prisoner to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing an action concerning prison conditions, yet Wilcox's complaint mentioned nothing about pursuing administrative remedies. Wilcox moved for reconsideration, arguing in part that his lawsuit was not a "civil action concerning prison conditions" because it could not be reasonably construed as a "conditions of confinement" case without any allegation of state action. The trial court denied his motion, stating that Wilcox's complaint "addresse[d] unsatisfactory conditions of confinement" because his allegations involve acts that occurred while Wilcox and the named defendants were incarcerated. Thus, the trial court explained, Wilcox must exhaust all administrative remedies before commencing his lawsuit. This appeal as of right followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The trial court cited no court rule in its order dismissing Wilcox's complaint, but we construe the trial court's order as relying on MCR 2.116(I)(1). Under this rule, a trial court may grant summary disposition sua sponte " ‘[i]f the pleadings show that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]’ " Al-Maliki v LaGrant , 286 Mich App 483, 485, 781 N.W.2d 853 (2009) (first alteration in original), quoting MCR 2.116(I)(1). ¹ We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1). AK Steel Holding Corp. v. Dep't Of Treasury , 314 Mich.App. 453, 462, 887 N.W.2d 209 (2016). We also review de novo issues of statutory interpretation and application.

Anderson v. Myers , 268 Mich.App. 713, 714, 709 N.W.2d 171 (2005). "De novo review means that we review the legal issue independently" and without deference to the trial court. Genesee Cnty Drain Comm'r v Genesee Cnty , 504 Mich 410, 417, 934 NW2d 805 (2019).

III. APPLICABILITY OF THE PLRA

Wilcox argues that he was not required to exhaust all administrative remedies because the PLRA did not apply to his lawsuit.

The PLRA "sets forth certain requirements that apply when a ‘prisoner’ brings a ‘civil action concerning prison conditions.’ " Anderson , 268 Mich App at 715, 709 N.W.2d 171 (citations omitted). One of those requirements is that "[a] prisoner shall not file an action concerning prison conditions until the prisoner has exhausted all available administrative remedies." MCL 600.5503(1). In this case, the trial court dismissed Wilcox's complaint because it found that he failed to plead that he had pursued available administrative remedies. Wilcox argues that MCL 600.5503(1) does not apply because his action is not an action concerning prison conditions.

MCL 600.5531(a) defines "civil action concerning prison conditions" as

any civil proceeding seeking damages or equitable relief arising with respect to any conditions of confinement or the effects of an act or omission of government officials, employees, or agents in the performance of their duties, but does not include proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison, or parole appeals or major misconduct appeals[.] ^{[2 ]}

This definition is in the disjunctive. Anderson , 268 Mich App at 716 n 1, 709 N.W.2d 171. Under this definition, a civil action concerns prison conditions if either of the following is true: (1) the action relates to the conditions of confinement; or (2) the action relates to the effects of the acts or omissions of a government agent, i.e., a prison official, in the performance of their duties. Wilcox's complaint makes no allegations involving acts or omissions by government officials and purely involves claims about conduct by his fellow inmates. Thus, Wilcox's suit does not arise with respect to "the effects of an act or omission of government officials, employees, or agents in the performance of their duties ...." MCL 600.5531(a). Therefore, whether Wilcox's lawsuit constitutes a "civil action concerning prison conditions" depends on whether the lawsuit arises with respect to any "conditions of confinement." ³

"Our fundamental obligation when interpreting a statute is to discern the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute." Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc , 482 Mich. 269, 275, 753 N.W.2d 207 (2008). In doing so, "we give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme." Anderson , 268 Mich App at 714-715, 709 N.W.2d 171. When a statutory term is undefined, we may turn to dictionaries to help determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. Brackett , 482 Mich. at 276, 753 N.W.2d 207. "Consulting a lay dictionary is proper when defining common words or phrases that lack a unique legal meaning, but when the statutory term is a legal term of art, the term must be construed in accordance with its peculiar and appropriate legal meaning." Farris v McKaig , 324 Mich App 349, 354, 920 N.W.2d 377 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The PLRA does not define the phrase "conditions of confinement," nor has any caselaw from our courts offered a definition. ⁴ Therefore, we turn first to dictionary definitions for guidance. "Conditions of confinement" does not appear to be a legal term of art, given that Black's Law Dictionary does not define it. See also Jenkins v. Haubert , 179 F3d 19, 28 (CA2, 1999) (" ‘Conditions of confinement’ is not a term of art; it has a plain meaning."). Piecing a lay definition of "condition" together with "confinement" unfortunately leaves us in no better place. "Conditions" in this context are defined as "attendant circumstances." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). And an "attendant circumstance," itself a legal phrase, is a "fact that is situationally relevant to a particular event or occurrence." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed.), p. 306. "Confinement" is the "state of being confined," i.e., to "hold within a location" or "imprison." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.) p. 261. Taken together, we do not believe that a "fact that is situationally relevant to being imprisoned" provides a helpful—if at all accurate—definition of the phrase "conditions of confinement" as it is used in the PLRA.

This definition does not help us determine the scope of the phrase, and if anything, the definition creates more ambiguity than clarity.

To assist us in discerning the plain meaning of an undefined term, we may also consider the context in which the term is used. Chico-Polo v Dep't of Corrections , 299 Mich App 193, 198, 829 N.W.2d 314 (2013). For purposes of our analysis, federal statutes and caselaw using the phrase "conditions of confinement" provide significant context for determining our Legislature's intent when using the same phrase in the PLRA.

The Legislature enacted Michigan's PLRA in 1999. 1999 PA 147. A few years earlier, the United States Congress enacted its own version of the PLRA, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 USC 1997e, which—much like Michigan's version—requires prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit. Jones v Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 202, 127 S Ct 910, 166 L Ed 2d 798 (2007). ⁵ The federal exhaustion...