Williams v. Commonwealth

80 Va. App. 637

900 S.E.2d 184

Dawn Lewis WILLIAMS

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

Record No. 1201-22-2

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Richmond.

April 30, 2024

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE, Richard E. Moore, Judge

Seth R. Carroll, Richmond (Melisa Azak; Commonwealth Law Group, PLLC, on briefs), for appellant.

Laura H. Cahill, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Charles H. Slemp III, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Maria N. Wittmann, Deputy Attorney Gen- eral; Richard C. Vorhis, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on briefs), for appellee.

Present: Judges AtLee, Ortiz and Lorish

OPINION BY JUDGE LISA M. LORISH

[1] While in the custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC"), Dawn Williams was injured and sent a notice of tort claim to the Office of the Attorney General. She then filed an initial complaint seeking relief under the Virginia Tort Claims Act ("VTCA"), but after she was released from prison, she nonsuited her first action and filed a new complaint. The VTCA waives the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity under certain circumstances, permitting plaintiffs to bring tort suite against the Commonwealth. But the VTCA specifically excludes from recovery "[a]ny claim by an inmate of a state correctional facility" unless the "claimant verifies under oath, by affidavit, that he has exhausted his remedies" under the VDOC grievance process. Code § 8.01-195.3. We hold that the VTCA requires a reviewing court to assess whether a claimant is an inmate when the complaint was filed. If so, the claimant must have exhausted her remedies. Because the operative complaint here was filed when Williams was no longer an inmate, the VTCA’s exclusion does not apply. We also find that Williams’s notices of claim were sufficient under the VTCA. We therefore reverse the circuit court’s order sustaining the Commonwealth’s plea in bar and dismissing Williams’s complaint.

BACKGROUND¹

On October 11, 2018, while incarcerated at Fluvanna Correctional Center ("Fluvanna"), Williams was scheduled to attend a medical appointment at UVA Health University Hospital ("UVA Hospital"). Williams required handicap-equipped transportation to take her from Fluvanna to the appointment.

The VDOC officers assigned to transport Williams informed her that a handicap-equipped van was unavailable and that they would instead use a standard transport van. Because Williams had difficulty safely loading herself into the van while shackled, the officers overseeing her transportation requested, and received, authorization to unshackle her so that she could help pull herself inside. When the van arrived at the hospital, one officer called again to request permission to unshackle Williams so she could help herself out of the van. But because they were running late for the appointment, another officer did not wait. Instead, this officer tried to pull Williams out of the van while she was still shackled. The officer lost her balance, fell down, and pulled Williams down with her. As a result, Williams injured several joints.

In August 2019, Williams filed, pro se, a handwritten notice of claim with the Office of the Attorney General indicating that she intended to sue VDOC for causing her injuries. She subsequently retained an attorney, who filed "further notice" of her claim with the Attorney General on October 8, 2019.

While still incarcerated, Williams filed her first complaint in the Fluvanna Circuit Court a few months later. She alleged that the Commonwealth was liable for the injuries she sustained while being transported to the hospital and sought relief under the VTCA. She did not file an affidavit stating that she had exhausted her remedies under the VDOC’s inmate grievance procedures. In response, the Commonwealth filed a plea in bar asserting sovereign immunity.

Before the court ruled on the pending plea in bar, Williams was released from prison. In July 2020, she nonsuited her original action, and refiled her complaint in the Charlottesville Circuit Court a month later, again seeking recovery under the VTCA. The Commonwealth filed another plea in bar asserting that the VTCA did not waive the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity because Williams asserted a "claim by an inmate" under Code § 8.01-195.3(7) and she had not attached an affidavit stating that she exhausted administrative remedies through the VDOC grievance process. The Commonwealth also argued that her notices of claim failed to meet the statutory requirements of Code § 8.01-195.6(A). The circuit court agreed on both fronts, sustaining the Commonwealth’s plea in bar and dismissing the complaint.

Williams timely appeals.

