Williams v. City of New York

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ALEXANDER WILLIAMS JR., Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CAPT BERNARD MATHIS, CAPTAIN JOHN HERNANDEZ, CAPT GORITZ, ADW HARVEY, WARDEN SWUAREZ, DEPUTY GALLOWAY, DEPUTY BAILEY, CO SANDRA ESPINOZA AND CO WELLS, Defendants.

No. 19-cv-3347 (LJL)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

April 12, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

Lewis J. Liman, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Alexander Williams, Jr. (“Plaintiff” or “Williams”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C § 1983, alleging that Defendants Bernard Mathis (“Mathis”) and Jakar Wells (“Wells,” and with Mathis, “Defendants”) violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by retaliating against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. Specifically Plaintiff complains that, in 2019, while he was detained by the New York City Department of Corrections at the Manhattan Detention Complex (“MDC”), he complained about restrictions on his access to mail and his use of the prison law library by filing grievances. He alleges that Mathis retaliated against him for filing these grievances and thereafter a lawsuit by (1) telling him that if he did no stop complaining, Mathis would see to it that Plaintiff did not receive mail; (2) acting aggressively towards Plaintiff and (3) threatening that if Plaintiff did not drop his lawsuits, he would make Plaintiff's stay at the MDC “hard.” Plaintiff alleges that, as retaliation Wells and another officer, during a search of Plaintiff's cell, stole legal papers belonging to Plaintiff that related to Plaintiff's ongoing or planned lawsuits. Dkt. No. 271 at 5. Trial in this case is scheduled for May 1, 2023.

Each of Plaintiff and Defendants have filed numerous motions in limine. Dkt. Nos. 27778 (Defendants' motion in limine); Dkt. Nos. 280-82 (Plaintiff's motion in limine). Each has filed opposition memoranda to the motion of the other party. Dkt. Nos. 287-88 (Plaintiff's opposition); Dkt. No. 289 (Defendants' opposition). This Opinion and Order resolves these pending motions in limine.

LEGAL STANDARD

“The purpose of an in limine motion is ‘to aid the trial process by enabling the Court to rule in advance of trial on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence, as to issues that are definitely set for trial, without lengthy argument at, or interruption of, the trial.'” Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Banque Hypothecaire Du Canton De Geneve v. Union Mines, 652 F.Supp. 1400, 1401 (D. Md. 1987)). The decision whether to grant an in limine motion “resides in a district court's inherent and discretionary ‘authority to manage the course of its trials.'” United States v. Ray, 2022 WL 558146, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2022) (quoting Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Schneider, 551 F.Supp.2d 173, 176-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). “The trial court should exclude evidence on a motion in limine only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” United States v. Ozsusamlar, 428 F.Supp.2d 161, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). “Because a ruling on a motion in limine is ‘subject to change as the case unfolds,' this ruling constitutes a preliminary determination in preparation for trial.” United States v. Perez, 2011 WL 1431985, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2011) (quoting Palmieri, 88 F.3d at 139).

DISCUSSION

I. Exclusion of Prior Convictions and Arrests

Plaintiff moves for an order precluding Defendants from introducing for any purposes, including impeachment, evidence of his prior criminal history and that of Plaintiff's witness Mr. Samuel Ceruti. Dkt. No. 281 at 13-20.

Plaintiff testified at his deposition that, in 2012, he was tried on drug charges but “jumped bail” and, once he “got caught,” pleaded guilty to the drug charges under terms of a plea deal that made it “concurrent” with the bail jumping. Dkt. No 282-3 at 12, 71. He served four-and-a-half years and was released in April 2016. Id. at 71. He is currently detained because he is “charged in a murder case.” Id. at 12. At his deposition, Mr. Ceruti testified that he is serving a 12-and-a-half to 25 year prison sentence on a conviction for “conspiracy,” to which he pleaded guilty after he was arrested for murder, a charge that was subsequently dismissed. Dkt. No. 282-5 at 103-04. In connection with the same events, Mr. Ceruti pleaded guilty to a federal count of trafficking stolen merchandise and received a “concurrent” sentence of “45 days' time served.” Id. at 110-11. Previously, in 1997, he was convicted for first-degree robbery and sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment and was released in 1998 on that charge. Id. at 102, 114. In 2003, he was convicted of second-degree robbery, and was released from prison in March 2013. Id. at 102. He also testified that he has been arrested for (1) trespass and loitering; and (2) an assault that occurred in jail. Id. at 106-07, 108-09. The parties have not submitted records indicating the precise charges for each of the convictions or the terms of imprisonment to which a person convicted of those crimes could be sentenced.

