Williams v. Correct Care Solutions, Inc.

CALVIN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, INC., et al., Defendants

Civil No. 3:16-cv-1259

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 8, 2017

(Judge Mariani)

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Calvin Williams ("Williams"), an inmate who, at all relevant times, was housed at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Houtzdale"), initiated the above-captioned civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Named as Defendants are Sommers, Glunt, Younkin, Beard, Wetzel, Dr. Khatri, Dr. Naji, and Correct Care Solutions, Inc. (Id.). Presently pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by Defendant Dr. Khatri, and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by Defendants Dr. Naji and Correct Care Solutions. (Docs. 27, 28). Despite requesting an extension of time to file briefs in opposition to moving Defendants' motions, Williams failed to oppose the motions. (Docs. 33, 34). Consequently, the motions are deemed unopposed and ripe for disposition. See L.R. 7.6 ("Any party opposing any motion . . . shall file a brief in opposition . . . [or] shall be deemed not to oppose such motion"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant each of the pending motions.

I. Motion to Dismiss Standard of Review

A complaint must be dismissed under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff must aver "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

"Though a complaint 'does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop. Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court "take[s] as true all the factual allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts, but . . . disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).

"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This "plausibility" determination will be a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

However, even "if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.

Id.

II. Allegations of the Complaint

During his incarceration at SCI-Houtzdale, Williams alleges that he presented to Dr. Khatri in April 2011 with complaints of difficulty sleeping, anxiety, and racing thoughts.(Doc. 1, ¶ 15). He alleges that Dr. Khatri immediately prescribed the psychotropic medication Remeron. (Id.). On or about August 11, 2011, Williams claims that Dr. Khatri prescribed Tegretol. (Id. at ¶ 17). On August 15, 2011, Williams alleges that Dr. Khatri increased his dosage of Tegretol, and at a later, unspecified date, again increased the dosage of Tegretol. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19). Williams alleges that, in September 2011, he "awoke feeling extremely fatally ill", with "burning, throbbing" eyes, hives, nausea, disorientation, and difficulty walking. (Id. at ¶ 21). Williams was immediately taken to the medical department, where he was assessed by "the medical staff" and prescribed moisturizing eye drops. (Id. at ¶ 22). He claims that his condition failed to improve and he was sent to an outside hospital on September 3, 2011. (Id. at ¶ 26). Once at the hospital, he was allegedly diagnosed with Stevens-Johnson syndrome (Id.). The hospital staff advised Williams that his symptoms were a reaction to Tegretol. (Id. at ¶ 28). Accordingly, this medication was discontinued. (Id. at ¶ 31). Williams returned to SCI-Houtzdale on September 7, 2011. (Id. at ¶ 30). He was placed in the prison infirmary for three weeks, and was prescribed eye drops, ointment for his hives, intravenous fluids, and "some kind of oral tablets." (Id.).

Williams alleges that Dr. Khatri "knew or should have known that plaintiff would allergically react negatively to the TEGRETOL and the prescribed dosages further based upon a number of factors, especially with plaintiff[']s previous medical history." (Id. at ¶ 32).

Subsequent to his hospitalization, Williams alleges that Dr. Naji failed to "adequately address the underlying cause of the painful symptoms." (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35). He asserts that Dr. Naji referred Williams to an ophthalmologist "many months" later. (Id. at ¶ 37). Williams further alleges that Dr. Naji delayed treatments and failed to comply with all of the treatments ordered by the ophthalmologist. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-39).

III. Discussion

A. Williams' claims are barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata

The preclusive effect given to prior adjudications under the doctrine of res judicata "is not a mere matter of 'practice or procedure' but 'a rule of fundamental and substantial justice.'" EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 492 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917). "Res judicata avoids 'the expense and vexation attending multiple law suits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.'" Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)).

Res judicata comprehends both "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion." Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984). Claim preclusion "applies to all claims actually brought or which could have been brought in a prior action regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding." Inofast Mfg., Inc. v. Bardsley, 103 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849 (E.D. Pa. 2000), aff'd mem., 265 F.3d 1055 (3d Cir.2001). Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, "bars relitigation only of an issue identical to that adjudication in the prior action." Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1070 (3d Cir. 1990). The party asserting claim preclusion must establish "(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action." Inofast, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 849; see also Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1086 (3d Cir. 1988). Each requirement for claim preclusion is present in the instant case. Williams has had previous opportunities to litigate his claims that he was improperly prescribed psychiatric medications by Dr. Khatri, which caused him to suffer from Stevens-Johnson syndrome, and that Dr. Naji scheduled Williams for an appointment with an ophthalmologist, the appointment took place several months after September 2011, and Dr. Naji followed some, but not all, of the ophthalmologist's orders and recommendations.

On September 6, 2013, Williams initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, naming Drs. Naji and Khatri as Defendants and setting forth nearly identical allegations.¹ See Williams v. Dr. Naji, et al., Civil No. 3:13-cv-205 (W.D. Pa). In the Western District case, Williams alleged that he suffered from painful symptoms as a result of an allergic reaction called Stevens-Johnson syndrome dueto the medication prescribed by Dr. Khatri in August 2011. See id. at (Doc. 19). He claimed that Dr. Khatri increased his dosages of medication which resulted in extreme illness and hospitalization in September of 2011. See id. Williams further alleged that Dr. Naji scheduled Williams for an appointment with an ophthalmologist, and the appointment took place "several months" after September 2011. (Id. at ¶ 33). He claims that Dr. Naji followed "some but not all of the ophthalmologist's treatment orders and recommendations. (Id. at ¶ 35).

On August 6, 2015, a Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania issued a Report and Recommendation recommending in part:

• The claims of deliberate indifference and negligence against Khatri survive until August 26, 2015

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