Williams v. Illinois

JEANETTA WILLIAMS,as independent administrator for the Estateof Dontrell Taquon Mundine-Williams, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,JOHN R. BALDWIN, and WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC. Defendants.

Case No. 3:19-CV-739-MAB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

July 22, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Jeanetta Williams brought this suit against the State of Illinois, the Illinois Department of Corrections ("the IDOC"), John Baldwin, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. ("Wexford") in her capacity as independent administrator for the estate of her son, Dontrell Taquon Mundine-Williams, who committed suicide on December 1, 2017 while incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center (Doc. 52). Williams alleges that Defendants' failure to provide her son with adequate medical and mental health care caused his death (Doc. 52). The three-count First Amended Complaint filed on October 28, 2019 (Doc. 52) is the operative complaint.

This matter is currently before the Court on the amended motion to dismiss (Doc. 74) and the motion to stay discovery (Doc. 81) filed by Defendants State of Illinois, the IDOC, and John Baldwin (Doc. 74). For the reasons explained below, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, and the motion to stay discovery is denied as moot.

FACTS ALLEGED IN THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Dontrell Taquon Mundine-Williams was incarcerated in May 2017 in the IDOC at Stateville Correctional Center on a parole violation. On July 28, 2017, he was transferred from Stateville to Lawrence Correctional Center. He was projected to be released in February 2018. However, he committed suicide on December 1, 2017.

The complaint alleges that Dontrell had a history of mental health issues and suicide attempts, which Defendants were aware of. While he was incarcerated between May and December 2017, Dontrell received medical and mental health treatment for his frequent seizures, depression, and bi-polar disorder. Dontrell had a history of at least four suicide attempts prior to his incarceration in May 2017 and three more while he was incarcerated—twice by using a staple to cut his wrists and once by drinking bleach. Dontrell repeatedly requested help and to speak with mental health professionals. Prison staff found him fashioning a noose out of his sheets on a number of occasions. He was placed on crisis watch at least six times.

Prior to December 1, 2017, which is the day Dontrell died, he learned he "was facing an extension of his time due to a rule violation" (Doc. 52, p. 5). On December 1st, he was not on crisis watch but in "a unit of lower level supervision and care and in segregation" (Doc. 52, p. 6). That day he flooded the toilet in his cell. At some point thereafter, he hung himself with a bedsheet.

The complaint alleges that Defendants are liable because, amongst other things, they did not keep Dontrell on crisis watch, failed to otherwise monitor Dontrell, failed to house him in a hospital or mental ward, failed to refer him for a mental health evaluation, and failed to provide him with appropriate mental health care.

MOTION TO DISMISS

The State of Illinois, the IDOC, and John Baldwin filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (Doc. 74). Defendants first stated that it is unclear what specific claims Plaintiff is bringing in the First Amended Complaint, but they surmised that Counts 1 and 3 were aimed at them (Doc. 74). They further stated that it appears all three Counts are based on Illinois state law, but to the extent Plaintiff brings constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they should be dismissed as to the State of Illinois and the IDOC because neither is a person within the meaning of § 1983 (Doc. 74). Defendants further argued that Plaintiff's claims against the State of Illinois and the IDOC are barred by state law sovereign immunity, as well as, the Eleventh Amendment (Doc. 74). Finally, Defendants argued that Plaintiff's claims against John Baldwin should be dismissed Plaintiff did not allege facts demonstrating Baldwin's personal involvement and because the claims are also barred by state sovereign immunity (Doc. 74).

Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss (Doc. 76), to which Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 78).

