Williams v. Salt Lake Cnty.

488 F.Supp.3d 1136

ESTATE OF Byron WILLIAMS, Plaintiff,

v.SALT LAKE COUNTY, West Valley City, and Does 1–20, Defendants.

Case No. 2:19-cv-00128

United States District Court, D. Utah.

Signed September 21, 2020

Michael P. Studebaker, Studebaker Legal Services PC, Ogden, UT, for Plaintiff.

David A. Miller, Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant Salt Lake County.

Matthew D. Church, Plant Christensen & Kanell, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant West Valley City.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Jill N. Parrish, United States District Court Judge

Before the court are two Motions to Dismiss (the "Motions") filed by defendants Salt Lake County and West Valley City (collectively, "Defendants"). See ECF Nos. 12, 13. The Estate of Byron Williams ("Plaintiff") filed this Section 1983 action on February 26, 2019, alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights because they were "deliberately indifferent to [Mr. Williams's] needs by failing to ensure he was treated for life threatening injuries" caused by violence from a third party. See Compl. ¶¶ 28–30. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims,¹ arguing in pertinent part that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which the court can grant relief. For the following reasons, the court grants the Defendants’ Motions.

I. BACKGROUND

This dispute involves the death of Byron Williams after government emergency services allegedly failed to timely render aid to Mr. Williams when he was shot by a private individual. Plaintiff alleges that on November 20, 2016, Mr. Williams had an altercation with Christopher James Bonds, which resulted in Mr. Bonds shooting Mr. Williams. Id. ¶¶ 14–16. An eyewitness to the shooting called 911 and requested that emergency services dispatch first responders to provide medical care for Mr. Williams. Id. ¶ 18. The eyewitness was placed on hold and disconnected from her first call, and she subsequently called 911 twice more before connecting with a 911 operator. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that the 911 operator inquired about Mr. Williams's race and the eyewitness stated that Mr. Williams was African American. See id. ¶¶ 20–21. Plaintiff asserts that it was "close to one-and-a-half hour[s]" after the 911 call when an ambulance arrived to where Mr. Williams lay injured. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff also alleges that upon arrival, the first responder medical personnel had "no sense of urgency" to care for Mr. Williams because "the responders were acting very nonchalantly" and "there were no emergency lights or sirens activated" when the ambulance arrived at the scene. Id. ¶ 24. Moreover, Plaintiff emphasizes that the first responders did not remove bystanders at the scene who "were just standing around." Id. ¶ 26. The first responders loaded Mr. Williams into the ambulance and, tragically, Mr. Williams died on his way to the hospital. See id. ¶ 23.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated Mr. Williams constitutional rights by failing to timely provide medical services to him after the shooting. In Count I, Plaintiff pleads that Defendants violated Mr. Williams's "Fourteenth amendment rights against c[ruel] and unusual punishment." Id. at 5. Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ alleged one-and-a-half-hour delay in providing "medical and emergency treatment for" Mr. Williams's injuries demonstrates that Defendants were "deliberately indifferent to Mr. Williams’ needs." Id. ¶¶ 28, 30. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants’ delay represents "inactions based on racial discrimination" because "it can easily be inferred ... [from] what transpired" and the 911 operator inquiring about Mr. Williams's race "that Mr. Williams would have been a higher priority for treatment had he been [ ] Caucasian." Id. ¶¶ 22, 25, 29. In Count II, Plaintiff pleads that this alleged constitutional violation occurred as a result of the municipalities’ purported failure "to provide adequate policies, procedures or training to their employees" to avoid such violations. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff asserts that the municipalities’ "failure to adequately train or supervise [their] subordinates" is "due to [their] deliberate indifference" to Mr. Williams's constitutional rights. Id. ¶ 36.

Among other arguments, Defendants urge the court to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint because "[t]here is no Constitutional claim for a City not providing fast enough 911 services." ECF No. 13 at 6. Specifically, West Valley City argues that Plaintiff's "Constitutional cruel and unusual punishment claims fail because Mr. Williams was not in custody at the time of his death," id. at 4, and that the City "otherwise did not have a special relationship with Mr. Williams that would require the City to be responsible for his safety and well-being," ECF No. 23 at 3. The court agrees and dismisses Count I without prejudice because, as pled, Plaintiff has not adequately stated a claim for a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.² As a consequence, the court also dismisses Count II without prejudice because Plaintiff has not adequately stated a claim of an underlying constitutional violation to hold the municipalities liable in this case.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must "state a claim upon which relief can be granted," FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), that "is plausible on its face," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The court "must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Albers v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Jefferson Cty. , 771 F.3d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cressman v. Thompson , 719 F.3d 1139, 1152 (10th Cir. 2013) ). The court's function "is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc. , 339 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges a violation of his substantive due process rights. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. , amend. XIV, § 1. Beyond a procedural right to due process, the Fourteenth Amendment also contains a judicially recognized substantive due process component that protects an individual's life, liberty, and property against "certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Plaintiffs can seek to remedy alleged violations of their substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

Under Section 1983, certain municipalities are considered "persons" and subject to liability if the municipality's "policy or custom" caused an underlying constitutional violation. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 690–94, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Such a policy or custom may be written or unwritten, and even a single decision by a municipal policymaker or single instance of unconstitutional conduct may represent a policy for purposes of municipal liability. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Thus, a municipality is liable under Section 1983 if it "has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation" committed by its employees, "and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm." Barney v. Pulsipher , 143 F.3d 1299, 1307–08 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services limited the reach of substantive due process protections by holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer an "affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." 489 U.S. 189, 196, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). In other words, "[a] state actor generally may not be held liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for harm a private individual intentionally or recklessly inflicts upon a victim." Matthews v. Bergdorf , 889 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Deshaney , 489 U.S. at 197, 109 S.Ct. 998 ); see also Hayes v. Garcia , 123 F. App'x 858, 861 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (holding that "there is no general right to medical care" even "for people injured by state actors"). This is because in instances "[w]here private violence is responsible for the harm, the state actor has not deprived the victim of any constitutional right; rather the private individual has deprived the victim of life, liberty, or property." Bergdorf , 889 F.3d at 1143.

The Deshaney Court recognized two exceptions to this general rule. First, government inaction may still violate a plaintiff's substantive due process rights if the government had an "affirmative duty" to the plaintiff based on "the limitation which it has imposed on his...