Wilkins v. Miss. Dep't of Corr.

DEMARCO WILKINS PLAINTIFF v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 4:17-CV-137-SA-DAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI GREENVILLE DIVISION

June 26, 2020

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Demarco Wilkins filed his Complaint [1] pro se on September 28, 2017, asserting various federal and state law claims against the Mississippi Department of Corrections, Mississippi State Penitentiary, Commissioner Pelicia Hall, Warden Timothy Morris, Superintendent Marshall Turner, and Officers Earnest Lee, Jamile Henry, and Betty Crawford. After retaining legal counsel, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [23] asserting additional claims against the Defendants. Presently before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [54]. The issues are briefed and ripe for review.

Factual and Procedural History

Demarco Wilkins, an inmate in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, alleges that he was approached by members of the Vice Lords gang and was asked to stab a member of their rival gang, the Gangster Disciples. After refusing to assault another prisoner, Wilkins claims that members of the Vice Lords threatened him. Wilkins looked to prison staff for protection: he claimed that he contacted Officer Jamile Henry asking to see the Captain to request protection. Wilkins alleges that Officer Henry responded that she would notify someone. Wilkins asserts that he never received any responses or protection from prison staff.

On the day of the attack, members of the Vice Lords began gathering in front of the zone proximate to Wilkins' cell which was within the view of a security tower that Officer Crawford was assigned to. According to Wilkins, Officer Crawford was not in the tower when a member of the Vice Lords, who also worked as a tier-worker, entered the tier and turned off the zone lights. Wilkins claims that 16 gang members began beating him with a broom stick, kicking, stomping, and burning his body. There were also cuts on his face and neck. The Plaintiff was left unconscious and bloody in his cell. The Plaintiff claims that he was injured due to a lack of protection by the prison staff after he requested help. He claims to have sustained permanent injuries due to the negligence of the Defendants.

Wilkins alleges the following five counts against the Defendants in his Amended Complaint: Inadequate supervision of close custody offenders; Failure to provide proper housing for offenders to prevent escape or injury from; Failure to protect; Negligent, grossly negligent, and wanton failure in hiring and monitor, train, and supervise officers involved; and Violation of federal due process, equal protection, civil rights law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, et. al.

The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss [54] arguing that the Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because the Defendants sued in their official capacity are entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and the claims against the Defendants in their individual capacity are barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The Plaintiff did not file a response to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [54].

Analysis and Discussion

The Defendants move for dismissal based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. (12(b)(1) & (6). As the Fifth Circuit has previously instructed, "when a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, . . . courts must considerthe jurisdictional challenge first." See McCasland v. City of Castroville, Tex., 478 F. Appx. 860 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Morgan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994)). This "prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice." Id. at 860-61 (quoting Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)); Hitt v. City of Pasadena, Tex., 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Accordingly, the Court looks first to the jurisdictional grounds of Wilkins' claims.

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Defendants claim that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because they are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Absent waiver by the state of sovereign immunity or a valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars the institution of a damages action in federal court against a state or state instrumentality. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (citations omitted). "Eleventh Amendment immunity is a jurisdictional issue that cannot be ignored, for a meritorious claim to that immunity deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action." McDonald v. Board of Miss. Levee Comm'rs, 832 F.2d 901, 906 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412, 415 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 570, 88 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1985)). The Fifth Circuit explained in Clay v. Texas Women's University that

the Eleventh Amendment clearly interposes a jurisdictional bar to suits against a state by private parties who seek monetary relief fromthe state in the form of compensatory damages, punitive damages, or monetary awards in the nature of equitable restitution, and also to suits against a state agency or state official when the monied award is to be paid from the state treasury.

728 F.2d 714, 715 (5th Cir.1984).

This immunity "protects not only states from suit in federal court, but also 'arms of the state.'" U.S. Oil Recovery Site Potential Responsible Parties Group v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 898 F.3d 497, 501 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Richards v. S. Univ., 118 F.3d 450, 452-54 (5th Cir. 1997)). Thus, "[t]he state need not be the named party in a federal lawsuit, for a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to any state agency or entity deemed an 'alter ego' or 'arm' of the state." Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the immunity "extends to state officials who are sued in their official capacities because such a suit is actually one against the state itself." Yul Chu v. Mississippi State University, 901. F. Supp. 2d 761, 771 (quoting New Orleans Towing Ass'n, Inc. v. Foster, 248 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 2012)) (additional citations omitted).

i. Arm(s) of the State

Whether the Defendants are entitled to the protections of sovereign immunity depends on whether they are considered an "arm of the state." Courts consider six factors in order to determine whether an entity is an arm of the state and hence entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity: (1) whether the state statutes and case law characterize the agency as an arm of the state; (2) the source of funding for the entity; (3) the degree of local autonomy the entity enjoys; (4) whether the entity is concerned primarily with local rather than state-wide problems; (5) whether the entity has authority to sue and be sued in its own name; and (6) whether the entity has the right to hold and use property. See Raj v. LSU, 714 F.3d 322, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 1991)). "A defendant need notsatisfy all of the factors to benefit from the Eleventh Amendment, and some factors weigh more heavily than others." Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 681-82 (5th Cir. 1999). "No one factor is dispositive, though we have deemed the source of an entity's funding a particularly important factor because a principal goal of the Eleventh Amendment is to protect state treasuries." Perez, 307 F.3d at 327 (citing Hudson, 174 F.3d at 682). To that end, "[a]n entity need not show that all of the factors are satisfied; the factors simply provide guidelines for courts to balance the equities and determine if the suit is really one against the state itself." Id.

The Defendants submit that an application of the six factors proves that MDOC is an arm of the state and is therefore entitled to sovereign immunity. To establish these factors, the Defendants argue that state statute views the MDOC as an arm of the state. Mississippi Code Section 47-5-1 provides that "[i]t shall be the policy of this state that the correctional system shall be operated and managed in the most efficient and economical manner possible. The Mississippi Department of Corrections shall so manage and operate the correctional system in that manner[.]" Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-1. This court in Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc., and other courts alike, found that "MDOC is responsible for managing and operating the correctional system for the State, and thus is an arm of the State." 971 F. Supp. 2d 671, 678 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 2013) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-1); See also Hines v. MDOC, 239 F.3d 366, 2000 WL 1741624, *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2000) (per curiam) (finding that the Mississippi Department of Corrections is a department of the State of Mississippi and enjoys the same immunity as the state itself); Martin v. Streeter, No. 3:11cv20-SA, 2012 WL 5269615, *2 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 24, 2012) (holding that the Mississippi Department of Corrections is an arm of the State of Mississippi); Ladner v. Leamon, No. 2:12cv131-KS, 2012 WL 4507904, *1 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 28, 2012) (stating that MDOC is considered an arm of the State of Mississippi).

In addition, the Defendants assert the following: that the MDOC is funded by the state of Mississippi¹; that MDOC is...