Williams v. Cnty. of San Bernardino Sheriff's Dep't

DONNA WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendant and Appellant.

D075077

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

June 17, 2019

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARINGNO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.264(c), it is ordered that the opinion filed on June 17, 2019, be modified by replacing the second sentence of part I. on page 2 with the following sentence:

We begin by setting forth how this court must analyze the issues and, accordingly, the limitations on our determination of the merits of the parties' underlying claims and defenses.

There is no change in judgment.

Respondent's petition for modification of the opinion and/or for rehearing is denied.

McCONNELL, P. J.

Copies to: All parties

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. CIVDS1517728)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Gilbert G. Ochoa, Judge. Affirmed.

Michelle D. Blakemore and Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, Richard D. Luczak, Deputy County Counsel for Defendant and Appellant.

Castillo Harper, Kasey A. Castillo and Michael A. Morguess for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department (Department) appeals from a judgment of the superior court in favor of plaintiff Donna Williams, whom the Department had terminated as a deputy sheriff. The court ruled as follows: The SanBernardino County Civil Service Commission (Commission) abused its discretion in sustaining the charges against Williams; and Williams suffered a due process violation during the predeprivation proceedings conducted by the Department pursuant to Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 (Skelly) (Skelly hearing). The judgment granted Williams's petition for writ of administrative mandate and issued the writ, reinstating Williams with back pay, benefits, and interest.

On appeal, the Department contends that the trial court erred on two independent grounds: The judgment is not supported by substantial evidence; and as a matter of law, there was no due process violation during the Skelly hearing process. As we explain, because the Department did not meet its burden of establishing that the evidence compels findings in favor of the Department as a matter of law—i.e., the Department did not establish a lack of substantial evidence to support the judgment—we will affirm the judgment without having to reach the Skelly issue.

I. PRESUMPTIONS AND STANDARDS ON APPEAL

The presumptions on appeal and the standard we must apply in our appellate review of the judgment determine the outcome of this appeal. Because the appellate briefing in this appeal has not acknowledged or properly followed some of these established criteria, we begin by setting forth how this court must analyze the issues and, accordingly, the limitations on our determination of the merits of the parties' underlying claims and defenses.

Initially, the judgment in favor of Williams " ' "is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness." ' "(Front Line Motor Cars v. Webb (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 153, 161 [administrative mandamus appeal]; accord, Anderson v. Davidson (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 136, 144 [same; "strong presumption of correctness" in judgment].) " 'This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.' " (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Because of this presumption, the Department (as appellant) has the burden of establishing reversible error (ibid.); i.e., Williams is not required to establish how or why the judgment should be affirmed.

In an administrative mandamus case like this, the administrative record contains the evidence introduced at the administrative hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a).) Where, as here, the case involves a fundamental vested right, the superior court uses its independent judgment to review a challenged administrative decision. (Barber v. Long Beach Civil Service Com. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 652, 658 (Barber) [peace officer's right to continued employment is a "vested property interest"].) Under this standard, the superior court must independently weigh the evidence in the administrative record and make its own findings. (Levingston v. Retirement Board (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 996, 1000.) This procedure not only allows, but "indeed, it requires," the trial court to reweigh the evidence, including specifically a determination of the credibility of witnesses. (Barber, at p. 658; accord, Duncan v. Department of Personnel Admin. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1174 (Duncan).) The court must then determine whether the agency's findings are "supported by the weight of the evidence" and, if not, must set aside the administrative decision as an "abuse of discretion." (CodeCiv. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c); accord, Coastal Environmental Rights Foundation v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 178, 187 (CERF).) In this context, "the weight of the evidence" means "the preponderance of the evidence." (Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil Service Com. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 362, 368-369.)

Where, as here, an appellate court is reviewing the trial court's exercise of its independent judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (c), the appellate court looks to the findings of the trial court, not to those of the administrative agency. (Duarte v. State Teachers' Retirement System (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 370, 383-384 (Duarte).) Under this procedure, the appellate court "must sustain the superior court's findings if substantial evidence supports them." (Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence (1977) 20 Cal.3d 309, 314 (Pasadena Unified School Dist.), italics added; accord, Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 824). Stated differently, the trial court's findings, whether express or implied, must be upheld unless they are " ' " 'so lacking in evidentiary support as to render them unreasonable.' " ' " (Paxton v. Board of Admin. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 553, 559 (Paxton).)

" 'In substantial evidence review [of a trial court's exercise of its independent judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (c)], the reviewing court defers to the factual findings made below. It does not weigh the evidence presented by both parties to determine whose position is favored by a preponderance. Instead, it determines whether the evidence the prevailing party presented was substantial—or, as itis often put, whether any rational finder of fact could have made the finding that was made below. If so, the decision must stand.' " (CERF, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 187-188, italics deleted and added.) In making this determination, the appellate court must " 'consider the facts in the light most favorable to [the respondent on appeal], giving [the evidence] every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in [the respondent's] favor.' " (Paxton, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 559.) "When more than one inference can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the appellate court cannot substitute its deductions for those of the superior court." (Pasadena Unified School Dist., supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 314.) The testimony of a single witness, including that of a party, may be sufficient for substantial evidence purposes. (Duncan, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1174, fn. 6; Evid. Code, § 411.¹)

Applying the foregoing concepts to the present appeal, we presume that the trial court's findings are supported by evidence in the administrative record, and the Department has the burden to show "there is no substantial evidence whatsoever to support them." (Harrington v. City of Davis (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 420, 443 (Harrington).) Where, as here, there is no statement of decision,² " 'the necessaryfindings of ultimate facts will be implied and the only issue on appeal is whether the implied findings are supported by substantial evidence.' " (Espinoza v. Shiomoto (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 85, 100 (Espinoza) [administrative mandamus appeal].) Significantly, since "we cannot reweigh the evidence," "we do not determine whether substantial evidence would have supported a contrary judgment, but only whether substantial evidence supports the judgment actually made by the trial court." (Duarte, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.) That is because "[t]he question on appeal is whether the evidence reveals substantial support—contradicted or uncontradicted—for the trial court's conclusion[.]" (Ibid., italics added; accord, Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 72 [same]; see Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 890 [even uncontradicted evidence in favor of an appellant does not establish the fact for which the evidence was submitted].)

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS³

The incident that prompted the administrative proceedings that led to the lawsuit underlying this appeal took place during the early morning hours of December 7, 2013. At that time, Williams had been a San Bernardino deputy sheriff for slightly under eight years and was then assigned to the High Desert Detention Center.

The night before, Williams and her boyfriend, C.F., attended a Christmas party for the employees of the detention center, after which they and others went out for food and an after-party at another deputy sheriff's house. On their way home, Williams and C.F. went to a Del Taco fast-food restaurant in Adelanto, arriving at the drive-thru lane a little after 4:00 a.m. After they had paid for and...