Williams v. Selvig (In re Williams)

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In re ESTATE OF JOSEPH STEPHEN WILLIAMS.

JOSEPH F. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. BRADLEY J. SELVIG, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF JOSEPH STEPHEN WILLIAMS, Appellee, and MARIE E. REICHERT, DAKOTA WILLIAMS, DAVID WILLIAMS, BLAKE WILLIAMS, VICTORIA SELVIG, and ASHLEY SELVIG, Other Parties.

No. 356227

Court of Appeals of Michigan

February 10, 2022

UNPUBLISHED

Kent Probate Court LC No. 11-191297-DE

Before: Borrello, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and Redford, JJ.

PER CURIAM

Appellant Joseph F. Williams, appeals as of right the order denying his petition for payment of Australian life insurance benefits to the beneficiaries under a policy issued to his son, Joseph S Williams (the decedent). We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court summarized the facts in its opinion related to appellant's earlier appeal of the probate court's grant of summary disposition in favor of Bradley J. Selvig brother of the decedent and personal representative of the estate, in a case in which appellant petitioned for the invalidation of the decedent's will. See In re Williams Estate, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 20, 2017 (Docket No. 332993). The decedent began working as a chef at Club Med in Australia in November 2010 and through his employer obtained membership in the Intrust Superannuation Fund, which paid a benefit upon his death. The membership application permitted identification of two distinct classes of death beneficiaries, "binding" and "preferred." The decedent named his aunt, Marie Reichert, and appellant as preferred beneficiaries and signed the application. The application specified that the nomination of preferred beneficiaries "will be used by the Trustee as a guide only and that the Trustee is not in any way bound by [the] nomination when exercising its absolute discretion to pay [the] benefit in Intrust Super."^[1]

During 2011, decedent visited appellant in Ohio, but in May 2011 he was diagnosed with cancer and began undergoing treatment there. On September 23, 2011, while living with appellant in Ohio, decedent executed a will leaving all of his property to appellant and appointed appellant as executor. This will did not identify any of the decedent's assets and contained no mention of the Intrust death benefit. Shortly after executing the will in Ohio, decedent was airlifted to a hospital in Grand Rapids, Michigan for medical treatment which proved unsuccessful leading to his transfer to a hospice care facility near Grand Rapids. On October 4, 2011, decedent executed a new will naming his brother Bradley as personal representative, specified bequests of various items of the decedent's personal property, and left the remainder of his property to the decedent's nieces, Bradley's daughters, but made no mention of the Intrust Super death benefit. Decedent passed away on November 7, 2011.

On November 29, 2011, appellee applied for informal probate of the October 4, 2011 will. The parties were initially unaware of the existence or amount of the decedent's Intrust Super death benefit. An inventory filed by appellee on March 28, 2012, stated the total value of decedent's property at $320. On January 12, 2013, appellee informed Reichert of her beneficiary status in a "small insurance policy in Australia" that was "worth a little over $700." At a March 4, 2013 hearing in the probate court, appellant's counsel asserted that the assets of the estate totaled less than $500. Appellee's counsel disclosed the existence of the Intrust Super death benefit, but stated the value as approximately $700. Addressing the court, appellee asserted that he needed appellant to "sign off on it that he would release it for the estate or not release the money, and the money would then basically go to him," and he stated his belief that appellant and Reichert were named as beneficiaries of the Intrust Super life insurance policy. Appellant's counsel asserted that it was not appellant's intention "to attack the will, to set aside the will." He also stated that appellant had never seen the insurance policy, had not known the identity of the beneficiaries before that day, and that the policy "was going to pass outside the will by the contract anyway, and it's, your Honor, was $700 there."

On February 18, 2013, however, an Intrust Super death benefit summary stated the account balance as $702, the insurance amount as $300, 000, and the total benefit as $300, 702. The summary listed appellant and Reichert as beneficiaries and listed appellee as personal representative of the decedent's estate. It also specified that decedent had made no binding nomination.

