Williams v. Mesa Underwriters Specialty Ins. Co.

538 F.Supp.3d 234

Jayden WILLIAMS, per proxima amici Carmen Morales, Plaintiff,

v.MESA UNDERWRITERS SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

3:19-CV-01772 (KAD)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed May 8, 2021

Keith A. Yagaloff, Keith Yagaloff, PC, South Windsor, CT, for Plaintiff.

Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr., Josiah T.D. Butts, Robinson & Cole LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendant MESA Underwriters Specialty Insurance Company.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANT MESA UNDERWRITERS SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 20) AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 17)

Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Jayden Williams, per proxima amici¹ Carmen Morales, seeks a declaratory judgment finding that Defendant MESA Underwriters Specialty Insurance Company² ("MUSIC") is obligated to pay him $250,000 pursuant to a stipulated judgment entered in his favor in a lawsuit for personal injury brought by Plaintiff against MUSIC's insureds Donavan Realty Corporation, LLC ("Donavan Realty") and Kingsley Spencer ("Spencer"), among others, captioned Jayden Williams, A Minor By and Through His Mother et al. v. Donavan Realty Corporation aka Donavan Realty Corp. et al. , Docket No. HHD-CV15-6058281-S (Superior Court of Connecticut for the Judicial District of Hartford). Pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment each of which relies, albeit to different conclusions, on the language of the insurance policy issued by MUSIC to Donavan Realty and Spencer. For the following reasons, MUSIC's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Background and Procedural History

The following facts are undisputed.³ MUSIC issued a Commercial Property and Commercial General Liability policy ("MUSIC Policy" or "policy") to Donavan Realty⁴ and Spencer for an apartment complex located at 1053-1057 Capitol Avenue, Hartford, Connecticut effective September 19, 2014 through September 19, 2015. In pertinent part, the MUSIC Policy provides that:

[MUSIC] will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance does not apply.

(ECF No. 22-1 at 30 ). The MUSIC Policy also includes an animal liability exclusion that "applies to all liability claims relating to or arising from animals[.]" (Id. at 15 (hereinafter, "animal liability exclusion")).

On January 28, 2015, while visiting tenants at the complex, Plaintiff was attacked by a pit bull and suffered injuries. On March 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed the underlying lawsuit against (1) Donavan Realty for negligence; (2) Leonardo Perez (co-owner of the dog) for strict liability and negligence; and (3) Carmen Y. Morales Pagen (co-owner of the dog) for strict liability and negligence.⁵ Therein, Plaintiff generally alleged that Donavan Realty was negligent for failing to use reasonable care in keeping the premises safe from dangerous conditions, including the presence of a dangerous dog.

Upon Plaintiff's filing of the underlying lawsuit, Donavan Realty's insurance agent provided MUSIC with notice of the incident along with the summons and complaint. By letter dated March 19, 2015, MUSIC informed Donavan Realty and Spencer that it was denying the claim citing the animal liability exclusion. (ECF No. 22-4 at 5 ).

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed three amended complaints in the underlying lawsuit. First, on September 22, 2015, Plaintiff sought to amend the complaint to add MUSIC as a party because it denied Donavan Realty's claim. The court denied Plaintiff's request. Then, on September 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a proposed second amended complaint seeking to add Spencer as a defendant. The court granted Plaintiff's request and the second amended complaint became operative in November 2016. However, neither the insureds nor Plaintiff provided MUSIC with notice of the second amended complaint. Similarly, when Plaintiff filed the third amended complaint in April 2017, neither the insureds nor Plaintiff notified MUSIC. The third amended complaint added factual allegations regarding, inter alia , Donavan Realty's policies regarding dogs and its awareness of the dog's presence on the property.

Ultimately, the parties resolved the underlying lawsuit by stipulated judgment on September 26, 2018. (ECF No. 17-3 at 26 ). The $250,000 judgment, entered in favor of Plaintiff, was allocated 96% to Donavan Realty and 4% to Spencer. (Id. ). Pursuant to the judgment, Donavan Realty assigned its interests in the MUSIC policy to Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel agreed to make good faith efforts to collect the judgment from MUSIC. (Id. ).

Accordingly, on October 21, 2019, Plaintiff brought this action against MUSIC in the Connecticut Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment and finding that MUSIC is obligated to pay Plaintiff the full amount of the stipulated judgment. On November 11, 2019, MUSIC removed the action to this Court. Thereafter, on August 4, 2020, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. On September 11, 2020, MUSIC cross-moved for summary judgment. Both motions were fully briefed, and on December 17, 2020, the Court heard oral argument.

Standard of Review

The standard under which the Court reviews motions for summary judgment is well-established. "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," while a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Significantly, the inquiry conducted by the Court when reviewing a motion for summary judgment focuses on "whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the Court is "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Johnson v. Killian , 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft , 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) ).

Discussion

As noted above, there is no factual dispute as to the policy language at issue. The dispute is as to the applicability of the policy provisions. And nor is there a factual dispute as to the allegations asserted in the underlying lawsuit. Again, the dispute is as to the implications of those allegations vis a vis the policy provisions. MUSIC, therefore, moves for summary judgment as to its Second Affirmative Defense arguing that it had no duty to defend, nor to indemnify, the insureds in the underlying lawsuit because coverage for Plaintiff's claims was excluded by the animal liability exclusion. The animal liability exclusion provides:

EXCLUSION – ANIMAL LIABILITY

This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following:

COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM

SECTION I-COVERAGES, COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY, 2. EXCLUSIONS AND COVERAGE B PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILITY, 2. EXCLUSIONS are amended and the following added:

This exclusion applies to all liability claims relating to or arising from animals, including the failure to train, supervise, or control animal (s).

All other terms and conditions of this policy remain unchanged.

(ECF No. 22-1 at 15 (emphasis added)). Plaintiff counters that the animal liability exclusion did not apply to the underlying litigation thereby excusing MUSIC's duty to defend the underlying lawsuit, or to indemnify the insureds, because (1) the underlying lawsuit was not a liability claim and/or (2) the underlying lawsuit did not relate to or arise from animals. Therefore, Plaintiff seeks summary judgment pursuant to the general liability coverage under the policy.⁶

Duty to Defend

An insurer's duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify. Cmty. Action for Greater Middlesex Cty., Inc. v. Am. All. Ins. Co. , 254 Conn. 387, 398, 757 A.2d 1074 (2000).⁷ "If an allegation of the complaint falls even possibly within the coverage, then the insurance company must defend the insured." Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 274 Conn. 457, 463, 876 A.2d 1139 (2005) (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[Connecticut courts construe] broad policy language in favor of imposing a duty to defend on the insurer." Id. at 466, 876 A.2d 1139. "Where the insurer has sufficient knowledge to show that a claim falls within coverage even though not properly pleaded to [invoke] coverage, the carrier cannot make the face of the complaint argument[.]" Id. at 467, 876 A.2d 1139 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, an insurer is required "to provide a defense when it has actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility of coverage." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

"[T]he question of whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured is purely a question of law,...