Wilkins v. United States

1

LARRY STEVEN WILKINS and JANE B. STANTON, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

No. CV 18-147-M-DLC

United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division

November 5, 2024

ORDER

Dana L. Christensen, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs Larry Steven Wilkins and Jane B Stanton (“Plaintiffs”) and Defendant United States of America (“the Government”) (Docs. 80 83). For the reasons herein, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the Government.

Factual Background

Although the Court and the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, the Court will restate the key background and procedure here for clarity. In 1962, Plaintiffs Wilkins and Stanton's predecessors-in-interest granted the United States an easement for Robbins Gulch Road. Located off Highway 93, just south of Connor, Montana, Robbins Gulch Road traverses private property for approximately one mile before entering the boundary of the Bitterroot National Forest.^[1]The deed conveyed to the United States a 60-foot easement “for a road as now constructed in place and to be re-constructed, improved, used, operated patrolled, and maintained and known as the Robbins Gulch Road, Project Number 446.” Plaintiffs each acquired their properties in 1991 and 2004, respectively.

Procedural Background

In 2018, Plaintiffs filed this action against the Government under the Quiet Title Act (“QTA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, alleging that the United States Forest Service (“Forest Service”) exceeded the scope of its limited easement by failing to “manage . . . this road in accordance with the intended limited use of the road for U.S. Forest Service administrative purposes” and has instead managed the road in a way that has enabled public access, including posting signs that encourage public use. Plaintiffs also sought to confirm and enforce the Forest Service's obligation to patrol and maintain the road.^[2]

In 2019, the Government moved to dismiss the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the QTA's 12-year statute of limitations. The Court agreed and dismissed the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Wilkins v. United States, 2020 WL 2732251, at *7 (D. Mont. May 26, 2020) (hereinafter “Wilkins I”). The Ninth Circuit affirmed in two bifurcated opinions: first, a memorandum disposition finding that Plaintiffs' claims were time barred; and second, a published disposition upholding the QTA's statute of limitations as jurisdictional. See Wilkins v. United States, 2021 WL 4200563 (9th Cir. 2021); Wilkins v. United States, 13 F.4th 791 (9th Cir. 2021) (overruled by Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152 (2023)). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the second bifurcated issue-whether the 12-year time bar was jurisdictional-and reversed. Wilkins, 598 U.S. at 165. The Supreme Court held that the QTA's statute of limitations was a claims processing rule, not a jurisdictional limitation, and remanded for further proceedings. Id.

Now on remand, the parties seek summary judgment on the issue of whether the Government's easement permits public use on Robbins Gulch Road and the nature of the Forest Service's obligations under the easement. (Docs. 81, 84.)

Legal Standard

A party is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is warranted where the documentary evidence permits only one conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). “The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court.” N.W. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Where parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, “[e]ach motion must be considered on its own merits.” Fair Housing Council of Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must still determine whether disputed issues of material fact exist, and it may not grant summary judgment if there are any genuine issues as to material facts. Id. at 1136.

Discussion

Plaintiffs seek quiet title to confirm the scope of the 1962 easement for Robbins Gulch Road (Count I) and to confirm and enforce the Forest Service's obligations under the 1962 easement (Count II). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2409a; 1346(f). Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on both counts arguing that they have standing under Montana law, the easement is limited in scope, and the Government is equitably estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a defense. (Doc. 81 at 15.) The Government similarly moves for summary judgment on both counts, but counters that Plaintiffs' claims are time barred or, in the alternative, that they fail on the merits. (Doc. 84 at 10, 23.)

I. Plaintiff' Property Interest

The QTA requires that Plaintiffs' Complaint “set forth with particularity the nature of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff claims in the real property, the circumstances under which it was acquired, and the right, title, or interest claimed by the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(d). Plaintiffs must, therefore, “claim a property interest to which title may be quieted.” Long v. Area Manager, Bureau of Reclamation, 236 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 2001). Unless Plaintiffs have met this requirement, the United States' sovereign immunity has not been waived and this case must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mills v. United States, 742 F.3d 400, 406 (9th Cir. 2014).

Here, Plaintiffs maintain that they have a property interest to which title may be quieted because, as owners of land adjacent to Robbins Gulch Road, they are presumed to own to the center of the road under Montana law. See Mont. Code Ann. § 70-16-202. The Court is not aware of, nor do Defendants present, any evidence to overcome this presumption. See McPherson v. Monegan, 187 P.2d 542, 543-45 (Mont. 1947). Plaintiffs have therefore provided competent proof that they have a property interest to which title may be quieted.

II. Whether Plaintiffs' Claims are Time Barred

A. Law of the Case

The Government argues that because Wilkins I and the Ninth Circuit previously determined that the QTA's statute of limitations had expired, reconsideration of this issue is barred by the doctrine of the law of the case. (Doc. 90 at 12.) The doctrine of the law of the case seeks to “promote judicial finality,” United States v. Cote, 51 F.3d 178, 181 (9th Cir. 1995), and as such, “a court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.” Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1993). The doctrine is not a mandatory limitation on a tribunal's power, but rather serves as a guide to judicial discretion. United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997).

As stated above, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Wilkins I's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the QTA's 12-year statute of limitations, and the Supreme Court's decision did not disturb the lower Courts' findings with respect to the time bar. The question therefore becomes whether a finding on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction informs the analysis on cross motions for summary judgment. In Leibel v. City of Buckeye, the court observed that because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 command different standards, denial of a motion to dismiss does not constitute the law of the case for purposes of summary judgment. 556 F.Supp.3d 1042, 1057 (D. Ariz. 2021).

Although Leibel it not precisely on point-it pertains to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and not Rule 12(b)(1)-the Court nonetheless finds it instructive. Like Rule 12(b)(6), motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 are analyzed under different standards. One of these differences is that the court may consider extrinsic evidence when construing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Kingman Reef Atoll Inv., 541 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the prior decisions “do[] not automatically constitute law of the case at this stage.” Leibel, 556 F.Supp.3d at 1057.

Leibel went on to note, however, that a court's prior ruling may be applied as the law of the case where the facts presumed true at the motion to dismiss stage are proven true at summary judgment. Id. at 1057-58. Indeed, when faced with motions for summary judgment on remand, the Ninth Circuit has observed that the law of the case may be applied where the record reveals no new evidence or no dispute of material fact, “the resolution of which might change the law applied by the appellate court.” Pubali Bank v. City Nat. Bank, 777 F.2d 1340, 1342 (9th Cir. 1985). The Court must therefore determine whether Plaintiffs have presented new evidence or whether the facts relied upon at the Rule 12(b)(1) stage are in dispute; if not, Wilkins I and the Ninth Circuit's decision become the law of the case.

B. Wilkins I and the Ninth Circuit's Decision

The QTA's statute of limitations requires Plaintiffs to bring a case “within twelve years of the date upon which [the claims] accrued.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). Accrual occurs “on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States.” Id. In Wilkins I, the Court found that “Plaintiffs' claims likely accrued sometime in the 1970's, [but] at the latest, on May 3 2006,” and were time barred as a result. 2020 WL 2732251, at *9....