Williams v. Burgess

1

BRITTANY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. SARAH BURGESS, in her individual and official capacity; PHILLIP BURNETT JR., in his official capacity; and the DEPARTMENT OF KENTUCKY STATE POLICE, Defendants.

No. 5:21-cv-00099 (TBR)

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah

December 6, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Thomas B. Russell, Senior Judge United States District Court

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Trooper Burgess's Motion to Dismiss Individual Capacity Claims (Mot. to Dismiss Ind. Claims), Dkt. 5, and Defendant Trooper Burgess's, Defendant Commissioner Burnett's, and Defendant Kentucky State Police's (KSP) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Official Capacity Claims (Mot. to Dismiss Off. Claims), Dkt. 6. Plaintiff Williams has responded (Resp.), Dkt. 9. Defendants have replied (Reply), Dkt. 14. As such, briefing is complete and the motions are ripe for adjudication.^[1]

For the reasons that follow, Defendant Burgess's Mot. to Dismiss Ind. Claims, Dkt. 5, is GRANTED IN PART and Defendants' Mot. to Dismiss Off. Claims, Dkt. 6, is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 29, 2020, KSP Trooper Sarah Burgess pulled a vehicle over at the intersection of Kentucky Route 90 and U.S. 641. See Complaint (Compl.), Dkt. 1, ¶ 13. According to the Complaint, Brittany Williams observed the traffic stop and “thought that it looked like the State Police [Trooper] was [being] hostile with the people [who were] pulled over.” Id. ¶ 14. Williams claims that is why she parked her vehicle on the side of the road, exited her vehicle, and began recording the traffic stop with her cell phone. See Id. ¶ 15.

Upon noticing Williams, Trooper Burgess allegedly ordered Williams to stop recording and leave the area. See Id. ¶ 16. Williams asserts that she continued videotaping Trooper Burgess and was not interfering with the traffic stop. See Id. ¶ 17. Trooper Burgess then approached Williams and, according to Williams, attempted to seize her cell phone and person, used excessive and unnecessary force and illegally searched her vehicle without a warrant. See Id. ¶¶ 18, 20, 23. Williams states that Trooper Burgess was successful in her attempts to unlawfully seize her cell phone and person, and that the KSP still unlawfully has possession of her cell phone. See Id. ¶¶ 21-22.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.' ” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)).

III. DISCUSSION

Williams sues Trooper Burgess in her individual and official capacity; the Commissioner of the KSP, Phillip Burnett Jr., in his official capacity; and the KSP. See Compl. ¶¶ 2-4. The Complaint sets forth the following counts: Count 1, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Id. ¶¶ 24- 32; Count II, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), see Id. ¶¶ 33-37; Count III, negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), see Id. ¶¶ 38-41; Count IV, battery, see Id. ¶¶ 42-44; and Count V, negligent credentialing, see Id. ¶¶ 45-48.^[2]

A. Official Capacity Claims

i. Federal Claims

Defendants maintain that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the federal official capacity claims because the Defendants enjoy sovereign immunity against all of these claims.^[3] The Eleventh Amendment bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief, against the state and its departments.^[4] See Sefa v. Kentucky, 510 Fed.Appx. 435, 437 (6th Cir. 2013). “The sovereign immunity guaranteed by th[e] [Eleventh] Amendment deprives federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction when a citizen sues his own State unless the State waives its immunity or Congress abrogates that sovereign immunity.” Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1046 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984)).

Such a waiver must be unequivocally expressed. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99. In that same vein, the Eleventh Amendment bars “claims brought against state employees in their official capacity because ‘a suit against a state officer in his or her official capacity is tantamount to a suit against the state itself.' ” Scott v. Michigan, 173 F.Supp.2d 708, 713 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100 (citing Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933)).

Here, the Court cannot draw a reasonable inference that the Defendants are liable for the federal official capacity claims. Williams claims that Trooper Burgess was employed as a KSP Trooper on July 29, 2020 and was acting in that capacity at all relevant times. See Compl. ¶ 2. So too for Commissioner Burnett. See Id. ¶ 3. The parties do not dispute that the KSP is an arm of the executive branch of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. See Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 12.020 Sec. II(1)(a) and 16.060; see also Mot. to Dismiss Off. Claims at 6; Resp. The parties also agree that the Commonwealth of Kentucky has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and that Congress has not abrogated state sovereign immunity under § 1983. See Mot. to Dismiss Off. Claims at 6; see also Resp. Accordingly, these claims against Trooper Burgess, Commissioner Burnett, and the KSP are considered suits against the state, and they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Regardless of her factual assertions, Williams has failed to offer any authority or affirmative evidence to alter this result.

Williams does direct the Court to Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but Monell does not change the outcome. Monell provides that municipalities may be liable for unconstitutional acts under § 1983. But as discussed above, Williams is trying to hold arms of a state government liable for unconstitutional acts under § 1983. “The law is well-settled that, unlike a local government, a state cannot be sued for damages under § 1983 in either state or federal court.” Bailey v. Montgomery, 433 F.Supp.2d 806, 809 (E.D. Ky. 2006)

Therefore, Williams's federal claims against Trooper Burgess in her official capacity, Commissioner Burnett in his official capacity, and the KSP are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

ii. State Claims

In addition to asserting federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Williams asserts state law claims against Defendants for IIED, NIED, battery, negligent credentialing, and possibly violations of the Kentucky Constitution. See Compl. ¶¶ 8, 11, 33-48. To the extent that these state law claims have been asserted against Defendants in their official capacity, Defendants move the Court to dismiss these claims because they are barred by official/governmental immunity. See Mot. to Dismiss Off. Claims at 10-14. The Court finds that Trooper Burgess in her official capacity, Commissioner Burnett, and the KSP are entitled to immunity on Plaintiff's state law claims.

Under Kentucky law, agencies of the state possess governmental immunity from suit when an action is premised on the agency's performance of a governmental (as opposed to a proprietary) function. See Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 519 (Ky. 2001) (noting that governmental immunity and sovereign immunity are used interchangeably by Kentucky courts). The KSP is tasked with enforcement of the law, a governmental function, and is therefore entitled to immunity. See Gaither v. Justice & Pub. Safety Cabinet, 447 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Ky. 2014); see also Allen v. Booth, No. CIV.A. 08-135, 2008 WL 4829875, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2008). Here, there is no dispute that the law enforcement functions of the KSP and its employees are governmental-not proprietary. See Mot. to Dismiss Off. Claims; Resp.

Moreover, under Kentucky law, governmental immunity extends to employees acting and sued in their official capacities. See Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521-22; see also Autry v Western Kentucky Univ., 219 S.W.3d 713, 717 (Ky. 2007) (“If a state agency is deemed to have governmental immunity, its officers or employees have official immunity when they are sued in their official or representative capacity.”). When an officer or employee of a governmental agency is sued in her representative (i.e., official) capacity, the officer's or employee's actions are afforded the same immunity, if any, to which the agency, itself, would be entitled. See Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521-22. As such, Trooper Burgess and Commissioner Burnett are officers of the state, and when they are sued in their “official capacity, ” they are afforded the same immunity as the KSP. See Compl. ¶¶ 2-3; see also Mot. to Dismiss Off. Claims. Accordingly, the KSP is entitled to immunity from Williams's state law claims, and this immunity extends to Trooper Carroll and Commissioner Burnett. Therefore, Plaintiff's state law official capacity claims against Defendants shall be...