Williams v. Gentry

JESSICA WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. JO GENTRY, et al,¹ Respondents.

Case No. 2:04-cv-01620-KJD-EJY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

June 18, 2020

ORDER

This habeas matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 comes before the Court for a final decision on the multiple grounds presented.

Introduction

Petitioner Jessica Williams seeks to overturn her 2001 Nevada state conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of six counts of driving with a prohibited substance in her blood in violation of then N.R.S. 484.3795(1)(f).

The criminal case arose from the tragic deaths of six teenagers assigned to a roadside cleanup crew who were struck and killed on March 19, 2000, when the vehicle that Williams was driving veered off the road into the median. According to the factual summary by the Supreme Court of Nevada, Williams had stayed up all night the prior evening. Williams admitted that she had smoked marijuana approximately two hours before veering off the road and that she had used the drug "ecstasy" the prior evening. Williams had a pipe with marijuana residue and a plastic bag with marijuana. Blood draws taken that day tested positive for the presence of the active ingredient of marijuana and a metabolite thereof. Williams maintained that she had fallen asleep at the wheel. See Williams v. State, 118 Nev. 536, 50 P.3d 1116, 1126-27 (2002) (Williams I).²

Williams was charged with, inter alia, six counts of violating then N.R.S. 484.3795, which provided in pertinent part at the relevant time:

1. A person who:

. . . .

(d) Is under the influence of a controlled substance or is under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance;

. . . . ; or

(f) Has a prohibited substance in his blood or urine in an amount equal to or greater than the amount set forth in subsection 3 of N.R.S. 484.379,

and does any act or neglects any duty imposed by law while driving or in actual physical control of any vehicle on or off the highways of this state, if the act or neglect of duty proximately causes the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, a person other than himself, is guilty of a category B felony . . . .

N.R.S. 484.3795(1)(d) & (f), recodified at N.R.S. 484C.430(d) & (f).³

The jury acquitted Williams on all six counts of the statutory alternative under N.R.S. 484.3795(1)(d) based upon being under the influence of a controlled substance. The jury convicted Williams on all six counts the alternative under N.R.S. 484.3795(1)(f) based upon having a prohibited substance in her blood in a requisite amount. This verdict in turn was based upon evidence seeking to establish that Williams had the active ingredient of marijuana and also a metabolite thereof in her bloodstream. Williams I, 118 Nev. at 539-40, 50 P.3d at 1118-19 (discussing also other charges).

Following review, and for the reasons discussed herein, the Court grants a conditional writ of habeas corpus on Ground 8(a) of the petition, as amended, subject to the State's ability to retry Williams within the time period established by this order. The Court discusses Ground 8(a) first and then the related Grounds 8(b) and 9.

The Court denies relief on all remaining grounds other than Ground 8(a) for the reasons stated herein, including Grounds 1, 4, 5, 7, 8(b) and 9. Technically, the Court need not necessarily reach any grounds as to which Williams may not secure greater relief than she has via the conditional writ granted herein. However, the Court had done extensive work on all then-pending grounds prior to entry of the stay in 2011; and it has updated that prior work on all remaining grounds in preparing this order. At this point, after now many years of combined state and federal litigation, the matter should be postured for a definitive and final resolution in the event of any appeal from the current order and judgment. The Court accordingly issues a decision as to all remaining claims presented, so that, inter alia, this matter potentially may be conclusively resolved on any appeal without a remand based at least on the presence of unadjudicated claims. While the Court is fully confident that a conditional writ grant is warranted on Ground 8(a), a resolution of all claims pending in the district court by this order best serves the interests of justice for all concerned after now two decades of state and federal litigation.

Standard of Review

When the state courts have adjudicated a claim on the merits, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) imposes a "highly deferential" standard for evaluating the state court ruling that is "difficult to meet" and "which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011). In particular, "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under this highly deferential standard of review, a federal court may not grant habeas relief merely because it might conclude that the state court decision was incorrect. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 202.

Rather, a state court decision is "contrary to" law clearly established by the Supreme Court only if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court case law or if the decision confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court decision and nevertheless arrives at a different result. E.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam). A state court decision is not contrary to established federal law merely because it does not cite the Supreme Court's opinions. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a state court need not even be aware of its precedents, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of its decision contradicts them. Id. Moreover, "[a] federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous." 540 U.S. at 16. For, at bottom, a decision that does not conflict with the reasoning or holdings of Supreme Court precedent is not contrary to clearly established federal law.

A state court decision constitutes an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law only if it is demonstrated that the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent to the facts of the case was not only incorrect but "objectively unreasonable." E.g., Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 18; Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004).

To the extent that a state court's factual findings are challenged, the "unreasonable determination of fact" clause of Section 2254(d)(2) controls on federal habeas review. E.g., Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). This clause requires that the federal courts "must be particularly deferential" to state court factual determinations. Id. The governing standard is not satisfied by a showing merely that the state court finding was "clearly erroneous." 393 F.3d at 973. Rather, AEDPA requires substantially more deference to the state court factual finding:

. . . . [I]n concluding that a state-court finding is unsupported by substantial evidence in the state-court record, it is not enough that we would reverse in similar circumstances if this were an appeal from a district court decision. Rather, we must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972.

In contrast, when the state courts have not adjudicated a claim on the merits, such as where the state courts rejected the claim instead on procedural grounds, the above-described AEDPA deference on legal and factual issues does not apply; and the federal courts instead review the claim de novo. E.g., Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1165 & 1167-68 (9^th Cir. 2002).

However, in all events, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), any state court factual findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. E.g., Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1168.

Discussion

Ground 8(a): Denial of Fair Warning by Judicial Expansion of Statute

In Ground 8(a), Williams alleges in principal part that she was denied due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when she was denied fair warning of the conduct prohibited by an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of the relevant statutes by the state supreme court. She alleges that the statutes as written did not give fair warning that the presence of an inactive ingredient of marijuana, marijuana metabolite, in her bloodstream would bring her within the terms of the statutes. She alleges that she thus could not be convicted based upon what therefore was an improper alternative theory of culpability, the presence of marijuana metabolite in her bloodstream, such that a new trial is required. (ECF No. 110, at 44-47.)

Review of the Merits

Ground 8(a) was rejected by the state supreme court on the basis of procedural default rather than on the merits. (ECF No. 98-4, at 11.) Federal habeas review of the merits thus is de novo following upon Williams having overcome the procedural default.

In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the bedrock principle that a criminal statute must provide fair notice of what is prohibited by the statute:

The basic principle that a criminal statu

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