Williams v. Nyberg

1

SHAWN L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. ROBIN NYBERG, WAGNER, HARMON, PAUL ENNIS, LAURA GILES, ROSCINSKI, ERIC EGAN, MICHAELC. CLARK, BRIAN FLINCHBAUGH, MICHELLE THARP, LT. T. ANDERSON, PRINCIPAL CINDY CLARK, RALPH A. DECECCO, SARA EDDY, LT. SKINNER, CAPT. D. HEIBNER, CAPT. SISSEM, CAPT. IRWIN, UNIT MANAGER KURT SEUSSER, VALARIE KUSIAK, LIEUTENANT J.W. FAIT, MAJOR PATRICIA THOMPSON, MAJOR CHRISTOPHER M. MEURE, ERIN BROWN, LT. S. BARNER, ASHLEY WEBER, J.S. JOHNSON, JOHNE. WETZEL, TREVOR WINGARD, JAMES C. BARNACLE, TABB BICKELL, RICH KUSTENBAUDER, CRAIG MCEWEN, and BARRY SMITH, Defendants

No. 1:20-cv-0208

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

October 19, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(6) ECF NO. 60

HON RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Recommendation

This case has been referred to the undersigned for pretrial proceedings in accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. 636, and Local Civil Rule 72. It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [ECF No 60] Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 72] be GRANTED.^[1] It is further recommended that Plaintiff be granted leave to file a third amended complaint as to certain claims, the deficiencies of which may be subject to cure as detailed in the following Report.

II. Background

The case is currently proceeding on Williams' Second Amended Complaint and concerns events that took place while he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”).^[2] See ECF No. 72. Williams, acting pro se, has filed a 102-paragraph Second Amended Complaint against thirty-four employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, each of whom he has sued in his or her official and individual capacities. Id. p. 2. Williams' Amended Complaint is not organized into counts or causes of action but, instead, presents as a chronological narrative spanning events between July 20, 2018 and January 14, 2019. Because Williams is representing himself, it is the Court's obligation to identify any claims that the factual allegations of the Second Amended Complaint plausibly support, regardless of whether Williams has correctly identified them. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972); Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969). This liberal approach to pro se complaints applies to Williams' factual allegations, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of the Defendants' motion to dismiss. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). It does not extend, however, to conclusions of law or factually unsupported characterizations and inferences, which the Court should disregard in deciding a motion to dismiss. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2009). Once the conclusions of law and factually unsupported characterizations and inferences are stripped from Williams' Amended Complaint, the factual allegations that remain are insufficient to support a viable claim under any theory of liability. Accordingly, Defendants' motion should be granted, and the claims against all Defendants should be dismissed, albeit with Williams being granted one final opportunity to amend as to certain claims.

III. The Second Amended Complaint

Although the “Statement of Claims” section of Williams' Second Amended Complaint purports to be a chronological recitation of facts, it is laden with conclusions of law and proposed inferences that are unsupported by facts. See ECF No. 72, pp. 2-23. It also repeatedly makes allegations against all or large groups of Defendants without identifying the conduct of specific individuals. Id. As the initial factual foundation for his claims, Williams alleges that, “[b]y July 20, 2018, ” he filed grievances against five of the Defendants, “Nyberg, Giles, M. Clark, Roscinski, and Kusiak regarding [his] law library access/privileges, and attacks on [his] work assignment as a Chapel Janitor.”^[3] Id., ¶ 1. Immediately following this allegation, Williams launches into conclusory assertions of a sweeping conspiracy involving all or substantially all Defendants. For example, Williams next paragraph states, “Plaintiff discerned a conspriratorial (sic) plot to enable Giles and Roscinski to terminate plaintiff from his Chapel Janitor work assignment because of his filings of DC-ADM 804 grievances, which was acquiesced by M. Clark, Ennis, Flinchbaugh, Kusiak, and Roscinski, with the understanding that plaintiff was marked as a target of retaliation for filing grievances and lawsuits against SCI Albion staff ...” Id., ¶ 2. Williams next references an incident on July 25, 2018, when “defendant Nyberg disrespectfully tossed plaintiff's call-out pass at him in a resentful manner., ” prompting Williams to file grievance 79448. Id., ¶ 3. Williams then attributes this facially unrelated incident to his grand conspiracy theory, alleging that, “On July 31, 2018, defendant Grievance Coordinator Tharp conspiratorially rejected grievance 74998 against Nyberg in a complicit act, intended to thwart plaintiff's complaint against Nyberg and deny plaintiff administrative remedy in retaliation..” Id., ¶ 4. Williams' next allegation is an assertion of “interference and intimidation” against him, which is likewise conclusory and devoid of factual support:

On August 6, 2018, defendants M. Clark and T. Anderson used interference and intimidation against plaintiff in concert with defendant Nyberg because of plaintiff's grievance against Nyberg. Both defendants used their authority to threaten and intimidate plaintiff into withdrawing his grievance claims against Nyberg, while acquiescing Nyberg's open display of resentment towards plaintiff, and intentionally destroying/failing to preserved the relevant video evidence [of Nyberg's disrespectful conduct on July 25, 2018] in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Id., ¶ 5.

This allegation is followed by Williams complaining about an incident “when defendant Roscinski confronted plaintiff and demanded plaintiff change his wall clock batteries, while using the opportunity to debase plaintiff and deny Supervisory defendant Dececco's request for plaintiff's pay rate promotion, and advising plaintiff that he ‘needed to start kissing up instead of filing grievances and complaining.'” Id., ¶ 6. Next, Williams references an ostensibly unrelated encounter some weeks later “when plaintiff was also reminded of the threast (sic) to ‘lay off Nyberg' by Wagner, and that Giles, Roscinski, T. Anderson, M. Clark, and C. Clark also did not want plaintiff working anywhere near Nyberg or the Education/Program Services building.” Id., ¶ 7. In the next two paragraphs of the Second Amended Complaint, Williams complains that Nyberg did not respond to a request he made on September 4, 2018, for law library access until a week later, when Nyberg explained that her failure to accommodate the request was due to “an institutional lockdown.” Id., ¶¶ 8-9. Williams characterizes Nyberg's actions and response as “retaliation with the intent to deny plaintiff's access to courts” and as “an attempt to antagonize plaintiff, frustrate and impede plaintiffs access to the court in violation of the First Amendment....” Id.

The Second Amended Complaint continues in similar fashion for the next ninety paragraphs. What the Court can discern factually from the Second Amended Complaint is that Williams is a prolific filer of grievances-certain of the Defendants expressed frustration to Williams concerning his practice of filing grievances in response to every action taken by prison personnel with which he disagreed and every perceived slight by a staff member. See e.g., id., ¶¶ 2, 6, 19. Indeed, the Second Amended Complaint reveals a clear pattern of Williams characterizing almost every such action or slight as an act of retaliation for a grievance or grievances that he previously submitted, typically against or involving unrelated prison personnel, all of whom Williams purports to link together under his grand conspiracy theory.

Nevertheless, construing Williams' pro se pleading liberally, some claims become readily apparent: (1) a First Amendment retaliation claim; (2) a First Amendment free speech claim; (3) an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim; (4) a conspiracy claim under state and federal law; and (5) a claim that some Defendants failed to prevent a conspiracy. Each claim will be analyzed in turn.

IV. Standards of Decision and Scope of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281...