Williams v. Dep't of Justice

1

ALEXANDER WILLIAMS, JR., Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-00401 (ACR)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

June 6, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ANA C REYES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Alexander Williams, Jr., proceeding pro se, sued Defendants the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S Marshals Service (USMS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Dkt. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 1-5. Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Dkts. 20, 22. For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion and DENIES Plaintiff's Cross-Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

In October 2022, Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to USMS seeking information about his underlying criminal case in New York. Compl. ¶ 12; Dkt. 1-1 at 14. Specifically, he requested:

(1) The name of the Marshals from Columbia, SC, who assisted [New York Police Department (NYPD) Detectives] Steven Snieder and Thomas Handley in or around July - September 2018 [in] locat[ing] Mr. David Walker; (2) Any/all documentation signed by NYPD [Detectives] Steven Snieder and Thomas Handley when making the request for the USMS assistance when they traveled to Columbia, SC;

(3) Any/all reports generated by the two USMS that assisted NYPD [Detectives] Steven Snieder and Thomas Handley during that travel to Columbia, SC, [and;]

(4) Documentation as to where the USMS that [assisted] NYPD [Detectives] Steven Snieder and Thomas Handley ultimately met and spoke with David Walker indicating [if there were] any [audio] and video recordings made or records kept from their conversation[].

Dkt. 1-1 at 2 (cleaned up).^[1]

In October 2022, USMS's FOIA Unit received Plaintiff's FOIA request and stated that it could neither confirm nor deny if it possessed records related to the referenced individuals. Dkt. 20-1 ¶ 13. It also stated it required an executed privacy waiver, known as Form DOJ-361, for Mr. Walker. Id.; Dkt. 20-2 at 5. The next month, Plaintiff submitted an executed Form DOJ-361 for Mr. Walker. Dkts. 20-1 ¶¶ 14-15; 20-2 at 12. Plaintiff's Complaint clarifies that he does not seek records specifically regarding Mr. Walker but “documentation, records, [and] log book entries that were generated when NYPD Detectives traveled to Columbia, SC, and applied for and [were] granted assistance from the U.S. Marshals Service in Columbia, SC.” Compl. ¶ 12 (cleaned up).

Plaintiff then followed up with USMS's FOIA Unit in November 2022, see id. ¶ 13; Dkt. 1-1 at 16-17, but before receiving a response, he filed an administrative appeal to the Office of Information Policy (OIP) in early December 2022, see Compl. ¶¶ 14-15; Dkt. 20-1 ¶ 16; Dkt. 11 at 19-20. Also in December 2022, Plaintiff narrowed his request to “logbook entries from the USMS office in Columbia, SC, in regards to the entries made when these two NYPD detectives were granted assistance from the Marshals Service in Columbia, South Carolina.” Compl. ¶ 16 (cleaned up); Dkt. 1-1 at 22-23. OIP then closed Plaintiff's appeal because USMS had yet to render a final determination. See Dkts. 20-1 ¶ 16; 20-2 at 14-15.

Later in December 2022, USMS issued a “Glomar response,”^[2] again indicating that it could neither confirm nor deny that it possessed records pertaining to USMS and NYPD personnel because such an acknowledgment would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6) (FOIA Exemption 6) and 552(b)(7)(C) (FOIA Exemption 7(C)). See Dkt. 20-1 ¶ 17; Dkt. 20-2 at 17-18. Plaintiff then appealed that determination, and in April 2023, OIP affirmed USMS's decision. See Dkt. 20-1 ¶ 17; Dkt. 20-2 at 21-22.

B. Procedural History

In February 2023, Plaintiff sued USMS and DOJ demanding the release of the records sought in his FOIA request and subsequent related letters. Compl. at 6. After USMS learned of this lawsuit, it maintained its Glomar response to Part (1) of Plaintiff's FOIA request, Dkt. 20-1 ¶ 26, but conducted searches for Parts (2), (3), and (4) of the request, id. ¶ 19. Following these searches, USMS did not find any responsive records. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25.

In June 2023, Defendants answered the Complaint. Dkt. 13. Defendants completed their review of Plaintiff's FOIA request the next month, Dkt. 14, and then moved for summary judgment in September 2023, Dkt. 20. Also in September 2023, Plaintiff filed his Cross-Motion, combined with what appeared to be his Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkts. 21-22.

To ensure that Plaintiff had every opportunity to address Defendants' arguments, the Court modified the briefing schedule and provided Plaintiff with a long extension to file any supplemental opposition or cross-motion by January 2024. Minute Order of Sept. 13, 2024. The Court also entered an order advising Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 23 at 3 (citing Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Despite this clear notice and additional time, Plaintiff did not submit any further briefing as to either Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or in support of his own Cross-Motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In a FOIA case, a district court reviews the agency's decisions de novo, Schoenman v. FBI, 604 F.Supp.2d 174, 186 (D.D.C. 2009), and “the burden is on the agency to sustain its action,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). “[T]he vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on summary judgment ....” Brayton v. Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[a] party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment in the movant's favor is proper as a matter of law.” Soundboard Ass'n v. FTC, 888 F.3d 1261, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (cleaned up); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[S]ummary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Aguiar v. DEA, 865 F.3d 730, 734-35 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

“[T]o satisfy [the] FOIA's aims of providing more transparency into the workings of the government,” an agency must show that it made an adequate search for records responsive to a FOIA request. Montgomery v. IRS, 40 F.4th 702, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2022). This demonstration “entails a showing that the agency made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.” Id. (cleaned up). “While the agency need not search every record system, it also may not limit its search to only one record system if there are others that are likely to turn up the information requested.” Id. (cleaned up). Moreover, “the adequacy of a FOIA search is generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the search.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of the Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

In short, summary judgment is inappropriate only “if a review of the record raises substantial doubt as to the search's adequacy, particularly in view of well defined requests and positive indications of overlooked materials.” Shapiro v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 40 F.4th 609, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 143 S.Ct. 526 (2022). In assessing an agency's fulfillment of its FOIA obligations, an agency's declarations are given “a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.” Id. (cleaned up).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Glomar Response (as to Part 1 of Plaintiff's FOIA Request)

Upon receipt of a FOIA request, an agency may provide what is known as a Glomar response-i.e., the agency may refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records responsive to the FOIA request because acknowledging the existence of responsive records would “cause harm cognizable under an FOIA exemption.” Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

“A Glomar response is valid if the fact of the existence or nonexistence of agency records falls within a FOIA exemption.” PETA v. Nat'l Insts. of Health, Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 745 F.3d 535, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). If a Glomar response is justified, an agency “need not conduct any search for responsive documents or perform any analysis to identify segregable portions of such documents.” Lindsey v. FBI, 271 F.Supp.3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2017) (cleaned up). “In determining whether the existence of agency records vel non fits a FOIA exemption, courts apply the general exemption review standards established in non-Glomar cases.” Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “Courts can grant summary judgment upholding a Glomar response based on agency affidavits explaining the basis for the response.” PETA, 745 F.3d at 540. “Affidavits must contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements and cannot be called into question by contradictory evidence in the record.” Id. (cleaned up).

USMS issued a Glomar response as to Part (1) of Plaintiff's FOIA request, Dkt. 20-1 ¶¶ 27-33, which sought the names and identifying information of U.S. Marshals in Columbia, South Carolina, who allegedly coordinated with NYPD Officers Snieder and Handley around July to September 2018 in locating Mr. Walker, Dkt. 1-1 at 2. USMS justifies its Glomar response under Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Dkt. 20-1 ¶¶ 27-33.

Exemption 6 protects “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a...