Williams v. Sec'y, Case No. 3:14-cv-706-J-34JBT

ADRIAN FRANCIS WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:14-cv-706-J-34JBT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

July 3, 2017

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Adrian Francis Williams, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on June 18, 2014, by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition; Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with exhibits (P. Ex.) and a "2254 Argument Brief" (Memorandum; Doc. 2). In the Petition, Williams challenges a 2012 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for dealing in stolen property and false verification of ownership on a pawnbroker transaction form. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Respondents' Response to Petition for Habeas Corpus (Response; Doc. 12) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On October 14, 2014, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to Petitioner (Doc. 7), admonishing Williams regarding his obligations and giving Williams a time frame in which to submit a reply. Williams submitted a brief in reply. See Response (Reply; Doc. 13). This case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

On September 23, 2010, the State of Florida, in case number 2010-CF-10746, charged Williams with burglary of a dwelling (count one), dealing in stolen property (count two), and false verification of ownership on a pawnbroker transaction form (count three). See Resp. Ex. A at 1. The State of Florida issued a capias that same day, see id. at 4, and Williams was arrested on November 28, 2011, see id. at 7; PD-1 at 1. In May 2012, Williams proceeded to trial, see Resp. Exs. D, E, F, Transcripts of the Jury Trial (Tr.), at the conclusion of which, on May 8, 2012, a jury found him guilty of dealing in stolen property (count two) and false verification of ownership on a pawnbroker transaction form (count three), see Resp. Ex. A at 118, 119, Verdicts, and not guilty of burglary (count one), as charged in the Information, see id. at 116-17, Verdict. On December 13, 2012, the court sentenced Williams to terms of imprisonment of twelve years on count two and ten years on count three, to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the sentences imposed in case numbers 2007-CF-14505 and 2007-CF-14726. See Resp. Ex. B at 218-24.

On direct appeal, Williams, with the benefit of counsel, filed an initial brief, arguing that: (1) Williams' due process rights under the Florida and United States Constitutions were violatedwhen the court denied him access to relevant and material evidence - the stolen ring - despite repeated motions to compel its production; production of the ring, still in the victim's possession, would have proven William's innocence, and (2) the circuit court failed to conduct a proper Melbourne¹ inquiry into the State's peremptory strike of prospective juror Beverly Randolph. The State filed an answer brief. See Resp. Ex. H. On January 22, 2014, the appellate court affirmed Williams' conviction per curiam, see Williams v. State, 130 So.3d 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), and the mandate issued on February 7, 2014, see Resp. Ex. I. During the pendency of Williams' appeal, he filed several petitions for extraordinary relief. See PD-2.

On March 10, 2010, Williams filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the petition, he asserted that appellate counsel (John Burr Kelly, III) failed to raise the following issues on direct appeal: Williams' right to speedy trial (claim one); the court's denial of his motion to vacate and set aside judgment based on a violation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 (claim two); and Williams' right to challenge the Information as a violation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(g) (claim three). See Resp. Ex. M. The appellate court denied the petition on the merits on April 8, 2014. See Williams v. State, 135 So.3d 1133 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Resp. Ex. N.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

The Petition appears to be timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-8668, 2017 WL 1346407 (June 12, 2017). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Williams'] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly deferential.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 1203 (2017); Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). Regardless of whether the last state court provided a reasoned opinion, "it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (citation omitted); see also Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, --, 133 S. Ct. 1088,1096 (2013).² Thus, the state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 100.

If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous legal conclusions. As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a "contrary to" clause and an "unreasonable application" clause. The "contrary to" clause allows for relief only "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The "unreasonable application"clause allows for relief only "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous factual determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal courts to grant relief only if the state court's denial of the petitioner's claim "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined § 2254(d)(2)'s "precise relationship" to § 2254(e)(1), which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the state court's factual findings "by clear and convincing evidence." SeeBurt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accordBrumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192 L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that "precise relationship" may be, "'a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.'"[³] Titlow, 571 U.S. at ---, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).

Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-8733, 2017 WL 1386004 (U.S. June 26, 2017); see also Daniel v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the state court thatadjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1)'s "requires an examination of the state-court decision...