Williams v. Daszko

HILLIARD WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. JAROM A. DASZKO, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-1248 KJM AC P

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

June 5, 2018

ORDER and FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Hilliard Williams is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Correctional Health Care Facility (CHCF) in Stockton, under the authority of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis and with appointed counsel in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case proceeds on plaintiff's original complaint on claims that defendant CDCR physicians Jarom Daszko and David Mathis were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment during plaintiff's previous incarceration at the California Medical Facility (CMF). See ECF No. 1.

Presently pending for decision are defendants' separate motions for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 90, 92. The motions were heard by the undersigned on January 24, 2018. Plaintiff was represented by Alexander Smith and Michelle Peleg; defendant Daszko was represented by Kevin Dehoff; and defendant Mathis was represented by Joseph Wheeler. This action is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(c). For the reasons that follow, this court recommends that summary judgment be granted for defendant Daszko, and denied for defendant Mathis.

II. Background

Plaintiff filed his original complaint in May 2014, and completed his request to proceed in forma pauperis in June 2014. In September 2014, the court granted plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, and found that his complaint states cognizable Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Mathis and Daszko, for whom service of process was appropriate. The defendants filed separate answers to the complaint in December 2014, and the court issued an initial Discovery and Scheduling Order on December 31, 2014.

In March 2015, defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment premised on plaintiff's alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before commencing this action. In February 2016, the undersigned recommended that both motions be denied; these findings and recommendations were adopted by the district judge in March 2016. Thereafter, defendants declined the court's invitation to participate in a settlement conference, and the court issued an Amended Discovery and Scheduling Order in April 2016, and a Further Amended Discovery and Scheduling Order later that month.

In November 2016, the court granted plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel and issued another Further Amended Discovery and Scheduling Order, which was further modified in May 2017 and September 2017 at the parties' requests.

Defendants filed their respective pending motions for summary judgment in November 2017. Plaintiff filed one comprehensive opposition to both motions, ECF No. 98; defendants filed separate replies, ECF Nos. 100, 101; plaintiff responded to defendant Mathis' evidentiary objections with a request that his response be construed as an authorized surreply, ECF No. 102. For the reasons offered by plaintiff, see ECF No. 102 at 1 n.1, plaintiff's request is granted.

Pursuant to the parties' preexisting stipulation to protect the confidentiality of plaintiff's medical records, all parties requested that such evidence be filed in this court under seal.Although this was a departure from the usual practice of this court, the undersigned granted the requests, subject to the following qualification:

Although the parties are free to enter into such agreements without a court order, plaintiff's medical records are essential to address the merits of this action - in the parties' briefing, at oral argument, and in the court's orders and findings and recommendations. While the court will permit the parties to file plaintiff's medical records under seal, thus protecting the original documents from public view, the court will place no restrictions on subsequent references to, or reliance on, plaintiff's medical records in the parties' briefing, at oral argument, or in the court's written references and analyses.

ECF Nos. 86 at 1-2, 88 at 1-2, 95 at 2.

III. Legal Standards

A. Legal Standards for Motions for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party "initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation), 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admission, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or by showing that such materials "do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1)(A), (B).

When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, "the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. SeeCelotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment ... is satisfied." Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. Moreover, "[a] [p]laintiff's verified complaint may be considered as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment if it is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).¹

The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need notestablish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citations omitted).

In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact," the court draws "all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party." Walls v. Central Costa County Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). It is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. ... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

In applying these rules, district courts must "construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and . avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly." Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). However, "[if] a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact, as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

B. Legal Standards for Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

"[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. This...