DISCUSSION

The Court agrees with Defendants that it is difficult to discern from the face of thecomplaint what claims Plaintiff is asserting. The First Amended Complaint is divided into three Counts (see Doc. 52). Typically, a "count" identifies a specific statute or legal theory under which a particular defendant is purportedly liable and the plaintiff is entitled to damages. N.A.A.C.P. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1992); Zurbriggen v. Twin Hill Acquisition Co., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 875, 882 (N.D. Ill. 2018). And each legal theory that the plaintiff is pursuing is put in a separate count. N.A.A.C.P., 978 F.2d at 292; Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992). But, here, none of the three Counts in the First Amended Complaint are titled (see Doc. 52). The allegations contained in each Count are largely, and often entirely, duplicative of one another (see id.). And each Count contains references or citations to numerous legal theories (see id.). For example, each Count contains language relevant to an Eighth Amendment claim ("utter indifference" and "conscious disregard"), as well as, a negligence claim ("duty of care") (e.g., Doc. 52, pp. 6-8, ¶¶28, 31). Each Count also cites to the Illinois Wrongful Death Act and the Illinois Survival Act (e.g., id. at p. 8, ¶¶35, 36). 37, 38). And each Count cites to the Illinois statute for medical malpractice—735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622—and references the attorney affidavit and certificate of merit attached to the complaint that are required under § 5/2-622 to maintain a medical malpractice claim (e.g., Doc. 52, p. 8, ¶¶ 37, 38).

Additionally, the Counts fail to identify which Defendant(s) they are directed at (see Doc. 52). The allegations and prayer for relief in Count 1 appear to be directed at the State of Illinois, the IDOC, and John Baldwin (see Doc. 52, pp. 2-8). In fact, Wexford is not mentioned in Count 1 (see id.). The allegations and prayers for relief in Counts 2 and 3appear to be primarily directed at Wexford, although the State of Illinois, the IDOC, and Baldwin are also mentioned in Counts 2 and 3 (Doc. 52, pp. 9-22).

That being said, the practice of pleading in counts, each identifying a specific statute or legal rule that was purportedly violated, is not required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although it is a common (and often very helpful) practice. Bartholet, 953 F.2d at 1078. See also N.A.A.C.P., 978 F.2d at 292 ("Identifying legal theories may assist defendants and the court in seeing how the plaintiff hopes to prevail, but this organization does not track the idea of 'claim for relief in the federal rules."). It is well-established that a complaint need not plead the legal theories that purportedly give rise to liability and damages. ACF 2006 Corp. v. Mark C. Ladendorf, Attorney at Law, P.C., 826 F.3d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 2016) ("[C]omplaints need not cite authority or set out a line of legal argument."); Rabe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 636 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2011)("A complaint need not identify legal theories, and specifying an incorrect legal theory is not a fatal error."); Hatmaker v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Although Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), require that a complaint in federal court allege facts sufficient to show that the case is plausible . . . they do not undermine the principle that plaintiffs in federal courts are not required to plead legal theories."); N.A.A.C.P., 978 F.2d at 292 ("[A complaint] need not identify the law on which the claim rests, and different legal theories therefore do not multiply the number of claims for relief. One set of facts producing one injury creates one claim for relief, no matter how many laws the deeds violate.").

Rather, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claimshowing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A "claim for relief" is a "grievance"—a statement of events or a general set of facts that entitle the plaintiff to damages. Johnson, 574 U.S. at 12; ACF 2006 Corp., 826 F.3d at 981; Rapid Test Prod., Inc. v. Durham Sch. Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 2006). See also N.A.A.C.P., 978 F.2d at 292 ("A complaint should limn the grievance and demand relief.").

Here, the complaint is premised on one core grievance: Defendants were well aware of Dontrell's medical and mental health problems but failed to provide him with adequate medical and mental health care due to systemic deficiencies within the IDOC, which led to Dontrell committing suicide (Doc. 52; Doc. 76). The motion to dismiss should be granted only if facts in the First Amended Complaint, taken as true, do not plausibly entitle Plaintiff to relief under any "recognized legal theory," even one not expressly identified in the complaint. Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, 999 F. Supp. 2d 991, 996 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (citing Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2012)); Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (reversing summary judgment that was entered against plaintiffs for failure to invoke 42. U.S.C. § 1983, explaining "no heightened pleading rule requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations of constitutional rights to invoke § 1983 expressly in order to state a claim."); Jajeh v. County of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 567 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding plaintiff pleaded a hostile work environment claim even though complaint never used that term). See also Norfleet v. Walker, ...