Williams v. State

240 N.E.3d 1285

Raymond Lamar WILLIAMS, Appellant-Defendant

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-2

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed August 9, 2024

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, The Honorable Charles F. Miller, Judge, The Honorable Matthew E. Symons, Magistrate, Trial Court Cause No. 49D29-2305-F4-13684

Attorneys for Appellant: Talisha Griffin, Ellen M. O’Connor, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Jennifer Anwarzai, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Raymond Lamar Williams was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony. Williams appeals and claims that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Williams possessed a firearm. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Williams presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Williams was in possession of a firearm.

Facts

[3] In the early morning hours of May 11, 2023, Officers Michael Graban and Matthew Pankonie of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD") were dispatched to investigate an incomplete 911 call in the 3300 block of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive. When the officers arrived, they observed a woman quickly leave a house and run to a nearby Chrysler 300, which then sped off. This aroused the officers’ attention, and Officer Graban followed the Chrysler in his patrol car. Williams, who was driving the Chrysler, attempted to evade Officer Graban by turning frequently and driving down alleyways. When Williams stopped at a red light, Officer Graban caught up with the Chrysler and ran the license plate. This check revealed the plate to be expired and registered to a different vehicle. Officer Graban, therefore, conducted a traffic stop.

[4] As he approached the vehicle, Officer Graban observed three people inside, including Williams. Officer Graban asked for Williams’ driver’s license, and Williams reached between the car seats. Unable to find his license, Williams identified himself as "Bryant Banks," but spelled his name "Branty." Tr. Vol. II p. 154. Officer Graban was unable to locate a driver’s license associated with the name Bryant Banks. When confronted with this information, Williams still insisted that his name was Bryant but this time misspelled it as "Brant." Id. Williams also handed Officer Graban an identification card with the name Landis Jani Bryant-Banks. The Social Security number on the card, however, did not match the number Williams had orally provided to Officer Graban; nor did the photo associated with this individual resemble Williams. Williams also claimed that he was driving to pick up a friend who lived on Dexter Street. Officer Graban found this odd, as Williams had passed Dexter Street while driving.

[5] During the stop, Officer Pankonie arrived to assist Officer Graban. Officer Pankonie could see in plain view a holstered handgun in the back seat of the Chrysler. Eventually, Williams admitted that he had lied about his name and provided the officer with his real name. Officer Graban then removed Williams from the vehicle and placed him in handcuffs. Officer Graban advised Williams of his Miranda rights and questioned Williams. Williams stated that the Chrysler belonged to him and that he had the title for the vehicle at home. Williams, however, denied knowing that a handgun was in the car.

[6] After taking possession of the handgun—a Taurus G2 firearm—Officer Pankonie took DNA swabs from the handgun’s slide and sight, frame, trigger and trigger guard, magazine release button, and the holster in which the handgun was found. DNA testing subsequently revealed that the DNA found on the handgun matched Williams’ DNA to an astonishing degree of certainty.¹ Additionally, Williams’ DNA comprised 60-75% of the DNA obtained, with the remainder coming from other unknown individuals. The forensic scientist who tested the samples testified that more DNA is transferred to an item via direct contact rather than secondary contact.

[7] On May 12, 2023, the State charged Williams with: (1) unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony; and (2) making a false identification statement, a Class A misdemeanor. The State later filed an amended information alleging that Williams was an habitual offender. The State subsequently amended the serious violent felon charge to allege a different predicate felony and also dismissed the misdemeanor charge.

[8] On October 19, 2023, the trial court held a jury trial. The jury found Williams guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon but did not find Williams to be an habitual offender. On December 12, 2023, the trial court sentenced Williams to seven years in the DOC. Williams now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[1–5] [9] Williams claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he possessed the firearm found in the back seat of his vehicle. "Claims of insufficient evidence ‘warrant a deferential standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.’ " Stubbers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 424, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020)), trans, denied. On appeal, "[w]e consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn from . that evidence." Id. (citing Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 262). " ‘We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of pro- bative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,’ "

and we will affirm a conviction " ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " Id. (citing Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 262). Thus, it is not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; instead, the evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. (citing Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007); Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

[10] To convict Williams of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, the State was required to prove that Williams was a serious violent felon, and that he did "knowingly or intentionally possess[ ] a firearm … . " Ind. Code § 35- 47-4-5(c). Here, the only element that Williams claims the State did not prove was his possession of the handgun found in the backseat of his car.²

[6, 7] [11] Indiana law on the question of possession is "rather straightforward: it can be either actual or constructive." Sargent v. State, 27 N.E.3d 729, 732-33 (Ind. 2015). Actual possession of contraband occurs when a person has direct physical control over the item. Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. 2004).

[12] Williams argues that the State failed to prove that he constructively possessed the handgun found in his car. The State argues that it did not need to resort to constructive possession because it proved that Williams had actually possessed the handgun. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Williams both actually and constructively possessed the handgun.

A. Actual Possession

[8] [13] As noted, a defendant actually possesses an item when he has direct physical control over the item. Id. The State presented overwhelming evidence that Williams’ DNA was found in multiple locations on the handgun including the trigger. This supports a reasonable inference that Williams’ DNA was on the handgun because he had directly possessed it.

[14] Although we have found no Indiana case directly on point, this Court has held that a defendant can be in "actual possession" of a weapon even if it is not directly found on his person. See McCoy v. State, 153 N.E.3d 363, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that even though a handgun was found in a shopping basket at a grocery store after the defendant left, which video evidence confirmed, the State presented sufficient evidence which permitted a reasonable inference that the defendant exercised direct physical control over the handgun before he discarded it).

[15] Moreover, courts in other jurisdictions have held that the presence of a defendant’s DNA on a firearm found near a defendant is sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant was in actual possession of the firearm. See United States v. Lewis, 62 F.4th 733, 745 (2d Cir. 2023) (holding that evidence was sufficient to establish defendant’s actual possession of a firearm found on the back porch of triplex where defendant lived, and defendant’s DNA was found on the weapon’s handle and trigger); State v. Manion, 173 Wash.App. 610, 295 P.3d 270, 282 (2013) (holding that evidence was sufficient to prove defendant had actual possession of a firearm found in the bushes near the location defendant was standing, and DNA testing of the firearm demonstrated that defendant was a possible contributor of DNA found on firearm); United States v. Ivory, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1258 (D. Kan. 2005) (holding that evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant had actual possession of a firearm found in a car parked in defendant’s garage where the DNA found on the firearm’s trigger guard was consistent with defendant’s DNA, and studies had shown that the last person to handle an item was generally the major contributor of DNA on the item); see also United States v. Richardson, 60 F.4th 397, 398-99 (7th Cir. 2023) (listing "DNA, fingerprints, [and] an eyewitness" as evidence of actual possession).

[16] Here, Williams was the major contributor to DNA present on the handgun and holster found in the backseat of Williams’ car. From this, the jury could reasonably conclude that Williams’ DNA was present on...