Williams v. Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People

227 N.E.3d 457

2023-Ohio-3948

Noel WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellee,

[Adam J. Grosshandler et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees],

v.NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 22AP-492

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Rendered on October 31, 2023

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, (C.P.C. No. 14CV-9504).

On brief: The Tyack Law Firm Co., LPA, Jonathan T. Tyack, and Holly B. Cline, Columbus, for appellee Noel Williams. Argued: Jonathan T. Tyack.

On brief: Adam J. Grosshandler, pro se. Argued: Adam J. Grosshandler.

On brief: Samil C. Pullen, pro se.

On brief: The Gittes Law Group, Frederick M. Gittes, and Jeffrey P. Vardaro, Columbus, for appellant National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; James E. Workman, Jr., Zanesville, for appellant Sybil Edwards-McNabb. Argued: Jeffrey P. Vardaro.

DECISION

LELAND, J.

{¶ 1} Defendants-appellants National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") and Sybil Edwards-McNabb ("McNabb") (collectively, "appellants"), appeal from a decision and entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying their motion for sanctions, pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11, against plaintiff-appellee, Noel Williams, and her former counsel Carrie Varner (collectively, "appellees"). Appellants also sought sanctions against Williams’ two former pro bono attorneys, Adam J. Grosshandler, and Samil C. Pullen.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} This matter arises from the July 14, 2022 judgment and entry of the common pleas court which the trial court issued upon remand from our decision in Williams v. NAACP, 10th Dist., 2019-Ohio-1897, 135 N.E.3d 1260 ("Williams"). As our prior decision thoroughly reviewed the facts as they pertain to the present case, we adopt such discussion here. See id. at ¶ 2-8. Below, we outline additional facts as they pertain to the issue of sanctions.

{¶ 3} On September 12, 2014, appellees filed a complaint alleging several contractual claims, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. Regarding the defamation claim, the complaint averred that on August 15, 2013, Ohio NAACP President McNabb published "a false statement about [Williams] * * * in a malicious attempt to harm" her reputation, NAACP membership status, and position as president of the Columbus NAACP branch office. (Compl. at 7-8.) The parties conducted discovery for more than three years, producing an extensive record detailing, among other things, McNabb’s allegedly defamatory statements and the damage they purportedly caused Williams’ reputation.

{¶ 4} On February 5, 2018, appellants each filed a motion for summary judgment, and on February 23, 2018, they filed a joint motion for sanctions against appellees in which they accused Williams and her attorneys of "providing knowingly false interrogatory answers and produc[ing] fabricated evidence" for the apparent purpose of complying with the statute of limitations, (Sept. 15, 2020 Mot. for Sanctions at 1.) Appellants sought an award of attorney fees and expenses commensurate with the cost of defending against appellees’ allegedly frivolous discovery filings. Appellees opposed both summary judgment motions but did not defend against the motion for sanctions. On May 15, 2018, the trial court granted appellants’ summary judgment motions and denied the motion for sanctions. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment decisions but reversed its denial of sanctions, remanding with instructions for the trial court to consider the motion for sanctions.

{¶ 5} The trial court then held a sanctions hearing on September 8, 2020. In spite of appellants’ objections and specific allegations that Varner, Williams’ former counsel, filed fraudulent documents into evidence, the trial court dismissed Varner from the hearing. Three witnesses testified in support of the motion for sanctions: James Workman, an attorney representing McNabb; Annie Ross-Womack, McNabb’s special assistant at NAACP; and Jeffrey P. Vardaro, an attorney representing NAACP. Appellees called no witnesses to testify at the hearing. On October 20, 2020, the trial court declined appellants’ request to schedule a second sanctions hearing and decided instead to resolve the issue based on submissions to the docket. The record includes the depositions of many witnesses relevant to the issue of sanctions, including McNabb and Varner. On July 14, 2022, the trial court again denied the motion for sanctions. The trial court tersely explained it did "not find sufficient evidence to award sanctions under Civil Rule 11 or O.R.C. 2323.51." (Order & Entry at 6.)

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 6} Appellants present the following assignment of error for our review:

The trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendants’ motion for sanctions in light of the extreme litigation misconduct committed by Plaintiff and her former counsel throughout the original litigation, the prior appeal, and even during the sanctions proceedings themselves, much of which the trial court completely ignored and omitted reference to in its order denying sanctions.

