Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd.

1

LEANDER WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD, Respondent.

No. A-1174-21

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division

October 18, 2022

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

Argued October 3, 2022.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney John P. Flynn, of counsel and on the briefs).

Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Suzanne Davies, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Before Currier, Enright and Bishop-Thompson, Judges.

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Leander Williams challenges the December 15, 2021 final agency decision of respondent State Parole Board, which affirmed the special condition that Williams enter a 180-day residential treatment program (RTP) upon his administrative parole release. We affirm.

Williams now fifty-one years old, has been arrested forty-five times since he was a teenager; he has twenty prior convictions, most of which are drug related. Williams has served at least eight prison sentences. While incarcerated between 2007 and 2009, he participated in an organizational scheme to provide contraband to fellow inmates. Additionally, he has a history of multiple probation and parole violations.

In July 2019, Williams was sentenced under various indictments to an aggregate eight-year prison term, with a four-year period of parole ineligibility, following convictions for: third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); two counts of third-degree possession of a CDS with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3); two counts of third-degree distributing a CDS near school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a); and fourth-degree contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a).

While serving this aggregate sentence, Williams engaged in treatment for substance abuse with Alcoholic Anonymous, the Bo-Robinson Treatment and Assessment Center and the Harbor House. In April 2021, he submitted to a mental health parole evaluation and the evaluator determined Williams was a "medium risk for recidivism." The evaluator also opined "[t]he likelihood of . . . Williams successfully completing a projected term of parole is fair to poor due to [his] past criminal lifestyle, limited pro[-]social problem-solving skills, insufficient pro-social support network, limited education and drug relapse risk." (emphasis added).

In September 2021, a Board panel reviewed and certified Williams for administrative parole release under the recently enacted Earn Your Way Out (EYWO) Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55b.^[1] The panel also imposed a special condition mandating Williams's participation in an RTP for a minimum of 180 days. Williams became eligible for parole the following month, having served out his minimum sentence.

In October 2021, Williams administratively appealed the special condition, arguing the Board lacked the statutory authority to compel his participation in an RTP once he qualified for administrative parole release under the EYWO Act. He further argued the special condition created an undue hardship for him because it interfered with his ability to see his wife, who was hospitalized and terminally ill with cancer.

On November 10, 2021, two Board panel members affirmed the special condition.^[2] Nine days later, Williams requested that his administrative appeal be considered by the full Board. Before the full Board had the opportunity to address his appeal, Williams was released to the RTP and subsequently completed the 180-day program.^[3]

In December 2021, shortly after Williams commenced the RTP, his parole officer (PO) granted Williams's request to visit his wife in the hospital. On the day of the scheduled visit, the PO advised Williams he was a "flight risk" and needed an escort to the hospital due to his history of violating parole.^[4] Williams became "defensive and belligerent" with his PO and questioned why he was assigned to the RTP. Because Williams became increasingly "verbally aggressive" and "argumentative," the PO told him to return to the housing unit and "regroup." Based on Williams's ongoing behavioral problems, the visit was postponed to the following day.^[5]

On December 15, the full Board affirmed the panel's imposition of the RTP as a special condition of Williams's administrative parole release. The Board concluded:

[p]ursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(b), an inmate released on administrative parole shall be subject to the provisions and conditions established by the appropriate Board panel in accordance with the procedures and standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59. The Board also finds that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a)[,] in addition to the general conditions of parole, the Board panel may impose additional special conditions of parole in an offender's case deemed reasonable . . . to reduce the likelihood of recurrence of criminal behavior. The Board finds . . . Williams participated in Alcoholics Anonymous . . .[,] the Bo-Robinson Treatment and Assessment Center . . . and . . . Harbor House ..... However, . . . [he] has a substantial criminal history involving drugs; . . . [and] is currently incarcerated for four drug[-]related offenses; . . . [His] offenses involve him selling cocaine and crack cocaine; [his] record reflects that he used cocaine in his teenage years and consumed alcohol daily; and . . . [he] has had several probation and parole opportunities in the past with violations[,] including failure to complete the Stages To Enhance Parolee Success Program. Therefore, the Board concurs with the Board panel's assessment that the imposition of the special condition requiring . . . Williams'[s] successful completion of a residential community program was . . . reasonable . . . to reduce the likelihood of recurrence of criminal behavior. The Board finds it imperative that . . . Williams receives additional programming to address his criminal behavior and substance abuse history, as well as obtain additional life/job skills, and that he will be able to participate in such programming in a residential community program.

. . . .

The Board finds that placement in the Electronic Monitoring Program or release to the community is not appropriate at this time as it is imperative that . . . Williams receive additional program[m]ing in a residential community program.

Shortly after the full Board issued its decision, Williams moved for emergent relief before us, seeking vacatur of the RTP condition. We denied the application, but subsequently granted his request to accelerate his appeal. The Supreme Court also denied Williams's request for emergent relief, noting, as we had, that Williams could apply to the Board for visits with his wife.

On appeal, Williams urges us to reverse the Board's imposition of the RTP as a special condition. He again contends the Board "lacks statutory authority to parole an inmate who qualifies for administrative parole release under the [EYWO] Act to a residential facility." In addition, he argues "the special condition mandating that [he] remain in a residential facility" was "arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable" because it did "not reasonably reduce the likelihood of recurrence of criminal behavior and amount[ed] to an undue hardship." We are not persuaded.

The scope of our review of an administrative agency's decision is limited. See Malacow v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 457 N.J.Super. 87, 93 (App. Div. 2018). "Our review of the Parole Board's determination[s] is deferential in light of its expertise in the specialized area of parole supervision." J.I. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 228 N.J. 204, 230 (2017) (citing McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J.Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002)). We affirm an agency determination unless it "'went so far wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made.'" N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J.Super. 534, 547 (App. Div. 1988) (quoting 613 Corp. v. State, Div. of State Lottery, 210 N.J.Super. 485, 495 (App. Div. 1986)).

We recognize "[t]o a greater degree than is the case with other administrative agencies, the Parole Board's decision-making function involves individualized discretionary appraisals." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (citing Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 358-59 (1973)). Such appraisals are presumed valid. McGowan, 347 N.J.Super. at 563. Therefore, "[w]e will reverse a decision of the Board only if the offender shows that the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable, lacked credible support in the record, or violated legislative policies." K.G. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 458 N.J.Super. 1, 30 (App. Div. 2019) (citations omitted). But an agency's statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002).

It is well established "[t]he Parole Board 'is the administrative agency charged with the responsibility of deciding whether an inmate satisfies the criteria for parole release under the Parole Act of 1979[, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 to - 123.76].'" Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 250 N.J. 431, 477 (2022) (quoting In re Application of Hawley, 98 N.J. 108, 112 (1984)).^[6] Under this Act, the Board has "broad authority" to "discharge . . . its responsibilities," which responsibilities "include imposing 'specific conditions of...