William Penn Apartments v. D.C. Court of Appeals

WILLIAM PENN APARTMENTS, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13-178 (RWR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SIGNED: April 14, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff William Penn Apartments ("WPA") brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against D.C. Court of Appeals Judges Phyllis D. Thompson, Corinne A. Beckwith, and Frank Q. Nebeker, and D.C. Superior Court Judges Brook Hedge and Michael L. Rankin ("judicial defendants"), as well as John S. Scherlis and William L. Scherlis ("Scherlis defendants").¹ The defendants move under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for failure to state a claim, and on Younger² abstention grounds. WPA's claim for § 1983 injunctive relief will be dismissed forfailure to state a claim. However, the Rooker-Feldman³ doctrine and Younger abstention do not bar WPA's claim for declaratory relief. Thus, the defendants' motions to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

From 1994 to 2004, defendant John Scherlis leased three apartments from WPA. Compl. ¶ 27. In 2005, WPA brought a suit (the "landlord-tenant case") in D.C. Superior Court against Scherlis for non-payment of rent, obtained a default judgment against him, and evicted him from one of the apartments. Id. ¶¶ 48-54, 67.

In August 2008, the Scherlis defendants filed suit (the "damages case") in D.C. Superior Court against WPA and Cafritz Company, alleging wrongful eviction, negligence, breach of good faith, and trespass, and seeking $18.5 million in damages. Id. ¶ 69. Also, John Scherlis moved to vacate the 2005 default judgment in the landlord-tenant case. Id. ¶ 75. Judge Hedge consolidated the landlord-tenant and damages cases and vacated the 2005 default judgment in the landlord-tenant case. Id. ¶¶ 95, 102. WPA appealed, and the D.C. Court of Appeals sua sponte remanded the case to the trial court. Id. ¶¶ 110, 123. The Court of Appeals' September 9, 2010 order stated that "uponthe entry of the order that resolves all matters in the consolidat[ed cases], if any party remains aggrieved, then they [sic] may file a notice of appeal." Id. ¶ 123 (emphasis omitted). On remand, Judge Hedge granted partial summary judgment to the Scherlis defendants in the damages case. Id. ¶¶ 125-26. WPA filed an application for review of Judge Hedge's grant of partial summary judgment in the damages case, which the D.C. Court of Appeals denied. Id. ¶¶ 131, 135. WPA appealed the order vacating the default judgment in the landlord-tenant case. Id. ¶ 146. Judges Thompson, Beckwith, and Nebeker dismissed the appeal. Id. ¶ 154. WPA moved for reconsideration, which Judges Thompson, Beckwith, and Nebeker denied. Id. ¶ 159. In October 2012, Judge Rankin denied WPA's request to refer the damages litigation to Judge Hedge and ordered the case to proceed. Id. ¶¶ 160, 188.

WPA asserts that procedural and legal errors infected the entire litigation process in the landlord-tenant and damages cases and that the judicial defendants committed multiple due process violations. See id. ¶¶ 113, 136, 143-44, 169. WPA claims that Judge Hedge erred by failing to dismiss the damages case, allowing the Scherlis defendants to move to vacate the default judgment in the landlord-tenant case, and vacating the default judgment in the landlord-tenant case. Id. ¶¶ 166-71. WPA further claims that Judges Thompson, Beckwith, and Nebeker denied WPA due process by declining to hear WPA's interlocutoryappeal of Judge Hedge's order vacating the default judgment in the landlord-tenant case. Id. ¶¶ 174-76. WPA also alleges that Judges Thompson, Beckwith, and Nebeker violated its due process rights by denying its motion for reconsideration. Id. ¶¶ 181-84. Finally, WPA alleges that Judge Rankin denied WPA due process by failing to transfer the damages case to Judge Hedge to "clarify her language for appeal" of her summary judgment order and proceeding with the damages case. Id. ¶¶ 186-88.

WPA brought this suit in federal court seeking a declaration that Judges Thompson, Beckwith, and Nebeker's failure to hear the appeal in the landlord-tenant case deprived WPA of due process and an injunction to prohibit Judge Rankin and the Scherlis defendants from proceeding in the damages case until the D.C. Court of Appeals decides the appeal in the landlord-tenant case. Id. at 35. The defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and (12)(b)(6), contending that WPA's suit is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that the judicial defendants are immune from claims for injunctive relief. Scherlis Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 3-7; Judicial Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. at 7-11. The judicial defendants also argue that Younger abstention precludes federal adjudication. Judicial Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. at 11-13. WPA opposes the defendants' motions arguing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to state court interlocutory decisions, that the judicial defendants are not immune because declaratory relief wasunavailable, and that Younger abstention does not apply because this case does not implicate important state interests. Pl.'s Opp'n to Judicial Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n to Jud. Defs.") at 5-17.

DISCUSSION

I. MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(1)

Jurisdiction is a threshold issue which ordinarily must be addressed before the merits of the case are reached. See Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Walsh v. Hagee, 900 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2012). Rule 12(b)(1) provides that a federal court must dismiss the case when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff bears the burden to establish that jurisdiction is proper. Araya v. Bayly, 875 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). "Faced with motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), a court should first consider the Rule 12(b)(1) motion because once a court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further." Center for Biological Diversity v. Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (3d ed. 2004).

Federal district courts have jurisdiction over civil actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the UnitedStates[,]" 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and over civil actions "to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4). Another statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the highest state courts. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Thus, lower federal courts do not possess jurisdiction to review such appeals even if the plaintiffs allege a constitutional injury. See Hunter v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 698 F. Supp. 2d. 94, 99 (D.D.C. 2010). In addition, "the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine 'prevents lower federal courts from hearing cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court,' . . . and that the doctrine extends to review of District of Columbia courts[.]" Araya, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 3 (quoting Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (citing Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar is limited to "cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced andinviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

Before Exxon Mobil, the D.C. Circuit stated that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred lower federal court review of interlocutory appeals from state courts. Richardson, 83 F.3d at 1514. In Richardson, the plaintiff challenged an order from the D.C. Court of Appeals that temporarily suspended him from the practice of law. Id. He characterized the suspension order as an "interlocutory" order for which federal lower court review was available under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. Although the D.C. Circuit found that the state court proceedings in that case had resulted in a final decision, it opined that

[e]ven if the suspension were not final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the district court would have lacked jurisdiction. We cannot imagine how one could reconcile Feldman's reasoning, based as it is on allowing state courts to arrive at decisions free from collateral federal attack, with the idea that the district court would be free to review Richardson's suspension so long as the decision was interlocutory. Indeed, other circuits have persuasively concluded that the boundaries of § 1257's grant of Supreme Court jurisdiction do not prevent the application of Rooker-Feldman to the final decisions of lower state courts, or to state courts' interlocutory decisions.

Id. at 1515. However, Exxon Mobil emphasized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can be applied only in "limited circumstances in which [the Supreme] Court's appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, precludes a United States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdictionin an action it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate under a congressional grant of authority[.]" Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291. In particular, the Supreme Court stated that both Rooker and Feldman inv...