III. Analysis

[1] {¶ 7} In their sole assignment of error, appellants contend the trial court erred in denying their motion for sanctions and attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11. Ohio law provides "separate mechanisms * * * for an aggrieved party to seek attorney fees for frivolous conduct—R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11." Thomas v. Murry, 8th Dist. No. 109287, 2021-Ohio-206, 2021 WL 303822, ¶ 34, citing In re Estate of O’Toole, 8th Dist. No. 108122, 2019-Ohio-4165, 2019 WL 5079689, ¶ 22. "While both R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11 authorize the award of attorney fees as a sanction for frivolous conduct, they present separate standards of proof and differ in application." Id., citing O’Toole at ¶ 22.

[2, 3] {¶ 8} Under Civ.R. 11, an attorney’s signature certifies the attorney: (1) "has read the document," (2) to the best of the attorney’s "knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it," and (3) "that it is not interposed for delay." A trial court examining an alleged Civ.R. 11 violation employs a subjective "bad-faith" standard in which it determines whether an attorney violated the rule willfully or merely negligently. See Stafford v. Columbus Bonding Ctr., 177 Ohio App.3d 799, 2008-Ohio-3948, 896 N.E.2d 191, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.), citing Ceol v. Zion Industries, Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 286, 290, 610 N.E.2d 1076 (9th Dist.1992). Only a "willful violation" of Civ.R. 11 may result in "an award to the opposing party of expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing any motion under this rule." Civ.R. 11; Crockett v. Crockett, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-482, 2003-Ohio-585, 2003 WL 257497, ¶ 16 ("[S]anctions are not supportable under [Civil] Rule 11 in the absence of a finding that the filing was willful."). Penalties under Civ.R. 11 may be levied only against attorneys or pro se litigants. An appellate court may not reverse a trial court’s Civ.R. 11 sanctions decision absent a showing the trial court abused its discretion. Williams I at ¶ 35, citing Brust v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-502, 2016-Ohio-7876, 2016 WL 6906124, ¶ 9.

[4–8] {¶ 9} Under R.C. 2323.51, a court "may assess and make an award to any party to the civil action or appeal who was adversely affected by frivolous conduct." R.C. 2323.51(B)(1). This statute was "not intended to punish mere misjudgment or tactical error," but rather "to chill egregious, overzealous, unjustifiable, and frivolous action." Thomas at ¶ 38, citing Turowski v. Johnson, 70 Ohio App.3d 118, 123, 590 N.E.2d 434 (9th Dist.1991), and Turowski v. Johnson, 68 Ohio App.3d 704, 706, 589 N.E.2d 462 (9th Dist.1990). Frivolous conduct has multiple definitions under this statute that are addressed separately below. In R.C. 2323.51, conduct is understood broadly to mean the actions typically taken by a party or a party’s counsel as they relate to litigation, such as filing suit, claims, defenses, pleadings, appeals, or other motions in connection to a civil action. See Uting v. Zimmer, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-627, 2022-Ohio-3248, 2022 WL 4243853, ¶ 30, quoting Russell v. Ryan, 10th Dist., 2021-Ohio-2505, 175 N.E.3d 969, ¶ 14. Unlike the bad-faith standard of Civ.R. 11, a court determines whether a party or a party’s counsel engaged in frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51 using an objective test, "without reference to what the individual knew or believed." Stafford at ¶ 8, citing Stevenson v. Bernard, 11th Dist. No. 2006-L-096, 2007-Ohio-3192, 2007 WL 1810487, ¶ 41. R.C. 2323.51 is therefore "broader in scope than Civ.R. 11." Id., citing State Farm Ins. Cos. v. Peda, 11th Dist. No. 2004-L-082, 2005-Ohio-3405, 2005 WL 1538623, ¶ 25. Any person "who has commenced or persisted in maintaining a frivolous action may be assessed sanctions" under R.C. 2323.51. Calypso Asset Mgt., L.L.C. v. 180 Indus., L.L.C., 10th Dist., 2019-Ohio-2, 127 N.E.3d 507, ¶ 42, citing Carasalina L.L.C. v. Bennett, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-74, 2014-Ohio-5665, 2014 WL 7274354, ¶ 30. An award pursuant to this statute may include "court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the civil action or appeal." R.C. 2323.51(B)(1).

[9–11] {¶ 10} Frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(ii) means the conduct of a party or the party’s counsel of record that "is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the establishment of new law." In objectively reviewing allegedly frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(ii), " ‘an attorney’s ignorance of the law or failure to investigate the law is not deemed objectively reasonable;’ " Calypso at ¶ 43, quoting Kozar v. Bio-Medical Applications of Ohio, Inc.,...