Williams v. Cleaver-Brooks, Inc.

THEODORE WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. CLEAVER-BROOKS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 7:11-CV-144 (HL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA VALDOSTA DIVISION

Date: December 11, 2012

ORDER

This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21). After reviewing the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other evidentiary materials presented, the Court grants Defendant's motion.

I. FACTS

Defendant Cleaver-Brooks develops, manufactures, and distributes packaged boiler systems. It operates a facility in Thomasville, Georgia. (DSOMF ¶¶ 3-4).¹

Defendant employs hourly paid workers to produce the boilers. These individuals work in a variety of classifications, but are primarily involved in either the production of component parts or the assembly of the final product. The hourly workers operate machines, weld, assemble, paint, or perform supportroles such as maintenance or material handling. (DSOMF ¶ 5). As part of their employment, the hourly workers are cross-trained in a variety of positions to allow the company to flex its workforce in response to particular production demands. (Declaration of Dennis Hettinger, ¶ 8). The employees cross-train throughout the plant when there is insufficient work available in a particular area. (Deposition of Everett Gaynor Hart, pp. 23-24; Deposition of Theodore Williams, pp. 63-64).

Plaintiff was one of these hourly workers. He began working at the Thomasville facility as a painter in August of 1994. (DSOMF ¶ 7). Plaintiff received some cross-training in the piping or pipefitting area. (Williams Dep., p. 64).

Employees were also periodically assigned to perform a variety of functions outside of their regular work duties, including sweeping the floors, picking up trash along the fence line outside, and spraying for weeds. These tasks were required of both black and white employees, and of both supervisors and non-supervisors. (DSOMF ¶¶ 12-14; Williams Dep., pp. 43-44, 46).

Plaintiff's supervisor from the fall of 2008 until July 22, 2010 was Everett Gaynor Hart. (Hart Dep., p. 12; Affidavit of Theodore Williams ¶ 11). Hart's position during that time period was shop floor supervisor, and he was assigned to supervise the final assembly department. (Hart Dep., p. 13). His dutiesincluded scheduling, maintaining safety, keeping track of parts and supplies, and discipline, though any discipline write-ups had to be approved by Dennis Hettinger, the plant human resources manager. (Hart Dep., p. 13; Hettinger Decl., ¶ 15). Hart did not have the authority to terminate any employees, though he would discuss employment decisions with upper management. (PSOMF ¶ 86). Ultimate employment decisions, including hiring and firing, were made by Hettinger and Joseph McAuley, the plant manufacturing manager. (Hettinger Dep., p. 9; Deposition of Joseph McAuley, p. 7).

Early in 2010, Plaintiff agreed to work the night shift after Hart asked for volunteers. Plaintiff believed the assignment would last up to a month (Williams Dep., p. 41), but he ended up working partially on nights for approximately seven weeks. (Supplemental Declaration of Dennis Hettinger, ¶ 4, Ex. A). Plaintiff contends he asked Hart several times to be returned to the day shift, but was ignored. (Williams Aff., ¶ 30). He then went to Hettinger, who had Plaintiff moved back to the day shift. (Williams Aff., ¶ 30). According to Plaintiff, at the time he talked to Hettinger, he told him that "Hart did not treat me the same as the other employees, that he routinely berated me." (Williams Aff., ¶ 31).²

In late June 2010, Plaintiff told Hettinger that he was giving his two weeks' notice. (Williams Dep., pp. 46, 52; Deposition of Dennis Hettinger, p. 10).³ Plaintiff reported that he was unhappy working with Hart, did not like moving back and forth between the day shift and the night shift, and did not enjoy the cross-training he was receiving. (DSOMF ¶ 23). Plaintiff complained that Hart had him outside picking up trash and spraying for weeds, that Hart was "cussing him,"⁴and that Hart was talking about Plaintiff to other employees. (Williams Dep., pp. 49-51). He did not complain about any racial discrimination or harassment when he met with Hettinger. (Hettinger Dep., pp. 10-11; Williams Dep., p. 46-51).

