Williams v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.

154 F.Supp.3d 407

Allen Williams

v.E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-cv-382-JWD-SCR

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

Signed December 30, 2015

Jane H. Barney, H. Barney Law Firm, LLC, J. Arthur Smith, III, Smith Law Firm, Baton Rouge, LA, for Allen Williams.

Monique M. Weiner, Lori A. Waters, Kuchler Polk Schell Weiner & Richeson, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company.

RULING AND ORDER

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Before the Court is Defendant E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company's (“DuPont”) Motion to Dismiss Hostile Work Environment Claims Under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 52.) Plaintiff Allen Williams (“Williams”) opposes the motion. (Doc. 55.) Also before the Court is Williams' request for leave to amend his Complaint. (Doc. 55 at 7.) DuPont opposes the request. (Doc. 57 at 3.) The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3). Oral argument is not necessary.

After careful consideration of the law, facts, and the arguments of the parties, DuPont's motion is granted. Williams has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for a hostile work environment under Title VII because a hostile work environment claim cannot reasonably grow out of the allegations of Williams' original EEOC charge and EEOC amendment. Further, Williams has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Finally, Williams' request for leave to amend his Complaint (Doc. 55 at 7) is denied because his request is futile in that he seeks to allege untimely, unrelated, and conclusory facts.

I. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

The Court previously granted in part and denied in part DuPont's Motion for Partial Dismissal. (Doc. 51.) However, the Court granted DuPont leave to file a motion to dismiss on Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim because Plaintiff argued this claim in his Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition, (Doc. 40) which was the last filing made with respect to the previous motion to dismiss.¹ (Doc. 51 at 20.) Subsequently, DuPont filed a motion to dismiss on the hostile work environment claims. (Doc. 55.)

The Court need not recite the entire factual background of Plaintiff's original complaint because it is detailed in the Court's previous ruling. (Doc. 51 at 2-10.) Even so, the most salient facts surrounding Williams' EEOC charge merit repeating.

A. Plaintiff's EEOC Charge

On September 13, 2010, Williams filled an EEOC charge (“the charge” or “original EEOC charge”). (Defendant's Exhibit A, Doc. 52-2 at 1.)² Williams alleged in the charge that he was subject to a schedule change on January 24, 2010 “for no reason” and that on April 10, 2010 he was written up after he complained to his supervisor, George Valentine. (Id. ) Williams' asserted in the complaint that “[a]ccording to [Valentine] ... the shift change occurred because [Williams] was weak and lacked confidence.” (Id. ) Further, “[t]he write-up ensured from incorrectly loading a chemical truck.” (Id. )

Williams claimed in the charge that he was “discriminated against based on [his] race, black” and that he was “retaliated against.” (Id. ) He asserted that he was discriminated against because a less experienced, white, junior operator “was not moved.” (Id. ) Additionally, Williams alleged that he was retaliated against because he “was written up for a ‘violation’ that is not written in a safety manual or anywhere else stating a truck cannot have a hose still hooked up on the rear of a trailer even if it is properly secured.” (Id. )

On September 11, 2012, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights to Williams. (Doc. 52-3 at 1.) On October 5, 2012, Williams requested that the EEOC reconsider its final determination and consolidate his charge with those of Leo Scott and Nathaniel Rapp. (Doc. 52-4 at 1-2.) The Field Director of the New Orleans Field Office then revoked the previous Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue on October 11, 2012. (Doc. 52-5 at 1.)

On January 31, 2014, Williams submitted a supplement (“EEOC amendment”) to his EEOC filing. (Defendant's Exhibit E, Doc. 52-6 at 1.) In that letter, Williams alleged that inclement weather occurred on January 24, 2014, making it unsafe for him to travel to work. (Id. ) When this happened, he contacted his new supervisor, Elizabeth Cromwell, and explained that he would be unable to come to work. (Id. ) She allegedly “responded that [Williams] would have to take a day of vacation³ if he could not get to work.” (Id. ) Williams “returned to work after the weather improved” and “spoke with Kent Templet⁴ ...” who informed Williams that “he also missed work due to the weather but was not required to use a vacation day for the weather related absence.” (Id. )

B. Present Motion

DuPont now moves this Court to dismiss Williams' hostile work environment claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).⁵ DuPont attaches eight (8) documents to its motion to dismiss. As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether it is appropriate to consider these documents.

