Williams v. State

1

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, Petitioner - Appellant, v. STATE OF UTAH, Respondent - Appellee.

No. 23-4092

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

July 2, 2024

(D.C. No. 4:18-CV-00093-DN) (D. Utah)

Before TYMKOVICH, BACHARACH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY^[*]

Timothy M. Tymkovich, Circuit Judge.

Christopher Williams, a Utah state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability ("COA") to challenge the district court's denial of his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring a COA to appeal "the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court"). We deny Williams's request for a COA and dismiss this matter.

I. BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Williams of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault stemming from his involvement in an attempt to collect on a drug debt in January 2011. Williams met the victim and drove him to the home of co-defendant David Nichols. Nichols beat the victim with a walking stick rendering him unconscious. Nichols and Williams tied the victim to a chair and threatened to kill him. They took the victim's wallet, cell phone, coat, shoes, and a food stamp card worth several hundred dollars. Williams then retrieved the victim's car and the title to it, and Nichols forced the victim to sign a bill of sale transferring title to Williams. Williams and another co-defendant, Max Dozah, then drove the victim up a canyon, threatening him during the drive. Dozah threatened to break the victim's legs or kill him with a metal pipe that was in the car. Eventually they stopped at a snow closure gate in the canyon and made the coatless victim get out. Dozah asked Williams to get the pipe from the car. Williams held the pipe out the window for Dozah, but Dozah never took it. After Dozah shouted threats at the victim, Dozah and Williams drove off, leaving the victim behind in the freezing canyon. The victim flagged down someone, who called for help. The police responded, and the victim was transported by ambulance to a hospital with rope burns on his arms and multiple bruises and contusions on his face and arms.

The jury convicted Williams of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery but acquitted him of aggravated assault. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of fifteen years to life for the aggravated kidnapping conviction and five years to life for the aggravated robbery conviction. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. See State v. Williams, 333 P.3d 1287, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, 343 P.3d 708 (Utah 2015). Williams filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCP"). The state district court ("PCP court") denied relief. See R., Vol. 1 at 545-64. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed in a summary disposition. See id. at 565-69. The Utah Supreme Court denied review. Williams v. State, 429 P.3d 465 (Utah 2018).

Williams next filed a petition under § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. He advanced eight grounds for relief. The district court denied relief on all grounds and denied a COA. Before us, Williams seeks a COA on grounds 5 (failure to provide jury instructions on lesser included offenses), 6 (flawed aggravated kidnapping instruction), 7 (sentencing error), and 8 (ineffective assistance of counsel).

II. COA AND AEDPA REQUIREMENTS

We will issue a COA "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires the applicant to demonstrate that "reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For claims the district court denied on a procedural ground without reaching the merits, the applicant must also show that the district court's procedural ruling is debatable. Id.

Our consideration of Williams's request for a COA must account for the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires "deferential treatment of state court decisions." Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004). We therefore "look to the District Court's application of AEDPA to [Williams's] constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was debatable amongst jurists of reason." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Under AEDPA, when a state court has adjudicated the merits of a claim, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if that state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2).

III. DISCUSSION^[1]

A. Grounds 5 and 6

1. Procedural Default

In his PCP, Williams argued that the trial court, the prosecution, and defense counsel erred by failing to provide or request jury instructions on lesser included offenses of aggravated kidnapping (namely, unlawful detention and kidnapping) and aggravated robbery (namely, theft), depriving him of a due process right to present a complete defense. He also argued that a jury instruction on aggravated kidnapping omitted elements of the primary offense of kidnapping.

The PCP court ruled that Williams's failure to raise the claims on direct appeal barred post-conviction review under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(c), which provides: "A petitioner is not eligible for relief under [the Utah Postconviction Remedies Act] upon any ground that . . . could have been but was not raised in the trial court, at trial, or on appeal." The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.

Williams raised these claims in Grounds 5 (lesser included offense instructions) and 6 (aggravated kidnapping instruction) of his § 2254 petition. The district court concluded those grounds were procedurally defaulted on an independent and adequate state law ground. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991) (explaining that "the independent and adequate state ground doctrine . . . applies to bar federal habeas when a state court declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement").

In his COA application, Williams advances no argument that § 78B-9-106(1)(c) is not independent or adequate.^[2] The only contention he makes that touches on the district court's invocation of procedural default is that the state courts "[a]buse[d]" the procedural bar, which he claims is too "narrow in scope with no circumventions or statutory protections against blanket bar application" and creates an "impossible burden[]." COA Appl. at 2. But § 78B-9-106(3)(a) and (b) provide exceptions to the bar when the failure to raise an issue in the trial court, at trial, or on appeal "was due to ineffective assistance of counsel" or "to force, fraud, or coercion." Thus, to the extent Williams meant his argument to question the independence or adequacy of § 78B-9-106(1)(c), it fails to show that reasonable jurists would debate the district court's conclusion that Grounds 5 and 6 were procedurally defaulted on an independent and adequate state law ground.

2. Failure to Overcome Procedural Default

A federal habeas petitioner can overcome procedural default by demonstrating "cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law" or "that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. We address these exceptions in order.

a. Cause and Prejudice Exception

In his PCP and again in his § 2254 petition, Williams argued that his trial and appellate counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance with respect to both grounds. Ineffective assistance of counsel can serve as cause to excuse a procedural default. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 450-51 (2000). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an applicant must show (1) constitutionally deficient performance that (2) resulted in prejudice by demonstrating "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984).

The PCP court held that Williams failed to establish either prong of the Strickland test as to both procedurally defaulted claims and therefore could not overcome the procedural bar. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed. Because the state court addressed the ineffectiveness claims on the merits, AEDPA "confines our review to the question of whether the [state court's] decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Strickland." Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1202 (10th Cir. 2004).

Thus, in the COA inquiry, we ask whether reasonable jurists could debate the district court's conclusion regarding the state court's Strickland analysis.^[3]

1) Ground 5-lesser included offense instructions

The district court concluded that Williams failed to show his counsel was ineffective by failing to request lesser included offense instructions. The court observed that Utah courts apply a two-stage test to determine whether a lesser included offense instruction is required: (1) there must be "some overlap in the statutory elements of allegedly included offenses," State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(a)); and (2) the evidence must "provide[] a 'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense,'" id. (quoting § 76-1-402(...