Williams v. Morgan State Univ.

484 Md. 534

300 A.3d 54

Michele WILLIAMS v. MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.

Misc. No. 9, Sept. Term, 2022

Supreme Court of Maryland. *

August 14, 2023

Argued by Daniel E. Kenney (DK Associates, LLC, Chevy Chase, MD), on brief, for Appellant

Argued by Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Atty. Gen. ( Anthony G. Brown, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellee

Argued before: Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ.

Eaves, J.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an "ancient" concept. ¹ It is the long-established view that a sovereign, such as a state, is "infallible," ² and, thus, immune from suit "absent the State's consent." ³ The General Assembly provided such consent in the Maryland Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"), Md. Code Ann. State Gov't ("SG") (1984, 2021 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.) § 12-104(a)(1), which waives the State's immunity as to a "tort action in a court of the State[.]" In this case, we must determine whether the MTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity as to "a tort action" extends to federal statutory claims.

Although this case comes to us as a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, it originated in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Michele Williams, Appellant, filed a complaint against her former employer, Morgan State University ("MSU"), and her former supervisor, Dean DeWayne Wickham, in his personal capacity (collectively "Appellees") regarding her termination from the University. In an amended complaint, Appellant added claims alleging retaliation in violation of the National Defense Authorization Act ("NDAA"), 41 U.S.C. § 4712, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ("ARRA"), Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553, 123 Stat. 115, 297 (2009). Appellees timely removed the suit to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.

As to her federal claims against MSU, Appellant alleges that her termination by MSU was impermissible retaliation for disclosing that the University, primarily Dean Wickham, had overstated "the University's operating costs to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the United States Department of Education and ... attempted to influence the 2016 Baltimore mayoral race by violating FCC regulation[s]." Eventually, the Fourth Circuit certified a question of law to this Court, which we have slightly rephrased: Does Maryland's waiver of sovereign immunity for "a tort action" under the MTCA extend to federal statutory claims? ⁴ For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the General Assembly did not waive the State's sovereign immunity for such claims.

IJURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The General Assembly has granted this Court the authority to "answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States ... if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State." Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. ("CJP") (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.) § 12-603. The certifying court must "issue a certification order and forward it" to this Court. Id. § 12-605. That certification order must contain, among other things, the question of law to be answered and the relevant facts. Id. § 12-606. This Court accepted the Fourth Circuit's certified question of law. See id. § 12-607.

When answering a certified question, "this Court accepts the facts provided by the certifying court[,]" United Bank v. Buckingham , 472 Md. 407, 413, 247 A.3d 336 (2021) (citing Price v. Murdy , 462 Md. 145, 147, 198 A.3d 798 (2018) ), and cabins its "legal analysis and final determinations of Maryland law to the question[ ] certified[,]" Dickson v. United States , 478 Md. 255, 260, 274 A.3d 366 (2022) (citing Buckingham , 472 Md. at 421, 247 A.3d 336 ). Because certified questions can encompass only legal questions, "our analysis necessarily is de novo ." Id.

IIBACKGROUND

To place this certified question in proper context, we first discuss the facts as provided by the Fourth Circuit, the relevant procedural history, and the MTCA.

A. Factual Background

Appellant worked from 2014 to 2017 as MSU's Director of Broadcast Operations where she oversaw and managed MSU's radio and television stations. Before Baltimore City's 2016 mayoral election, Appellant organized a debate among all candidates. Then-incumbent Catherine Pugh, the Democratic Party candidate, was unable to attend the debate, so, according to Appellant, Dean Wickham instructed Appellant to cancel the debate at Mayor Pugh's behest. Adhering to prior guidance that candidates be provided on-air interviews to compensate for cancelled debate time, Appellant granted requests for interviews from Republican and Green Party candidates. Dean Wickham disapproved of Appellant's grants for interviews, stating that things would "not end well for her." Appellant complained to MSU that she believed Dean Wickham's actions violated various federal and state laws and regulations. Appellant also voiced concern to Dean Wickham and other MSU leaders that she believed that MSU intentionally was inflating expenses in reports submitted to state and federal agencies to secure larger grants. Appellant believes that her complaints resulted in her improper termination in 2017.

B. Procedural History

Appellant filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against MSU for wrongful termination in violation of a clear mandate of public policy (Count I), and against Dean Wickham for defamation (Count II). The operative first amended complaint, filed in December 2018, sought to "recover civil damages under Maryland common law torts and federal law" by adding to the initial complaint's common law tort counts a claim against both defendants for retaliation under the NDAA and the ARRA (Count III). ⁵ Appellees removed the suit to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, which dismissed the action with prejudice.

Appellant appealed, and the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order dismissing Appellant's federal statutory claims and remanded the case to the district court to address whether Maryland has waived state sovereign immunity against federal whistleblower claims by enacting the MTCA. Following remand and supplemental briefing by the parties, on July 26, 2021, the district court granted Appellees' renewed motion to dismiss on the ground that the MTCA does not waive the State's sovereign immunity with respect to such claims. Appellant again appealed from the district court's judgment dismissing her action. After briefing and oral argument, the Fourth Circuit certified the question of law to this Court, which we accepted.

C. The MTCA's Statutory Framework

The MTCA is codified under the State Government Article as Subtitle 1 of Title 12. "The MTCA was enacted in 1981 as a waiver of the State's sovereign immunity for tortious acts or omissions committed within the scope of the public duties of ‘state personnel’ and committed without malice or gross negligence." Barbre v. Pope , 402 Md. 157, 173, 935 A.2d 699 (2007). Under the MTCA, a party injured by the negligent act or omission of a state officer or employee within the scope of the officer's or employee's public duties may obtain compensation for that injury from the State.

SG § 12-104 states in pertinent part:

(a)(1) Subject to the exclusions and limitations in this subtitle and notwithstanding any other provision of the law, the immunity of the State and its units is waived as to a tort action, in a court of the State , to the extent provided under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(2)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, the liability of the state and its units may not exceed $400,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence.

* * *

(b) Immunity is not waived under this section as described under § 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

(Emphasis added). By its plain terms, SG § 12-104(b) provides that the scope of the State's waiver of sovereign immunity is established by the interplay between subsection (a) and CJP § 5-522(a). That section provides that the State's immunity is not waived for, among other things, "[a]ny tortious act or omission of State personnel that: (i) [i]s not within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel; or (ii) [i]s made with malice or gross negligence[.]" CJP § 5-522(a)(4).

The other central component of the MTCA, in addition to its waiver of the State's sovereign immunity for tortious acts or omissions by State personnel, is a corresponding immunity from suit and from liability in tort for State personnel. See SG § 12-105 ("State personnel shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article."); CJP § 5-522(b) (providing that State Personnel as defined under the MTCA are "immune from suit in courts of the State and from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence, and for which the State or its units have waived immunity" under SG § 12-104, "even if the damages exceed the limits of that waiver.").

The Legislature has created a comprehensive statutory scheme, where the waiver of the State's sovereign immunity for tort actions corresponds precisely with immunity from suit and liability for State personnel. In lieu of recovery from the negligent State personnel, the party may obtain compensation for that injury from the State. Barbre , 402 Md. at 173–74, 935 A.2d 699. "In other words, liability of the State and liability of individual State personnel are mutually exclusive. If the State is liable, the individual is immune; if the individual is liable, the State is immune." Newell v. Runnels , 407 Md. 578, 635, 967 A.2d 729 (2009). "In effect, the MTCA subs...