Williams v. Giroux

JOSEPH WILLIAMS, Petitioner v. NANCY A. GIROUX, et al., Respondents

No. 3:15-CV-1090

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

April 5, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBERT D. MARIANI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Petitioner Joseph Williams filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Presently before the Court are Williams' objections to the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) filed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson. The Court finds that, although the lion's share of Williams' claims do not warrant habeas relief, at least one claim has potential merit, cannot be decided on the current record, and thus requires further development.

I. Background

In 2015, Williams filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which contained both exhausted and unexhausted claims. (Doc. 1). He requested a stay and abeyance while he exhausted his state-court remedies, which this Court granted. (See Docs. 3, 6).

When his lengthy state-court collateral proceedings reached their conclusion, the Court lifted the stay, reopened Williams' habeas case, and granted him leave to file an amended Section 2254 petition. (Doc. 43). Williams filed his amended petition and supporting memorandum in November 2020 raising six grounds for relief. (Docs. 46, 46-1). After several extensions of time, Respondents filed their response to the amended petition. (Doc. 54). The case was then referred to Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson.

On August 17, 2021, Magistrate Judge Carlson issued an R&R (Doc. 56), recommending that Williams' Section 2254 petition be denied and that no certificate of appealability should issue. Williams thereafter filed objections (Doc. 60) to the R&R. Upon de novo review of Magistrate Judge Carlson's R&R, Williams' objections thereto, and all relevant filings, the Court will overrule most of Williams' objections. However, as to Williams' sixth ground for relief invoking Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Court will defer ruling on this claim until the record is properly developed.

II. Legal Standard

A district court may “designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition” of certain matters pending before the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). If a party timely and properly files a written objection to a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the District Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011); M.D. Pa. Local Rule 72.3.

III. Discussion

Williams objects to nearly all aspects of the R&R. The Court, however, will address only those objections requiring discussion beyond that which has already been provided by Magistrate Judge Carlson's comprehensive report. Specifically, the Court will discuss Williams' objections with respect to habeas grounds 1, 2, 3, and 6.

A. Ground One - Severance

Williams first contends that the R&R misconstrued his due process claim regarding the trial court's denial of his attempts to sever his case from codefendant Anthony Herndon. Williams maintains that the issue is not whether the state court's decision to deny severance was erroneous, but whether the trial judge "abused his discretion when he allowed [Williams'] trial to continue after explicitly finding that” the defenses presented by the codefendants were “clearly antagonistic.” (Doc. 60 at 1 (quoting Doc. 54-20, 2/11/09 Trial Tr. at 56:22)). Williams further maintains that the R&R should have analyzed the “abuse of discretion factors” when deciding this habeas claim. (Id. at 2).

The problem with Williams' argument, however, is that habeas corpus is a collateral remedy and therefore this Court does not act as a court of direct review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (citation omitted). Unlike, for example, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on direct appeal, a federal habeas court does not make determinations regarding whether a state trial court abused its discretion in denying severance. Instead, this Court is constrained to asking whether the state court's determination on severance was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(A).

Under this highly deferential rubric, it is clear that the trial court's decision to press on-rather than declare a mistrial-despite believing the codefendants' defenses were antagonistic does not provide an avenue for federal habeas relief.^[1] As several courts of appeals, including the Third Circuit, have noted, the United States Supreme Court “has explicitly rejected a per se rule requiring severance where two defendants present mutually antagonistic defenses." Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 775 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1993)); United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1094 (3d Cir. 1996); Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 731 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538). Rather, the touchstone for severance challenges on habeas review is whether “misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional violation” in that “it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his [due process] right to a fair trial.” United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986) (discussing joinder of federal defendants). Because joinder and severance are governed by state law, misjoinder would only warrant federal habeas relief when it deprives the defendant of “fundamental fairness” in the trial process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72-73 (1991)

Williams has not made this difficult showing. He has not identified any basis- beyond antagonistic defenses-for why his joint trial was fundamentally unfair, nor has he established a specific constitutional right that was violated by being tried with Herndon. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 73 (explaining that “fundamental fairness” for due process is “narrowly” defined and cabined to violations of the Bill of Rights). In sum, Williams has not shown that the Pennsylvania Superior Court's rejection of this severance claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or that his joint trial was so prejudicial that it violated due process.

B. Ground Two - Constructive Amendment

In his objection regarding ground 2, Williams argues that the Superior Court constructively amended his indictment. He contends that, on direct appeal, the Superior Court erroneously denied his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge and affirmed his robbery conviction under one subdivision of Pennsylvania's robbery statute-18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701 (a)(1)(ii)^[2]-even though he was indicted and convicted under a different subdivision-18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701 (a)(1)(i).^[3] According to Williams, this amounted to an unlawful and unconstitutional constructive amendment of his indictment. It does not appear that Williams raised this claim in state court. (See generally Doc. 54-11). Even if he had, it would not warrant habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (permitting denial on the merits of an unexhausted claim).

The Court recognizes that Williams' argument is not baseless. From review of the record, the Pennsylvania Superior Court indeed relied on a different and uncharged subdivision of the robbery statute in its analysis of Williams' sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. See Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 723 MDA 2009, 31 A.3d 741, at 11-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 10, 2011) (table) (nonprecedential). Pennsylvania law, however, explicitly holds that these statutory subdivisions are not interchangeable. See Commonwealth v. Neal, 418 A.2d 378, 380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); see also Commonwealth v. Brandon, 79 A.3d 1192, 1194-95 (Pa. 2013) (differentiating subdivisions of Section 3701(a)(1) and holding that conviction under subdivision (a)(1)(v) that was never charged must be vacated).

Nevertheless, this does not mean that Williams' indictment was constructively amended. Williams was charged under subdivision (a)(1)(i), (see Doc. 54-1 at 3; Doc. 54-4 at 2), and this is the subdivision under which he was convicted, (see Doc. 54-1 at 4). There was, in fact, no amendment-constructive or otherwise-of his indictment. While the Superior Court may have relied on the wrong statutory subdivision on appeal, its analysis regarding attempted theft under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701(a)(2), together with the indisputable fact that the jury found that Williams caused "serious bodily injury" when it convicted him of third-degree murder, demonstrates that there was no constitutional violation with respect to Williams' Section 3701 (a)(1)(i) robbery conviction.

As to any constitutional claim regarding sufficiency of the evidence unrelated to constructive amendment, such a claim is meritless. Under the facts recited by the state court, and through the highly deferential lens of sufficiency claims on habeas review, the Court cannot conclude that the state court's sufficiency-of-the-evidence determination was “objectively unreasonable.” See Coleman v Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (explaining that, on federal habeas review, a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge faces “two layers of judicial deference, ” and habeas courts cannot overturn a state court decision unless it was “objectively unreasonable”). Even under de novo review, there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to sustain a Section 3701 (a)(1)(i) conviction. Furthermore, it does not appear that Williams has...