ANALYSIS

[2–4] Williams asks us to reverse the circuit court’s decision to sustain the Commonwealth’s plea in bar based on its claim of sovereign immunity. Where, as here, "no evidence is taken in support of a plea in bar, the trial court, and the appellate court upon review, consider solely the pleadings in resolving the issue presented." Massenburg v. City of Petersburg, 298 Va. 212, 216, 836 S.E.2d 391 (2019). "The facts as stated in the pleadings by the plaintiff are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the special plea." Gray v. Va. Sec’y of Transp., 276 Va. 93, 97, 662 S.E.2d 66 (2008) (quoting Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 233, 564 S.E.2d 127 (2002)). To determine whether the Commonwealth waived sovereign immunity here, we must interpret several sections of the VTCA, a task we take up de novo. Wright v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 754, 759, 685 S.E.2d 655 (2009).

I. The exhaustion requirement of Code § 8.01-195.3(7)

[5–7] "The Commonwealth and its agencies are immune from liability for the tortious acts or omissions of their agents and employees in the absence of an express constitutional or statutory waiver of sovereign immunity." Billups v. Carter, 268 Va. 701, 707, 604 S.E.2d 414 (2004). The VTCA generally waives the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity for claims for money "on account of damage to or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee while acting within the scope of his employment." Code § 8.01-195.3. But the VTCA excludes recovery for certain claims, including "claim[s] by an inmate of a state correctional facility, as defined in § 53.1-1, unless the claimant verifies under oath, by affidavit, that he has exhaust- ed his remedies under the adult institutional inmate grievance procedures promulgated by the Department of Corrections." Code § 8.01-195.3(7). Initiating the institutional inmate grievance procedure tolls "the time for filing the notice of tort claim … during the pendency of the grievance procedure." Id. Thus, the VTCA "partially waives sovereign immunity" for "state prisoners" who comply with the exhaustion requirements of Code § 8.01-195.3(7), but it does not waive immunity for claims by inmates who do not. AlBritton v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 392, 399, 853 S.E.2d 512 (2021).

Along with excluding certain claims, the statute imposes procedural requirements on claimants. To assert a "claim cognizable against the Commonwealth," a plaintiff must first file a "notice of claim" with the Director of the Division of Risk Management or the Attorney General; otherwise, her claim "shall be forever barred." Code § 8.01-195.6(A)-(B). The notice of claim must be "a written statement of the nature of the claim" that both describes the "time and place at which the injury occurred" and designates the agency or agencies the plaintiff seeks to hold liable for the injury. Code § 8.01-195.6(A). The VTCA also requires that the notice of claim be filed "within one year after such cause of action accrued." Id.

The specific language that we must interpret today excludes from recovery: "Any claim by an inmate of a state correctional facility, as defined in § 53.1-1, unless the claimant verifies under oath, by affidavit, that he has exhausted his remedies." Code § 8.01-195.3(7). No party has suggested that we interpret the word "inmate" to mean anything other than what common sense would dictate—that an inmate is someone presently imprisoned in a detention center or in the custody of the VDOC. See also Inmate, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining inmate as "[a] person confined in a prison, hospital, or similar institution"). But the tougher question is this: when does it matter whether a claimant is an inmate in evaluating the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity defense?

[8–11] To understand when claims are barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, we look to the text and structure of the VTCA. "The ‘primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.’ " Grethen v. Robinson, 294 Va. 392, 397, 806 S.E.2d 406 (2017) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337 (1983)). An appellate court must determine the legislative intent "from the plain meaning of the language used." Street v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 298, 306, 876 S.E.2d 202 (2022) (quoting Hillman v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 585, 592-93, 811 S.E.2d 853 (2018)). "Where bound by the plain meaning of the language used, we are not permitted ‘to add or to subtract from the words used in the statute.’ " Coles v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 549, 557, 605 S.E.2d 784 (2004) (quoting Posey v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 551, 553, 96 S.E. 771 (1918)). We also evaluate the language in the context "of the entire statute" because "it is our duty to interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole." Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 420, 425, 722 S.E.2d 626 (2012) (quoting Eberhardt v. Fairfax Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. Bd. of Trs., 283 Va. 190, 194-95, 721 S.E.2d 524 (2012)).

Williams asserts that she was not an inmate at the time she filed her most recent complaint and so was not subject to the VTCA’s requirement that a "claimant" asserting a "claim by an inmate" must...