Williams v. Prisoner Transp. Servs., LLC

FRANKLYN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. PRISONER TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendants.

NO. 3:19-cv-00599

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

November 30, 2020

JUDGE RICHARDSON

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court are Defendant Brevard Extraditions, LLC d/b/a U.S. Prisoner Transport's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 15) and Defendants Prisoner Transportation Services, LLC and Prisoner Transportation Services of America, LLC's Joint Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 24) (together, "Motions"). Plaintiff has filed a response to the Motions (Doc. No. 30), and Defendant Brevard Extraditions has filed a Reply (Doc. No. 31).

BACKGROUND¹

This case arises from the five-day transport of Plaintiff by Defendants from Omaha, Nebraska, to Cleveland, Ohio, in July 2018. During that transport, Plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of Defendants and, at the time of filing this action, Plaintiff was in the custody of the Cuyahoga County Jail in Cleveland, Ohio.

Defendants Prisoner Transportation Services of America, LLC; Brevard Extraditions, LLC d/b/a U.S. Prisoner Transport; and Prisoner Transportation Services, LLC will be referred to herein as "the PTS Defendants."² The only other remaining Defendant³ is Cuyahoga County, Ohio, which contracted with the PTS Defendants for the provision of extradition and prisoner transport services traditionally provided by local law enforcement.

Plaintiff asserts that the PTS Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment through cruel and unusual punishment, including deplorable and inhumane conditions of transport,⁴ inadequate medical care, and the use of excessive force. He contends that the PTS Defendants' policies and practices encourage this mistreatment of prisoners because they "prioritize maximizing profits by transporting as many detainees as possible, with as few stops for rest or care possible, over [their] obligation to safely transport those in [their] custody." (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 15). Plaintiff alleges that the PTS Defendants fail to appropriately screen, train, and/or supervise their drivers and employees to ensure that such abuses of detainees do not occur. (Id. at ¶ 44). "In fact, the PTS Defendants' policies and practices engender a culture that encourages such conduct." (Id.).

Plaintiff also alleges that the PTS Defendants are liable on state-law claims of assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, vicarious liability for the wrongful acts of their employees, negligence, gross negligence, and negligent supervision and hiring. The PTS Defendants have moved to dismiss some of Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 1950. A legal conclusion, including one couched as a factual allegation, need not be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss, nor are mere recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Id.; Fritz v. Charter Township of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010), cited in Abriq v. Hall, 295 F. Supp. 3d 874, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2018). Moreover, factual allegations that are merely consistent with the defendant's liability do not satisfy the claimant's burden, as mere consistency does not establish plausibility of entitlement to relief even if it supports the possibility of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In determining whether a complaint is sufficient under the standards of Iqbal and its predecessor and complementary case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), it maybe appropriate to "begin [the] analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. This can be crucial, as no such allegations count toward the plaintiff's goal of reaching plausibility of relief. To reiterate, such allegations include "bare assertions," formulaic recitation of the elements, and "conclusory" or "bald" allegations. Id. at 681. The question is whether the remaining allegations - factual allegations, i.e., allegations of factual matter - plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. If not, the pleading fails to meet the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and thus must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 683.

As a general rule, matters outside the pleadings may not be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) unless the motion is converted to one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). When a document is referred to in the pleadings and is integral to the claims, it may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 219 F.Supp.3d 645, 652-53 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Blanch v. Trans Union, LLC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 789, 791-92 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

In response to the pending motions, Plaintiff has conceded that his constitutional claims are based upon the Fourteenth Amendment only, not the Fourth or Eighth Amendment.⁵ (Doc. No.30 at 2). Moreover, Plaintiff concedes that the PTS Defendants cannot be held liable for constitutional violations based upon a respondeat superior theory. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff alleges that the PTS Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment through (1) their use of excessive force, (2) their failure to provide adequate medical care, and (3) their imposition of the conditions of confinement to which Plaintiff was subjected. He contends that the PTS Defendants are liable for their own constitutional violations and their practices, policies, and customs that were the moving force behind Guerra's actions. (Doc. No. 30 at 3).

A private party may enforce his federal constitutional rights against "anyone who subjects [him] to the deprivation of any rights or privileges secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A person suing under this statute must demonstrate the denial of a constitutional right caused by a defendant "acting under color of state law." Carl v. Muskegon County, 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6^th Cir. 2014); Epperson v. City of Humboldt, 183 F. Supp. 3d 897, 903 (W.D. Tenn. 2016). Because they performed a traditional state function in transporting state prisoners, the PTS Defendants were acting under the color of state law for purposes of the events alleged in the Complaint.⁶ See Vick v. CoreCivic, 329 F. Supp. 3d 426, 445 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (citing Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996)).

The Sixth Circuit applies the standards for assessing municipal liability to claims against private corporations that operate prisons (or, as here, transport prisoners). Bumpus v. Howard, No. 3:19-cv-01081, 2020 WL 4431463, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. July 30, 2020). A municipality (and therefore the PTS Defendants) can be liable under Section 1983 only if the plaintiff establishesthat (1) the plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) the municipality was responsible for that violation. Roath v. Lee, No. 3:17-cv-00995, 2019 WL 3066533, at *15 (M.D. Tenn. July 12, 2019) (citing Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 2009)). Municipalities are liable for harms resulting from a constitutional violation only when the injury resulted from an implementation of the municipality's official policies or established customs. Id. (citing Spears, 589 F.3d at 256). That is to say, the PTS Defendants may be liable under § 1983 only if their official policies or customs caused a constitutional injury to Plaintiff. Vick, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 445; Mason v. Doe, No. 3:12CV-P794-H, 2013 WL 4500107, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 21, 2013) ("a private corporation may be liable under § 1983 when the corporation's official policy or custom causes the alleged deprivation of a federal right").

Like every other § 1983 "person," local governments (and, as here, private corporations), may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom," even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decision-making channels. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see also Leach v. Shelby Cty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1248 (6th Cir. 1989) (sheriff's failure to supervise and correct the situation [instances of abuse of paraplegic or physically infirm inmates] in view of the numerous similar incidents and his failure subsequently to punish the responsible individuals found to be "more than sufficient evidence" of a policy or custom to render county liable for the plaintiff's damages).⁷

Liability for constitutional violations attaches only if the defendants' policies are shown to be the "moving force" behind the plaintiff's injury. Vick, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 445 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). As to each alleged constitutional violation, therefore, the Court must look at whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation and, if so, whether he has sufficiently alleged that the moving force behind his alleged injury was...