The governing standard appears in Rule 12, its many exceptions mined in case law. In general, pursuant to Rule 12(d), “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) [,] ... matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ; United States v. Rogers Cartage Co. , 794 F.3d 854, 861 (7th Cir.2015). Naturally, there are some exceptions to this ostensibly ironclad standard. On a motion to dismiss, the court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, ‘documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.’ ” Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius , 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir.2011) (quoting Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc. , 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir.2008) ) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As the Fifth Circuit has recently explained, “[i]f the district court does not rely on materials in the record, such as affidavits, it need not convert a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.” U.S. ex rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C. , 798 F.3d 265, 275 (5th Cir.2015) (citing Davis v. Bayless , 70 F.3d 367, 372 n. 3 (5th Cir.1995). “[T]he mere submission [or service] of extraneous materials does not by itself convert a Rule 12(b)(6) [or 12(c) ] motion into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. v. Norfolk S. Corp. , 109 F.3d 993, 996 (4th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)). A district court, moreover, enjoys broad discretion in deciding whether to treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. See St. Paul Ins. Co. v. AFIA Worldwide Ins. Co. , 937 F.2d 274, 280 n. 6 (5th Cir.1991).

Here, DuPont's attachments consist of Williams' EEOC charge, right to sue letters, EEOC amendment, and several other related documents. (See Docs. 52-2 through 52-7.) These documents were referenced by Williams several times in either his original Complaint or First Amended Complaint. (See , generally, Docs. 1 and 13.) Further, Leo Scott and Nathaniel Rapp's separate EEOC charges (Docs. 52-8 and 52-9) were referenced by Williams when he alleged that he requested for the EEOC to consolidate his charge with those of Scott and Rapp. (Doc. 13 at 2 ¶ 70.2.)

Thus, because Williams referenced these documents in his original Complaint or First Amended Complaint, it is appropriate for the Court to consider these documents in deciding the present motion. As such, the Court need not convert the DuPont's Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment.

1. DuPont's Argument

DuPont argues that Williams' hostile work environment claim should be dismissed because he failed to administratively exhaust his claim under Title VII. (Doc. 52-1 at 2.) Further, with respect to section 1981, DuPont asserts that this Court “has already ruled that all discrete incidents of alleged discrimination arising before June 20, 2010 are time barred ... [and] are not resurrected by claiming that these discrete acts give rise to a hostile work environment claim.” (Id. )

DuPont claims that “[b]ecause a hostile work environment generally consists of multiple acts over a period of time, the requisite EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days of any action that contributed to the hostile work environment. (Id. at 8-9 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. WC&M Enterprises, Inc. , 496 F.3d 393, 398 (5th Cir.2007) ).) Additionally, DuPont argues that the scope of Williams' lawsuit “is limited to the ‘scope’ of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” (Id. at 9 (citing Stewart v. May Dept. Stores , 294 F.Supp.2d 841, 848 (M.D.La.2003) ).)

DuPont argues that “Williams only listed two discrete incidents of discrimination in his September 13, 2010 Charge: the January 24, 2010 schedule change and the April 6, 2010 write-up.” (Id. at 11.) DuPont claims that “Williams did not mention any other events, nor did he assert that his work environment was generally hostile.”

(Id. ) DuPont further argues that the letter Williams submitted to the EEOC to amend his charge to add the additional event on January 31, 2014, where Williams was allegedly forced to use a vacation day, also failed to include “any charge or discussion of hostile work environment[.]” (Id. ) As such, DuPont submits that “Williams is precluded by the four corners of his charge from asserting a claim of a hostile work environment,” and, because of this, “[Williams'] hostile work environment claim under Title VII must be dismissed.” (Id. )⁶

Next, with respect to section 1981, DuPont argues that the events prior to June 20, 2010 are not sufficiently related to post-June 20, 2010 claims, and, thus, are not actionable. (Id. at 12.) DuPont...