Plaintiff argues that the convictions that are less than ten years old should be excluded because their probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, that the convictions older than ten years should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b), and that the arrests that have not yet led to convictions are inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 608. Dkt. No. 20 at 14-20. The Court considers each issue in turn.

A. Admissibility of Convictions Less Than Ten Years Old

Plaintiff moves to exclude his own prior convictions as well as those of his witness, Mr. Ceruti, that are less than ten years old from being used for impeachment purposes and in Defendants' case-in-chief. Dkt. No. 281 at 14, 16, 18-19. As noted, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to drug charges and bail jumping in 2012 and served four-and-a-half years in prison on these charges before being released in April 2016. Dkt. No 282-3 at 71. Mr. Ceruti is currently serving a 12-and-a-half to 25 year prison sentence for a “conspiracy” charge in relation to a second-degree murder charge that was dismissed. Dkt. No. 282-5 at 103-04. Mr. Ceruti also pleaded guilty to federal charges of trafficking stolen merchandise in relation to the same events as the conspiracy charge, and received a concurrent sentence of 45 days' time served. Id. at 11011.

Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) provides that a witness's character for truthfulness may be attacked “by evidence of a criminal conviction . . . for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year.” Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1). For convictions where fewer than ten years have passed since the later of the date of conviction or the witness's release from confinement for it, such evidence “must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case.” Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1)(A). Under Rule 403, such evidence may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. The presumption under Rule 609(a) “is that the ‘essential facts' of a witness's convictions, including the statutory name of each offense, the date of conviction, and the sentence imposed” are to be admitted for impeachment purposes. United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 2005).

For the Rule 403 analysis under Rule 609(a)(1), the Second Circuit has instructed that “Rule 609(a)(1) presumes that all felonies are at least somewhat probative of a witness's propensity to testify truthfully.” Id. at 617. “In balancing probative value against prejudicial effect under [Rule 609(a)(1)], courts examine the following factors: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the remoteness of the prior conviction, (3) the similarity between the past crime and the conduct at issue, and (4) the importance of the credibility of the witness.” Daniels v. Loizzo, 986 F.Supp. 245, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir. 1977)); City of Almaty, Kazakhstan v. Ablyazov, 2022 WL 16901995, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 2022) (denying admission of evidence of murder-for-hire); Casmento v. Volmar Constr., Inc., 2022 WL 1094529, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2022) (assessing these factors in Rule 609(b) context of falsification of business records conviction more than 10 years earlier); Djangmah v. Falcione, 2013 WL 6388364, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2013) (admitting evidence of larceny conviction).

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), by contrast, evidence of a criminal conviction “for any crime regardless of punishment . . . must be admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime required proving-or the witness's admitting-a dishonest act or false statement.” Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2).

The Court excludes evidence of Plaintiff's drug-related conviction; Defendants will not be permitted to cross-examine on that conviction. Although Plaintiff's credibility is critical and the prior conviction and the claims at issue in this case are dissimilar, diminishing the risk of prejudice other factors weigh more heavily in the analysis. The Second Circuit has repeatedly instructed that narcotics-related crimes generally are “less probative of veracity” than “crimes that reflect adversely on a person's integrity, and which therefore bear on honesty[,] such as those involving deceit, fraud and theft.” Estrada, 430 F.3d at 617-18; see also United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1971) (“[W]e do not believe that a narcotics conviction is particularly relevant to in-court veracity.”); ...