Wilkes v. Lamont

511 F.Supp.3d 156

Thomas WILKES, et al., on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.Ned LAMONT, Governor, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL CASE NO. 3:20-cv-594 (JCH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed December 18, 2020

Karyl Lee Hall, Virginia Martins Teixeira, Kirk W. Lowry, Connecticut Legal Rights Project, Inc., Middletown, CT, Mark J. Murphy, Steven J. Schwartz, Center for Public Representation, Northampton, MA, Ira Burnim, 1526 Live Oak Drive, Silver Spring, MD, Jennifer Mathis, Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Emily V. Melendez, Henry A. Salton, Laura D. Thurston, Shawn L. Rutchick, Ralph E. Urban, State of Connecticut Office of the Attorney General, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Janet C. Hall, U.S. District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, five people confined in psychiatric hospitals in Connecticut, bring this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, section 1983 of title 42 of the U.S. Code, and section 2241 of title 28 of the U.S. Code. See Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 10). They seek, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals, various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 25-27 (Prayer for Relief). Plaintiffs allege in their Amended Class Action Complaint and Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the "Amended Complaint") that the defendants, various state officials with authority over the operation of Connecticut's inpatient psychiatric facilities, have not adopted adequate measures to protect plaintiffs and similarly situated persons from the COVID-19 pandemic. See id. ¶¶ 10-14, 66-88.

Before the court is the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. See Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. No. 32). The defendants ask the court to decline to hear the plaintiffs’ claims on account of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over certain of the plaintiffs’ claims under the doctrine announced in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) (" Colorado River"), and to dismiss the portion of the Amended Complaint seeking a writ of habeas corpus for failure to exhaust state remedies. Id. at 1.

For the reasons below, the Motion to Dismiss is denied in part and granted in part. The portion of the Amended Complaint petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.

II. BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs in this case are five individuals confined at Connecticut Valley Hospital ("CVH") and Whiting Forensic Hospital ("WFH"), two state-operated inpatient psychiatric facilities in Connecticut. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 5-9. Thomas Wilkes, 67 years old, is civilly committed in the Battell Hall 3 South area of CVH. Id. ¶ 5. As of the filing of the Amended Complaint, Mr. Wilkes was in quarantine after experiencing symptoms consistent with COVID-19, and after his roommate tested positive for COVID-19. Id. Barbara Flood, 64 years old, suffers from kidney failure and is civilly committed in the Woodward Hall area of CVH, despite having been assessed as "discharge-ready," because of difficulties in securing dialysis treatment outside CVH. Id. ¶ 6. Vincent Ardizzone, 58 years old, suffers from emphysema and Stage IV prostate cancer and is committed as an acquittee in the Dutcher North 3 area of WFH under section 17a-582 of the Connecticut General Statutes, despite having been approved for temporary leave. Id. 7. Gail Litsky, 53 years old, experiences unspecified health conditions that put her at high-risk for contracting COVID-19 and is committed as an acquittee in the Dutcher North 2 area of WFH under section 17a-582. Id. ¶ 8. Carson Mueller, 45 years old, is committed as an acquittee in the Dutcher South 3 area of WFH under section 17 pro se-582, despite having "been in psychiatric remission for many years." Id. ¶ 9.

Certain features of CVH and WFH present obstacles to implementing precautions for curbing the spread of COVID-19. See id. ¶¶ 18, 20, 43. According to plaintiffs, "[a]lmost all patients on every unit in both CVH and WFH live in close contact with 15-20 other patients and 5-10 staff at any one time." Id. ¶ 43. As of the filing of the Amended Complaint, approximately 209 patients resided in the general psychiatry division of CVH; the Amended Complaint does not report or estimate the total populations of CVH and WFH. See id. ¶ 16.

On March 24, 2020, the Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services ("DMHAS") announced that a staff member at CVH had tested positive for COVID-19. Id. ¶ 33. Two days later, DMHAS announced that a patient at CVH also tested positive. Id. ¶ 34. In the ensuing weeks, COVID-19 spread throughout CVH and WFH. Id. ¶¶ 37-40. By April 28, 2020, there were confirmed COVID-19 cases for patients or staff in every building within CVH and WFH. Id. ¶ 40. Several patients were transferred to Middlesex Hospital on account of the severity of their symptoms. Id.

On April 30, 2020, the outbreak within the hospitals turned lethal when a patient at CVH died from COVID-19. Id. ¶ 41. That same day, plaintiffs commenced this case by filing their initial Complaint. See Compl. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiffs subsequently filed their Amended Complaint on May 7, 2020.¹ See Am. Compl.

In the Amended Complaint, plaintiffs name as defendants Connecticut Governor Ned Lamont, DMHAS Commissioner Miriam E. Delphin-Rittmon, WFH CEO Hal Smith, and CVH CEO Lakisha Hyatt, in their official capacities only. Id. ¶¶ 10-13. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants owe a duty to provide safe conditions at CVH and WFH, and that they have violated this duty by failing to take sufficient measures to protect plaintiffs and other patients from COVID-19. Id. ¶ 64.

Count One asserts a claim under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to ensure safe conditions at psychiatric facilities. Id. ¶¶ 65-74 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) ). Counts Two and Three asserted claims for discrimination on the basis of physical or mental impairments under Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. ¶¶ 75-88.

In their Prayer for Relief, plaintiffs seek declarations that defendants have violated plaintiffs’ rights, as well as various forms of injunctive relief. See id. at 25-27 (Prayer for Relief). The types of injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs range from orders directing regular testing of patients and cleaning of facilities, to orders "suspending all commitments for civil patients, competency restoration patients, [Department of Correction] transfers and acquittees" and directing the "[i]mmediate[ ] discharge [of] patients to the most integrated setting wherever possible, and where not possible to do so immediately, [the provision of] temporary placements." Id. Plaintiffs also petition for a writ of habeas corpus ordering the defendants to "release a sufficient number of patients to enable the remaining patients to practice safe social distancing and to enable staff to maintain the hospital[s] in constitutionally safe conditions of confinement." Id.

On June 11, 2020, the defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. See Mot. to Dismiss. The defendants argue that plaintiffs’ request for relief via a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies, that the court should decline to address plaintiffs’ claims at this time on account of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, and that the court should abstain under Colorado River from plaintiffs’ claims pertaining to assessment and discharge. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.’ Mem.") (Doc. No. 33) at 8, 13, 17. Plaintiffs filed their Opposition to defendants’ Motion on July 2, 2020. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pls.’ Opp'n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ("Pls.’ Opp'n") (Doc. No. 47). Subsequently, on July 20, 2020, plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Brief addressing defendants’ arguments concerning exhaustion of state remedies. See Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Pls.’ Opp'n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ("Pls.’ Suppl. Br.") (Doc. No. 62); Order (Doc. No. 61) (granting leave to file). The defendants filed a Reply on July 30, 2020. See Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Suppl. Br. Regarding Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.’ Reply").

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), "[a] case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ... when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ). A plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. When determining whether to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court may consider affidavits. All. for Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2006). A court also "has discretion to hold a hearing to resolve factual disputes that bear on the court's jurisdiction." Saleh v. Sulka Trading, 957 F.3d 348, 353 (2d Cir. 2020). However, a court must otherwise "accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Id.

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id....