Williams v. Columbia Housing Authority, No. M2007-01379-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 9/30/2008)

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LEORY WILLIAMS v. COLUMBIA HOUSING AUTHORITY.

No. M2007-01379-COA-R3-CV.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville.

March 26, 2008 Session.

Filed September 30, 2008.

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Maury County No. 05-288 Stella L. Hargrove, Chancellor.

Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed.

Leroy Williams, Murfreesboro, pro se.

Wesley Mack Bryant, Columbia, TN, for Appellee.

Alan E. Highers, P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which David R. Farmer, J., and Holly M. Kirby, J., joined.

OPINION

ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J.

This appeal involves summary judgment on an employee's common law and statutory retaliatory discharge claims. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that the employee had not established a prima facie case for either claim. The employee appeals, and we affirm.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In December of 1999, the Columbia Housing Authority ("CHA"or "Appellee") hired Leroy Williams ("Appellant") as its executive director. CHA is a public housing authority in Columbia, Tennessee, authorized by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to furnish government housing to those who qualify. As CHA's executive director, Mr. Williams was responsible for overseeing the day to day operations, "including implementing the policies and procedures of the [CHA] Board of Directors[.]" Mr. Williams and CHA did not have a written employment contract.

In August of 2002, HUD performed an on-site "coordinated management/monitoring review" of CHA. HUD performed this review "based on factors of a risk analysis, including new Executive Director, tenant/hot-line complaints, [and] past practices that caused near-troubled status." A letter from HUD accompanying the report read, in relevant part:

The report includes findings and corrective actions required, observations and recommendations for improvement and general areas of concern. The report also . . . reflects an overall average performance rating. There were several areas of unsatisfactory operation as noted in the report. However, there have been areas of great improvement and we commend the agency for its progress in correcting certain deficiencies listed in the previous review report of 1995.

The report's "executive summary" indicated that "[i]n recent years, there have been several Executive Directors appointed (Mr. Leroy Williams currently holds the position). CHA was designated Troubled under the Public Housing Management Assessment Program (PHMAP). . . ." Of the 26 problems documented in the previous 1995 report, 9 of those were repeat problems in the 2002 report. The executive summary explained:

[T]here remain many problems that need final resolution. There are several `REPEAT' findings. Repeated findings are especially serious because it is evidence that deficiencies were never corrected though certified as such to the HUD office for clearance of a prior finding -the Agency made false certifications. Because of the repeat nature of some findings, clearance will only be granted following on-site verification of the corrective action.

The report concluded that "management performance of the [CHA] has greatly improved under the leadership of its current Board, Executive Director and staff. . . . The CHA appears to be operating at the standard performer level."

HUD conducted a follow-up review of CHA on April 22 through 24, 2003. (Exhibit 19). The follow-up report indicated:

There have been some very significant improvements in the operations of [CHA]. There also remains much work to be done, especially in the area of vacant unit turnaround. . . . Executive Director Williams' comments throughout this on-site session included reminders that CHA was in much worse condition when he began his tenure three years ago. While the HUD office certainly agrees with his assessment, it is also believed that three years is sufficient time to have resolved many of the on-going and recurring problems.

The follow-up report also indicated that "the overall [Financial Assessment] score for 2002 is 19.88, which is less than two points from failing and being designated as a financially troubled [public housing agency]." Of the previous 9 findings/problem areas, 3 still remained open after the followup review.

In July of 2004, HUD's Memphis Hub conducted a "public housing assessment system independent assessment & confirmatory review." This review indicated that CHA had received a failing Financial Assessment score as of December 31, 2003, and thus, this July 2004 review was necessary. This report indicated several "areas requiring improvement," including the area of vacant unit turn around, which was a repeat finding/problem during the 2002 review.

CHA's Board unanimously decided to terminate Mr. Williams' employment effective August 12, 2004.

On March 6, 2005, Mr. Williams filed suit against CHA, alleging both statutory and common law claims of retaliatory discharge. Mr. Williams painted a different picture of the events leading up to his termination. He contended that the Board fired him because he raised issues relating to improper practices of Board members. Specifically, Mr. Williams alleged violations by the Board of its personnel policy; violations of its travel expenses policy; the misuse of CHA employees and equipment by certain Board members for personal business; and an agreement between CHA and the City of Columbia, in which CHA "has paid the city money to clean the streets, however, despite the fact that the Plaintiff continued to pay this bill, the [c]ity has done nothing as consideration for these payments." As to the last contention, Mr. Williams alleged that "[s]ince [he] addressed his concerns the Board of Directors was concerned that the Plaintiff would expose this agreement."

CHA filed an answer, and on April 19, 2007, filed a motion for summary judgment. CHA contended in its motion that it terminated Mr. Williams' employment due to "his unwillingness to address HUD concerns," and not in retaliation for any other actions/inactions on Mr. Williams' part.

On May 22, 2007, the trial court granted CHA's motion for summary judgment. Without further elaboration, the court found that Mr. Williams failed to establish a prima facie case for his claims of common law retaliatory discharge and statutory retaliatory discharge, and thus CHA was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

CHA then filed a motion for discretionary costs and a motion for sanctions/attorney's fees. CHA sought sanctions against Mr. Williams, contending that he instituted his cause of action for an improper purpose,¹ "including but not limited to harassment and/or to cause needless increase in costs to [CHA]."

On June 21, 2007, Mr. Williams filed his notice of appeal. Thereafter, on August 17, 2007, Mr. Williams attempted to supplement the record. CHA filed a motion opposing such an amendment to the record, as such documents were not before the trial court when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment.

On November 27, 2007, the trial court denied both CHA's motion seeking sanctions/attorney's fees and Mr. Williams' motion to supplement the record. On December 21, 2007, CHA filed its notice of appeal concerning the trial court's denial of its motion for sanctions/attorney's fees.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Mr. Williams² raises three issues for our review. The only issue we perceive is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.³ Additionally, CHA argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for sanctions/attorney's fees.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court's decision concerning summary judgment de novo with no presumption of correctness. Abbott v. Blount County, 207 S.W.3d 732, 735 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002)). "Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party has shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002)). Summary judgment proceedings should not be used "as a substitute for trial of disputed factual issues." Jones v. Home Indem. Ins. Co., 651 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Tenn. 1983). If there is any doubt as to whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Doe 1 ex rel. Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 154 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2005) For purposes of summary judgment, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor, Abbott, 207 S.W.3d at 735 (citing Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002)), and disregard all countervailing evidence. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Tenn. 1993).

IV. DISCUSSION

The trial court found that Mr. Williams did not establish his prima facie case for statutory retaliatory discharge and common law retaliatory discharge. We agree.

Generally, an at-will employee may be fired for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all. Collins v. AmSouth Bank, 241 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) ("Tennessee is an employment at-will state."); Willard v. Golden Gallon-TN, LLC, 154 S.W.3d 571, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted). Under our common law, however, there is a narrow exception to the employment at-will doctrine: an employer is prohibited from terminating an employee when doing so violates a clearly established public policy, which is "evidenced by an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision." Collins, 241 S.W.3d at 884 (citing Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tenn. 1997); Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Tenn. 1988)). For a retaliatory discharge claim under our common law, the employee must prove: (1) the existence of an at-will employment relationship between the employee and the employer; (2) the termination of the at-will...