Williams v. Forest River, Inc.

1

JOHN WILLIAMS and ELIZABETH WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs, v. FOREST RIVER, INC., Defendant.

No. 3:24cv701 DRL

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division

November 27, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

DAMON R. LEICHTY JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

John and Elizabeth Williams purchased a camper manufactured by Forest River, Inc. that they say has irreparable defects. After repeated attempts at repair, the Williamses sued Forest River alleging the company breached its express and implied warranties. This case was transferred from the Western District of Virginia with a motion to dismiss pending. Although the briefs at times alternate between Virginia and Indiana law, they suffice to aid the court in ruling. Forest River says the Williamses waited too long to bring their warranty claims and deficiently plead their other claims. The court agrees with Forest River only in part.

BACKGROUND

The court takes the well-pleaded allegations as true. On February 14, 2022, the Williamses bought a 2022 Cherokee Wolf Camper from a dealer, RV Outlet USA of Ringgold, Virginia [34 ¶ 4-5]. Forest River manufactured the camper and provided a written limited warranty [41-1]. The warranty contained a forum selection clause requiring that any legal disputes over the warranty be brought in Indiana. The warranty also explicitly limited the period in which a buyer could bring a warranty lawsuit to one year and ninety days after the purchase date.

The Williamses noticed various defects over the ensuing year and returned the camper to RV Outlet USA three times for repairs. They first brought it in on September 14, 2022, when it was submitted for repairs and serviced for 40 days; next on November 17 2022, for 42 days; and finally on April 12, 2023, for over 100 days [34 ¶¶ 7-9]. The Williamses say these repairs were unsuccessful and the camper remains defective [id. ¶ 9].

They sued in the Western District of Virginia on August 16, 2023 alleging Forest River breached its express and implied warranties under the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) see 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq., and requesting revocation and rescission. Forest River moved to dismiss or transfer the case, and the Western District of Virginia granted the Williamses leave to file an amended complaint. They amended on June 4, 2024, adding claims. Forest River again moved to dismiss or transfer. After briefing, the Western District of Virginia upheld the forum selection clause and transferred the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to this court.

STANDARD

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). It need not plead “detailed factual allegations.” Id. A claim must be plausible, not probable. Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). Evaluating whether a claim is sufficiently plausible to survive a motion to dismiss is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” McCauley v. City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citation omitted).

Generally, if a party attaches evidence outside the pleadings in a motion to dismiss, “the court must either convert [the motion] into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 . . . or exclude the documents attached to the motion to dismiss and continue under Rule 12.” 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). There is a narrow exception: a dismissal motion can rest on critical documents, central to the claim and referred to in the complaint. Geinosky v. City of Chi., 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012); 188 LLC, 300 F.3d at 735.

DISCUSSION

The Williamses advance five claims against Forest River in their amended complaint: express and implied warranty claims under both state and federal law (counts 5 and 1 respectively) [34 ¶¶ 11-17, 28]; purported claims for revocation and rescission (counts 2 and 3) [id. ¶¶ 18-25]; and a deceptive practices claim under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (IDCSA) (count 4) [id. ¶¶ 26-27].

A. Choice of Law.

Because the amended complaint and briefs at times cite both Indiana and Virginia law, the court pauses to address choice of law. In a federal question case, such as this one that arises through the MMWA, “the choice-of-law rule for pendent state claims should be that of the forum.” Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 681 (7th Cir. 1986). The question is which “forum.” A prior transfer presents a unique scenario. “Generally, when a case is transferred from a district court with proper venue to another district court, the transferee court will apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the transferor court sits.” Dobbs v. Depuy Orthopedics, Inc., 842 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); Looper v. Cook Inc., 20 F.4th 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2021). No one says the Virginia district court was improper venue.

That said, though “generally” a change of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) “should be, with respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms,” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639, this general rule doesn't extend to cases when a transfer motion “is premised on enforcement of a valid forum-selection clause,” Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 65 (2013). Instead, the law “reject[s] the rule that the law of the court in which the plaintiff inappropriately filed suit should follow the case to the forum contractually selected by the parties” because “a plaintiff who files suit in violation of a forumselection clause . . . is entitled to no concomitant state-law advantages.” Id. (quotations omitted). Thus, Indiana's choice-of-law rules apply. See id.; Balt. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 681.

Forest River's warranty says Indiana law governs “all claims or causes of action arising out of or relating to this limited warranty or implied warranty,” whether they sound in “contract, tort, or statute,” without giving effect to any conflict of law rule that would cause a different jurisdiction's law to apply. Indiana presumes the validity of this choice-of-law provision, Allen v. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co., 766 N.E.2d 1157, 1162 (Ind. 2002); Hess v. Biomet, Inc., 105 F.4th 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2024), and no exceptional circumstances exist to upset its application here, Barrow v. ATCO Mfg. Co., 524 N.E.2d 1313, 1314-15 (Ind.Ct.App. 1988); Sheldon v. Munford, Inc., 660 F.Supp. 130, 134 (N.D. Ind. 1987). Nor has anyone argued such exceptional circumstances.

Although the amended complaint states its right to revocation under Virginia Code § 8.2-608 and its right to recission with citations to Virginia law, such counts “relate to” the warranty in that the nonconformity that the Williamses contend justifies either revocation or rescission arises from Forest River's assurances about the product's quality and its failure to deliver a reliable and functional camper. See, e.g., Kiefer Specialty Flooring, Inc. v. Tarkett, Inc., 174 F.3d 907, 909-10 (7th Cir. 1999) (viewing such language as “broad and capable of an expansive reach”); see also United States v. Liestman, 97 F.4th 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 2024) (“relating to” is the “broadest of connecting language”); see also Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U.S. 709, 717 (2018). The Williamses also offer no argument that today's result would change were Virginia law to apply. They expressly advance their deceptive practices claim under Indiana law already. Accordingly, the court applies Indiana law.

B. Statute o/Limitation and Equitable Toiling (Counts 1 and 5).

Forest River says the MMWA and UCC claims are time-barred by its limited warranty. The warranty covers the camper “for one (1) year from the date of purchase” and bars any suit for breach of warranty or revocation brought more than 90 days after the warranty period expires.^[1] The Williamses bought their camper on February 14, 2022 [34 ¶ 4]. According to Forest River, the Williamses could sue as late as May 14, 2023, making their lawsuit filed on August 16, 2023 untimely. The Williamses respond that they are not required plead around the statute of limitations; and, in any event, Forest River's conduct equitably tolled the statute of limitations.

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and a complaint doesn't need to plead against it. See Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004). Though a limitations defense isn't normally a valid basis to dismiss, it is “when the allegations of the complaint reveal that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2011); Small v. Chao, 398 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005) (courts may dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) if the claim is “indisputably time barred”).

The MMWA lacks its own statute of limitations; instead, the limitations period from an analogous state cause of action applies. N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29 33-35 (1995). Indiana's statute of limitations applies. The court also applies “any rules that are an integral part of the statute of limitations, such as tolling and equitable...