Williams v. Garrett

1

NATHANIEL WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. TIM GARRETT, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:22-CV-00264-CLB

United States District Court, D. Nevada

July 31, 2024

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF Nos. 45, 58]

This case involves a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff Nathaniel Williams (“Williams”) against Defendants Tim Garrett (“Garrett”), Tara Carpenter (“Carpenter”), Dawn Bequette (“Bequette”), Kara LeGrand (“LeGrand”), and Renee Baker (“Baker”) (collectively referred to as “Defendants”). Currently pending before the Court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. First is Williams's motion for summary judgment, (ECF No 45), to which Defendants responded, (ECF No. 50), and Williams replied. (ECF No. 60.)^[1] Subsequently, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 58 64.)^[2]Williams responded, (ECF No. 62), and Defendants replied. (ECF No. 63.) For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Williams's motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 45), and grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 58), in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Williams was formerly an inmate in the custody of the Nevada Department Corrections (“NDOC”). On June 13, 2022, Williams filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for events that occurred while he was incarcerated at the Lovelock Correctional Center (“LCC”).^[3] (ECF No. 1.) On July 13, 2023, Williams filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”), (ECF No. 34), which the Court screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). (ECF No. 36.) Williams's complaint alleges Defendants oversaw the mishandling of Williams's legal mail containing sensitive, private, and confidential information which created a risk to his safety. (ECF No. 34.) Based on these allegations, the Court allowed Williams to proceed on three claims: (1) a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy (“Claim 1 ”); (2) a First Amendment mishandling of outgoing mail (“Claim 2”); (3) an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to safety (“Claim 3”). (ECF No. 36 at 4.) Each claim was allowed to proceed against all Defendants. (Id.)

On April 3, 2024, Williams filed his motion arguing summary judgment should be granted because: (1) Defendants unconstitutionally allowed inmates to copy and sort confidential documents and attorney correspondence; (2) Defendants allowed a policy of sending scratch paper to the school that lacked adequate safeguards to prevent the dissemination of confidential information; (3) the policies allowed his confidential information to be released, causing him to be labeled as a “snitch;” and (4) Defendants were deliberately indifferent by allowing law library and education workers to be moved into his unit and denying him a protective transfer. (ECF No. 45.)

On May 14, 2024, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) all three of Williams's claims fail on the merits; (2) Defendants did not personally participate in any alleged constitutional violations; and (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity regardless of any alleged constitutional violations. (ECF No. 58.) /// ///

B. Factual Summary

The LLC law library allows inmates to make copies of documents by submitting copy request forms. (See ECF No. 64-1.) When a copy request form is filled out, a copy of the form is retained until the original is returned to the law library to ensure there is proof of the copies made. (Id. at 2.) Copy request forms contain the inmate's name and prison identification number. (ECF No. 58-1; ECF No. 58-6.) NDOC does not consider the information on the copy request forms to be confidential.^[4] (ECF No. 64-1 at 2.) Prior to the incident at issue here, discarded copy request forms would be used in the Education Department as scratch paper. (Id.) According to the declaration from the law library supervisor, “[c]opies of personal papers or legal documents are not kept for any reason in the law library” and were returned to the requestor after the copies are made. (Id. at 12.) If an error occurs in copying a document, “it is destroyed immediately.” (Id. at 3.)

In 2020, inmate Charles Wirth (“Wirth”) brought copies of copy request forms with his name and the name of other inmates to the law library. (Id. at 2-3.) Bequette reviewed the papers and found that all of them were copy request forms, including one from Williams. (Id. at 3.) Bequette told Wirth no confidential information appeared on the copy request forms but to prevent the incident from reoccurring, the law library “would pull the scratch paper from education.” (Id.)

On July 22, 2020, Bequette received a kite from Williams regarding the scratch paper incident. (ECF No. 64-1 at 3; ECF No. 58-2; ECF No. 58-6.) Bequette responded that no confidential information was disclosed, and that scratch paper would no longer be sent to the school. (Id.) Williams claimed his personal grievances were included in the scratch paper but refused to show the papers to Bequette. (ECF No. 64-1 at 3.) Later, Williams went to Bequette's office and claimed “bad copies” of personal information were given out but again refused to show the paper to Bequette. (Id.) Williams also accused Bequette of using Williams's Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) claim as scratch paper. (Id.) In her declaration, Bequette states she never disclosed any of Williams's medical information or the fact that he filed a PREA claim, did not use his PREA claim as scratch paper, and did not label him as a “snitch.” (Id.) Bequette also declares she only knows Williams filed a PREA claim because Williams himself mentioned it, in the presence of other inmates. (Id. at 4) (emphasis added.)

Defendants provide sworn declarations from Garrett, Carpenter, LeGrand, and Baker that assert each Defendant “never authorized the law library to use inmate's personal papers as scratch paper” and were “unaware that the law library was using inmate order forms or any other document for that purpose.” (ECF No. 58-11 at 2; ECF No. 58-10 at 2; ECF No. 58-8 at 2; ECF No. 58-9.) The declarations further assert that Garrett, Carpenter, LeGrand and Baker “never allowed, nor implemented a policy that allowed any inmate to read Mr. Williams' outgoing legal mail” and were “not directly involved in the legal mail process.” (ECF No. 58-11 at 3; ECF No. 58-10 at 3; ECF No. 58-8 at 3; ECF No. 58-9.) Garrett, Carpenter, LeGrand, and Baker also declare they did not institute nor were “aware of any ‘policy' to allow inmates to sort the ‘bad copies' in the law library.” (Id.)

Defendants provide declarations establishing that all inmate movement between institutions is coordinated by the Offender Management Division. (ECF No. 58-9 at 2; ECF No. 58-10; ECF No. 58-10 at 3.) The sworn declarations provided by Garrett, Carpenter, LeGrand, and Baker establish that they did not have authority to authorize a transfer to another NDOC institution. (ECF No. 58-11 at 2; ECF No. 58-10; ECF No. 58-8 at 2; ECF No. 58-9 at 2.) LeGrand's sworn declaration asserts that she did not authorize any transfers of law library workers into Williams's unit because, as a caseworker, LeGrand could forward requests for inmate transfers or recommend a classification hearing but did not have the authority to order a transfer on her own. (ECF No. 58-8 at 3.) LeGrand and Garrett's sworn declarations also establish that during the subject time frame, there were times that workers were housed in the same unit due to Covid protocols. (ECF No. 58-8 at 3; ECF No. 58-11 at 3.) The declarations also establish that those Covid protocols prompted many bed moves during that time period. (Id.) However, LeGrand and Garrett both declare they did not authorize any moves into Williams's unit for any other purpose. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The substantive law applicable to the claim or claims determines which facts are material. Coles v. Eagle, 704 F.3d 624, 628 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Only disputes over facts that address the main legal question of the suit can preclude summary judgment, and factual disputes that are irrelevant are not material. Frlekin v. Apple, Inc., 979 F.3d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 2020). A dispute is “genuine” only where a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The parties subject to a motion for summary judgment must: (1) cite facts from the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, and declarations, and then (2) “show[] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Documents submitted during summary judgment must be authenticated, and if only personal knowledge authenticates a document (i.e., even a review of the contents of the document would not prove that it is authentic), an affidavit attesting to its authenticity must be attached to the submitted document. Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Neheme, 632 F.3d 526, 532-33 (9th Cir. 2011). Conclusory statements, speculative opinions, pleading allegations, or other assertions uncorroborated by facts are insufficient to establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007); Stephens v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 935 F.3d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 2019).

The moving party bears the initial...