Williams v. Linode Liab. Co.

1

CARL WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. LINODE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-01618-JDW

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

March 29, 2024

MEMORANDUM

JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.

At a trial, there are at least two sides to every story. That goes without saying because if the “litigants' versions of the case were in harmony, there would have been no need for this trial.” Bolt v. Hickok, 887 F.Supp 709, 721 (D. Del. 1995). After hearing everyone's story our judicial system trusts juries to decide what happened. A jury's deliberations occur in a sanctum. Throughout trial, we tell jurors to avoid any outside information about a case and to decide the case based only on the evidence. And while they deliberate, we cut them off from the outside world. They have no cellphones or computers while they deliberate, just the exhibits, their memories of the testimony, and their common sense. And when they finish, we defer to their decisions, with very narrow exceptions. In this case, each side told its story to a jury over a seven-day trial. Carl Williams told a jury that he experienced pervasive discrimination during his employment at Linode LLC, and that Linode fired him due to that discrimination. Linode told the jury that it fired Mr. Williams because he had an ongoing relationship with John Musbach, who had been accused of criminal activity that at least some Linode employees could not stomach. The jury concluded that Mr Williams didn't prove his case.

Now, Mr. Williams wants a mulligan. He says my rulings before and during trial deprived him of a fair trial. While briefing that motion, he filed a reply brief that was late and overlength. I told him to shorten it, but Linode wants me to reconsider and strike his reply altogether. I won't deprive Mr. Williams of his reply. But I also won't give him a new trial. I've reviewed his arguments and the trial record, and I've concluded that Mr. Williams got a fair trial based on admissible evidence. I've also concluded that any errors that he posits did not prejudice the trial as a whole. I will therefore deny both Mr. Williams's motion for a new trial and Linode's request that I strike Mr. Williams's reply brief.

I. RECONSIDERATION

Mr. Williams filed his reply brief in support of his new trial motion late and overlength. I struck the brief for being overlength and gave him an opportunity to refile. Linode asks me to reconsider that and to bar Mr. Williams's reply for its lateness. A court may reconsider a prior ruling if the moving party shows (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court issued its order, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. See Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1 F.Supp.3d 319, 420 (E.D. Pa. 2014). Courts should grant reconsideration “sparingly.” Id. There's no new evidence or new law, so presumably Linode thinks I made a clear error or that my ruling is manifestly unjust.

While deadlines are mandates and not suggestions, I balance the need to enforce them with the well-established preference to resolve disputes on the merits. See Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1984). As a result, I have the authority to “extend a missed deadline if the party seeking the extension shows that it was tardy due to ‘excusable neglect.'” In re Princeton Off. Park, L.P., 649 Fed.Appx. 137, 141 n.3 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1)(B)). Under Rule 6(b), excusable neglect may extend to “inadvertent delays” and “is not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of the movant.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 392 (1993).

Although Mr. Williams does not provide a sufficient reason for his tardiness, his delay was not excessive. Linode suffers no prejudice from it. And Mr. Williams would suffer substantial prejudice if I did not consider his reply, which is the only chance he has to respond to Linode's arguments. Because Linode has not articulated a prejudice that it faces from my consideration of Mr. Williams's reply, I won't strike the filing. See In re Princeton Off. Park, L.P., 649 Fed.Appx. at 141 n.3.

II. NEW TRIAL

A. Legal Standard

After a jury trial, a judge may grant a new trial under Rule 59 “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1)(A). However, the judge will only grant a new trial where the “jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience.” Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991). Granting a new trial is discretionary. See Foster v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Co., 316 F.3d 424, 429 (3d Cir. 2003).

In granting a motion for a new trial on the basis of trial error, the judge must consider (1) whether an error was in fact committed and (2) whether that error was so prejudicial that denial of a new trial would be inconsistent with substantial justice. Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 709 F.Supp. 600, 601, aff'd, 922 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1990).

A judge “cannot speculate as to the content of the jury's deliberations.” See United States v. Russell, 134 F.3d 171, 177 (3d Cir. 1998). The judge must assume the jury understood and followed the instructions it received. See O'Brien v. Middle East Forum, 57 F.4th 110, 122 (3d Cir. 2023). Absent proof of improper extraneous influence, a judge will not guess or inquire as to the jury's thought process. See Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481, 488 (3d Cir. 1984). “Extraneous influences” include communications between the judge and jury outside the presence of counsel. See id.

B. Preliminary Matters

1. Post-trial juror comments

After a jury returns a verdict, I often permit counsel for the Parties to speak with jurors who are willing to do so. The opportunity lets counsel get feedback on the substance and style of their performance. The session takes place in the courtroom but off the record, and it is informal. Some jurors stay, others don't. I afforded counsel for the Parties in this case that opportunity. Now, Mr. Williams seeks to use what some jurors said during that discussion to support his Motion. To get around the fact that there is no record of the conversations, Mr. Williams's counsel, Seth Carson, submits a Declaration reporting on what he claims the jurors said to him, including that the jurors believed Mr. Williams to be “complicit” in Mr. Musbach's criminal activity. (ECF No. 81-1 at ¶ 20.)

At least two problems. First, the juror's statements as related in Mr. Carson's Declaration are hearsay. They were made out-of-court, in the sense that court was not in session (even though the conversation happened in the courtroom), and Mr. Williams offers them for their truth. But I have no way of knowing what the jurors said or the context in which they said it. Second, the jury's statements don't matter. It is “well settled ... that the jury's deliberative processes are not legally cognizable, except where subject to extraneous influences.” See Van Buskirk, 760 F.2d at 488 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Mr. Carson's Declaration doesn't suggest that there was any outside influence. It just reports on intra-jury discussions and thought process. To the extent that those thoughts evince “confusion[,]” that's “an inevitable result of jury deliberations” and cannot support a finding of a new trial. See id.

Finally, I note that Mr. Carson's introduction into the record of the jury's comments violates a trust between the bench and the bar. I give lawyers the chance to talk to jurors as an opportunity to learn from the experience. The learning opportunity is particularly important as jury trials have become less common. But the chance to talk with the jurors is a privilege, not a right. And by introducing the jurors' comments and using them as a basis to seek post-trial relief, Mr. Carson has abused that privilege. Jurors are willing to speak with counsel because they understand it is off the record, and if they think that their words will become fodder for post-trial motions, they won't want to speak. In addition, lawyers who prevail at trial will have no choice but to object to having jurors available to the losing counsel, and in the process they will forfeit their only opportunity to learn from the jurors. That shouldn't happen. Having abused the privilege of speaking with jurors, Mr. Carson should expect that I will not afford him the opportunity again in the future.

2. References to Mr. Carson's professionalism

In its response to the new trial motion, Linode cites instances where other judges in this court, including me, have sanctioned Mr. Carson in other cases. But what happened in other cases has nothing to do with the merits of Mr. Williams's new trial motion. It's a transparent attempt to poison me in my assessment of Mr. Williams's arguments. That's inappropriate. Linode's counsel may have frustrations with Mr. Carson. Indeed, Linode's counsel, Jonathan Cavalier, made those frustrations plain during trial. But this isn't the place to air those grievances. This is a motion for a new trial, not a sanctions motion, and my job is to resolve the motion on its merits, not based on Mr. Carson's history in other, unrelated cases.

C. John Musbach

Mr Musbach is not a party, and he did not testify at trial, but his shadow loomed large throughout the proceedings. Mr. Musbach is a former Linode employee. He had a personal relationship with Mr. Williams. At trial, the nature of that relationship was a bit unclear. But at points, Mr. Williams...