Williams v. Camden II Operations, LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-1028

JACQUELINE WILLIAMS, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Autry LeeSams, deceased, and on behalf of the Wrongful death beneficiaries of Autry Lee Sams PLAINTIFF v. CAMDEN II OPERATIONS, LLC d/b/a/PINE HILLS HEALTH AND REHABILITATIONCENTER; et al. DEFENDANTS

Case No. 1:18-cv-1028

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS EL DORADO DIVISION

August 21, 2018

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Jacqueline Williams' Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 14). Defendants filed a response. (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 24). Defendants filed a sur-reply. (ECF No. 28). The Court finds the matter ripe for consideration.

I. BACKGROUND

From April 5, 2015, until February 1, 2017, Autry Lee Sams was a resident of Pine Hills Health and Rehabilitation Center ("Pine Hills") in Camden, Arkansas. Mr. Sams died on February 8, 2017. On April 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed this action in the Circuit Court of Ouachita County, Arkansas, against Defendants, who are various corporate entities and individuals allegedly involved in some fashion with Pine Hills. Plaintiff asserts claims of negligence and medical malpractice on behalf of Mr. Sams' estate and wrongful death beneficiaries.

Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Sams was incapable of independently providing for his daily care and personal needs, and thus, he relied on Pine Hills for the same. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' failure to adequately staff Pine Hills led to Mr. Sams suffering various injuries, including: multiple falls with injuries; urinary tract infections and sepsis; acute kidney injury; pressure sores; skin tears and abrasions; dehydration; malnutrition; delay in treatment; poor hygiene; unnecessary pain and suffering; and untimely death.

On May 24, 2018, Defendants removed the case to this Court. In doing so, Defendants asserted that the Court has original jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because there is complete diversity between parties and the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. Defendants asserted that Plaintiff is a citizen of Arkansas and that Separate Defendants Camden II Operations d/b/a Pine Hills LLC Health and Rehabilitation Center; Southern Administrative Services, LLC; Ross M. Ponthie; John Ponthie; and JEJ Investments, LLC are citizens of Louisiana and/or Texas. Defendants state that although Separate Defendant Robin Looney is a citizen of Arkansas, Plaintiff proceeds against her "in her capacity as the administrator of Pine Hills." Defendants contend that because Plaintiff has sued Separate Defendant Looney solely in her "official capacity" as an administrator, the Court should disregard Separate Defendant Looney's personal citizenship for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction and instead utilize the citizenship of her employer, Pine Hills.¹ Accordingly, Defendants conclude that complete diversity exists.

On June 18, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to remand, arguing that the Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because there is not complete diversity between parties. Defendants oppose the motion.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asks the Court to remand this action to the Circuit Court of Ouachita County, Arkansas, because there is not complete diversity between parties. Defendants argue in response that complete diversity exists, and even if it does not, that Separate Defendant Looney wasfraudulently joined and, thus, her citizenship may be ignored for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The Court will first determine whether complete diversity exists, and if not, the Court will then determine whether Plaintiffs fraudulently joined Separate Defendant Looney such that her citizenship may be ignored.

A. Complete Diversity

Defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that there is not complete diversity and, thus, the Court must remand the case to state court.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and only certain types of cases may proceed in federal court. See Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. Schieffer, 715 F.3d 712, 712 (8th Cir. 2013). A defendant in state court may remove a case to federal court if the defendant can demonstrate that the federal court has original jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). This requirement can be met in one of two ways: (1) when the case in question involves a federal question, or (2) when diversity jurisdiction exists. The party seeking removal or opposing remand has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, and all doubts on that issue are to be resolved in favor of remand. Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 119 F.3d 619, 625 (8th Cir. 1997). A case must be remanded to the state court from which it was removed whenever the federal court concludes that subject matter jurisdiction is nonexistent. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions where the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Diversity of citizenship under 18 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005). Complete diversity "exists where no defendant holdscitizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship." OnePoint Solutions, LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 2007).

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is an Arkansas citizen and that all Defendants other than Separate Defendant Looney are citizens of states other than Arkansas. Accordingly, the only question before the Court is whether Separate Defendant Looney's citizenship destroys diversity jurisdiction.

Plaintiff argues that there is not complete diversity because Plaintiff and Separate Defendant Looney are both Arkansas citizens. In support, Plaintiff provides the Court with documents indicating: (1) that Separate Defendant Looney resides in El Dorado, Arkansas; (2) that she has been a registered voter in Arkansas since 2000; and (3) that she pays taxes in Union County, Arkansas.

Defendants do not contest that Separate Defendant Looney is an Arkansas citizen. Instead, they argue that she is named in the case caption as "Robin R. Looney, in her capacity as Administrator of Pine Hills Health and Rehabilitation Center," and thus, she is being sued in her "official" capacity. Defendants argue further that when an individual is sued in their official capacity, the suit is effectively against the individual's employer—Pine Hills, in this instance. Thus, Defendants assert that Separate Defendant Looney's personal citizenship is irrelevant, and the Court should instead use Pine Hills' citizenship in determining whether complete diversity exists.²

Plaintiff argues in reply that Defendants provide no binding authority supporting theproposition that Separate Defendant Looney's citizenship must be disregarded. To the contrary, Plaintiff asserts that federal courts have remanded similar nursing home cases for lack of complete diversity based on the non-diverse citizenship of a nursing-home administrator.

Upon consideration, the Court agrees with Plaintiff. Defendants argue that because the case caption in this matter names Separate Defendant Looney "in her capacity as Administrator of Pine Hills Health and Rehabilitation Center," she is thus being sued in her "official capacity," and the Court must disregard her personal citizenship and instead look to the citizenship of her employer, Pine Hills.³ In support of this argument, Defendants primarily cite four cases: Couzens v. Donohue, 854 F.3d 508, 513 (8th Cir. 2017); Alternate Fuels, Inc. v. Cabanas, 435 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 2006); General Ry. Signal Co. v. Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1991); and Placide Ayissi-Etoh v. Mae, 49 F. Supp. 3d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 2014). As the removing party and the party opposing remand, Defendants bear the burden of proving federal jurisdiction. Transit Cas. Co., 119 F.3d at 625. Accordingly, the Court will determine whether Defendants' cited authority supports their argument for disregarding Separate Defendant Looney's citizenship in this case.

In Alternate Fuels, the Eighth Circuit stated that because a state employee was sued in his official capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the suit was one against the state, which has no citizenship for diversity purposes. Alternate Fuels, 435 F.3d at 860 n.2. Similarly, in Corcoran, the Seventh Circuit ruled that an interpleader action that named as a defendant the administrator of a state agency was equivalent to a suit against the state agency itself. Corcoran, 921 F.2d at 704-05.

The Court is not persuaded by these cases. To be sure, section 1983 claims against a stateor county employee in their official capacity are considered claims against the employing government entity. See Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). However, Plaintiff has not asserted a section 1983 claim in this case. Moreover, Separate Defendant Looney is not a state or county employee, but rather is employed by a private business entity. As a result, the Court finds that Alternate Fuels and Corcoran are distinguishable from the case at bar. Accordingly, the Court declines to apply their reasoning to the issue at hand.

In Couzens, the plaintiff, a Missouri citizen, asserted various tort claims against individuals who were Missouri citizens, both individually and in their capacities as officers of a foreign, forfeited corporation. Couzens, 854 F.3d at 511. He did so because he believed that he could not sue the forfeited corporate entity directly. Id. at 513. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff could have sued the corporate entity pursuant to Missouri law and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the individual defendants on the basis that the plaintiff had not made any...