After the meeting with Hettinger, Plaintiff went on vacation. His requested vacation for June 25, 2010 and for June 28, 2010 through July 2, 2010 was approved by Hart. (Hettinger Supp. Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. E). Plaintiff returned to work on July 6, 2010. (Hettinger Supp. Decl., ¶ 8). Upon his return, Plaintiff met with Hettinger and McAuley. (Hettinger Dep., p. 13; McAuley Dep., p. 17; WilliamsDep., pp. 52-53). During that meeting, Plaintiff inquired about a transfer to the tubing department. (DSOMF ¶ 27). There is a dispute as to whether there was an available vacancy in the tubing department, but the dispute is immaterial as any position there would have been entry-level and Plaintiff was not willing to take a pay cut. (Williams Dep., pp. 48-49). Plaintiff stated that he did not want to quit, and according to McAuley, recanted his two weeks' notice. (McAuley Dep., pp. 16-17; Williams Dep., p. 53).⁵

Plaintiff was at that time cross-training in the piping area. After meeting with Hettinger and McAuley, Plaintiff returned to his piping duties. What follows is a series of events that led to Plaintiff's termination. In the Court's opinion it is not necessary to get into the minutia of the alleged policy violations because they do not affect the Court's ultimate findings. However, the Court will briefly discuss the events which occurred during the time period between July 15 and July 22.

In October of 2009, Plaintiff received a written warning for not showing up to work. (Williams Dep., Ex. 7). On July 15, 2010, a second written warning was prepared by Hart resulting from an incident where Plaintiff threw a broken valve in the trash in violation of company policy. (DSOMF ¶ 31; Williams Dep., p. 75;Hart Dep., Ex. 15).⁶ On July 19 or July 20, Hart prepared a third written warning because Plaintiff left work early on July 19 without receiving permission from a supervisor. (Hart Dep., Ex. 18). Under Defendant's progressive discipline policy, this third infraction within a 12-month period called for a three-day suspension. (Hettinger Decl., ¶ 13; Hart Dep., Ex. 18). But the warning that called for the suspension did not become effective until signed off on by Hettinger, who was not at work on July 19. (Hettinger Decl., ¶¶ 55, 59).

On July 20, 2010, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Hart confronted Plaintiff and asked him why he had left work early on July 19. (DSOMF ¶ 60). Plaintiff responded that he thought his shift hours were over at 2:30 p.m., which is when he left. (DSOMF ¶ 61). According to Plaintiff, Hart then told him he was suspended for three days. (Williams Dep., pp. 87-88). So Plaintiff just turned around and walked out. (Williams Dep., pp. 88-89). Plaintiff did not call in on July 21, and did not report for work. (DSOMF ¶ 69). Plaintiff came back to the plant on July 22 and turned in his uniforms to Hettinger. (DSOMF ¶ 70). Plaintiff states that Hettinger told him he was being terminated for not showing up to work on July 21. (Williams Aff., ¶ 64). Plaintiff never returned to work at the company.

At some point in time during his employment with Defendant, Hart had a Georgia State flag or Confederate flag sticker on his tool box. (Hart Dep., p. 15). The sticker was removed from the tool box sometime before Hart became a shop floor supervisor in 2008. (Williams Dep., pp. 128-29). Plaintiff alleges that Hart had a black figurine with a rope around its neck tied to his tool box, but the figurine was removed at least five or six years before Hart became a supervisor in 2008. (Williams Dep., pp. 37-38).⁷ Hart also had a Georgia State flag or Confederate flag sticker on the cab window of his truck. (Hart Dep., p. 14). However, Plaintiff never complained about the presence of the flag sticker on Hart's tool box or about any other potentially racially-offensive items or symbols in the workplace. (DSOMF ¶ 20).

Plaintiff alleges that Hart regularly referred to him as "boy" when talking to him. (Williams Aff., ¶ 19). Another worker in the final assembly department, Bobby Trotman, regularly told Plaintiff to "get [his] black ass to work." (Williams Dep., pp. 118-119). On one occasion in 2008, prior to the presidential election, Plaintiff overheard Hart call Barack Obama a "nigger," and Plaintiff contends Hartcalled him a "nigger" once. (Williams Aff., ¶¶ 24-25). Plaintiff states that Hart "micro-managed" him and improperly singled him out at work. (Williams Aff., ¶ 26).

Plaintiff filed a two count complaint on October 18, 2011, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff contends in Count One that he was discriminated against based on his race and in Count Two that he was retaliated against for reporting unlawful employment practices. Defendant now moves for judgment in its favor on both claims.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "The moving party bears 'the initial responsibility of informing the . . . court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)). Where the moving party makes such ashowing, the burden...