After the Intrust Superannuation Fund trustee determined that the death benefit would be paid to appellee, as personal representative of the decedent's estate, Reichert filed a complaint with the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal, disputing the decision to award the death benefit to the estate. On September 6, 2013, the tribunal affirmed that the total death benefit of $300, 687.93 would be paid to appellee as personal representative. Appellant also disputed the Intrust Super trustee's decision and initiated legal proceedings in Australia that were not concluded until May 2019, with a decision by the High Court of Australia dismissing appellant's appeal.

While appellant challenged the decision in Australian courts, the proceedings in the Kent Probate Court continued. On July 2, 2015, appellant petitioned the court to deny admission of the October 4, 2011 will to probate and requested that it admit the September 23, 2011 will "as the Last Will of the decedent." Appellant contended that the October 4, 2011 will did not represent the decedent's wishes, was induced by fraud, duress, and undue influence, and "benefits the children of Bradley J. Selvig to the exclusion of decedent's father, Joseph F. Williams." Appellee moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the ground that "decedent had sufficient mental and physical capacity to make a valid will," that decedent executed the will of his "own free act and deed," and that execution of the will was "not induced by fraud, duress, or undue influence." In response, appellant contended that no dispute existed that the decedent wanted Reichert and appellant to receive the Intrust Super death benefit, that decedent named appellant as beneficiary in order to repay him for debts incurred on the decedent's behalf, that he did not understand that under the October 4, 2011 will the Intrust Super death benefit would be paid to his nieces rather than to appellant and Reichert, and that there was no evidence that the decedent intended that his nieces receive the death benefit.

At a hearing on April 18, 2016, the probate court noted that an Australian appellate court had "ruled that the funds are properly placed in the estate and not to an individual person." The probate court ruled that the evidence showed that decedent was capable of making a will, there was no evidence of undue influence, and decedent understood the nature and extent of his property, as shown by devises of his personal property and his residual estate. The probate court further ruled that it must give full faith and credit to the decision of the Australian court and attached no significance to the fact that the Intrust Super fund was not listed in either will. The probate court, therefore, granted summary disposition.

Appellant appealed to this Court, which affirmed the probate court's decision ruling that the probate court did not err by holding that appellant failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the decedent's ability to understand the general nature of his act in signing the October 4, 2011 will. In re Williams, unpub op at 5. Addressing appellant's contention that appellee and the decedent's mother unduly influenced the decedent, this Court noted that appellant had cited no authority supporting his contention and had abandoned the issue on appeal. Id. at 6. Moreover, this Court observed, "opportunity, motive, or the ability to control, without proof that such was in fact exercised, is insufficient to establish undue influence." Id. This Court concluded that the probate court did not err by granting summary disposition in favor of appellee. Id.^[2]

Appellee continued administration of the estate while proceedings continued in the Australian courts. On June 11, 2019, Intrust Super informed appellee, as personal representative of the decedent's estate, that the amount payable to the estate was $300, 565.98. By November 6, 2019, this amount had been paid to the estate.

On April 14, 2020, appellant filed a notice of continued administration that he signed claiming himself to be the personal representative of decedent's estate, which stated that he had submitted an inquiry to the High Court of Australia and had discovered new information. His notice requested that he be allowed to present this information to the probate court. Nearly four months later, appellant, proceeding in propria persona, also filed a petition asserting that decedent had an Australian life insurance policy that had been paid to the estate in 2019 and that the two beneficiaries of that policy had not been paid by the estate. Appellant requested an order that "the Executor pay the beneficiaries of Joseph S. Williams life insurance policy as soon as possible." In December 2020, appellant filed six documents in the probate court that he anticipated using as exhibits, including the decedent's Intrust Superannuation Fund application and correspondence between Intrust Super, Reichert, and appellee. Notably, appellant did not file copies of any Australian court decisions.

Appellee opposed the petition on December 11, 2020, because decedent's...