Williams v. State, A16-1526

899 N.W.2d 504

Tramayne Colfred WILLIAMS, petitioner, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

A16-1526

A16-1527

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed June 12, 2017

Review Granted August 22, 2017

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant).

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; David Hauser, Otter Tail County Attorney, Kurt Mortenson, Assistant County Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O' Neill Moller, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent).

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge.^*

OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

In these consolidated appeals, appellant Tramayne Colfred Williams challenges the decisions of two district courts,¹ in separate proceedings in Hennepin County and Otter Tail County, to deny his motions to correct sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. At the crux of the appeals is Williams's argument that the sentencing courts improperly assigned felony criminal-history points to two Illinois drug convictions for which he had received boot-camp sentences. Williams also argues that the Hennepin County District Court erred in sua sponte dismissing his motion as time barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2016), without giving him an opportunity to be heard on the issue.²

We conclude that the district courts did not abuse their discretion in determining that Williams's Illinois convictions are felonies. We also conclude, however, that the Hennepin County District Court erred in applying the time bar without giving Williams an opportunity to be heard. We thus affirm the decision in the Otter Tail County case; but, because the Hennepin County case included a separate, undisputed error in the criminal-history score, and it appears that Williams seeks postconviction relief related to that error, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand that case for further proceedings.

FACTS

Otter Tail County and Hennepin County Sentencing Decisions

In September 2011, Williams was charged in Otter Tail County with aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery. In April 2012, he pleaded guilty to the charge pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea agreement provided that, assuming a criminal-history score of five, Williams would be sentenced to 84 months in prison, which was the bottom of the presumptive guidelines range. Williams was not sentenced at the time of the plea.

While awaiting sentencing in the Otter Tail County case, Williams was charged in Hennepin County with several offenses, including promoting prostitution. In November 2012, Williams pleaded guilty in Hennepin County to promoting prostitution and was sentenced. The plea agreement provided that the state would dismiss the other counts and Williams would be sentenced to 96 months, to be served concurrently with whatever sentence the court in Otter Tail County imposed. The plea petition identified the 96-month sentence as a mitigated durational departure from the presumed 180-month sentence based on a felony criminal-history score of six. Williams waived, and Hennepin County did not conduct, a presentence investigation. However, a criminal-record summary prepared before sentencing, and a sentencing worksheet prepared after sentencing, calculated Williams's criminal-history score at six, including 0.5 points for an Illinois receiving-stolen-property conviction and a total of 2.0 points for two Illinois drug convictions for which he received concurrent boot-camp sentences at the Cook County Boot Camp (the "boot camp"). The state produced no other evidence regarding Williams's out-of-state convictions. Williams did not object to the calculation of his criminal-history score. Consistent with the plea agreement, the Hennepin County sentencing court sentenced Williams to 96 months' imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the sentence anticipated in Otter Tail County. Williams did not appeal his Hennepin County sentence.

Williams was sentenced in the Otter Tail County case in January 2013. A presentence investigation report was prepared, assigning Williams 1.5 points for an Indiana drug conviction and a total of 2.0 points for the two Illinois drug convictions for which he received boot-camp sentences. The state did not produce other evidence regarding Williams's out-of-state convictions. With the addition of the Hennepin County conviction, Williams's criminal-history score increased from five to eight. The Otter Tail County sentencing court noted that the new criminal-history score resulted in a bottom-of-the-presumptive-range sentence of 92 months, instead of 84 months as contemplated in the plea agreement. Williams did not object to the calculation of his criminal-history score, and he agreed to a 92-month sentence. Williams did not appeal his Otter Tail County sentence.³

Otter Tail County Collateral Proceeding

In 2016, through counsel, Williams moved to correct his Otter Tail County sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Williams argued that he was sentenced with an incorrect criminal-history score because (1) he was given 1.5 points for an Indiana drug conviction when the comparable offense in Minnesota would have been assigned 0.5 points and (2) he was given 2.0 points for the two Illinois drug convictions for which he had received boot-camp, and not felony-level, sentences. The state did not file a response.

The Otter Tail County District Court agreed that the Indiana drug conviction should have been assigned 0.5 points. The district court concluded, however, that the two Illinois drug convictions were properly counted as felony convictions because the boot-camp sentences were the equivalent of stays of execution. The district court concluded that Williams's correct criminal-history score was seven, not eight, but nevertheless denied his motion because Williams had received a bottom-of-the-presumptive-range sentence for an offender with a criminal-history score of six or more.

Hennepin County Collateral Proceeding

In 2016, Williams also moved to correct his Hennepin County sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Williams argued that his sentence was calculated using an incorrect criminal-history score because (1) he was given 0.5 points for an Illinois receiving-stolen-property conviction that should have been scored as a misdemeanor, and (2) he was given 2.0 points for the two Illinois drug convictions for which he had received boot-camp sentences. The state filed a response.

The Hennepin County District Court agreed that the Illinois receiving-stolen-property conviction should not have been used in calculating Williams's criminal-history score. The district court, however, concluded that the two Illinois drug convictions were properly counted as felony convictions because the boot-camp sentences were the equivalent of stays of imposition. The district court therefore concluded that Williams's correct criminal-history score was five, not six. The district court nevertheless denied Williams's motion because Williams's 96-month sentence was still below the guidelines range for an offender with a criminal-history score of five. The district court also concluded that Williams's motion to correct sentence implicated the plea and was time barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01.⁴

Williams appeals.

ISSUES

I. Did the district courts abuse their discretion by concluding that the Illinois drug convictions qualified as felonies for purposes of calculating Williams's criminal-history scores?

II. Did the Hennepin County District Court err by sua sponte applying the time bar under Minn. Stat. § 590.01without giving Williams an opportunity to be heard?

ANALYSIS

I. The district courts did not abuse their discretion by concluding that the Illinois drug convictions qualified as felonies for purposes of calculating Williams's criminal-history scores.

Williams argues that the district courts abused their discretion because the state failed to meet its burden of proving that Williams's boot-camp sentences were felony-level sentences.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, permits a court to correct a "sentence not authorized by law." A sentence is unauthorized by law if it is "contrary to law or applicable statutes." Reynolds v. State , 888 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). A sentence based on an incorrect criminal-history score is an unauthorized sentence. State v. Maurstad , 733 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Minn. 2007). On appeal from the denial of a rule 27.03 motion, we will affirm the decision of the district court if it properly exercised its discretion and the sentence is authorized by law. Anderson v. State , 794 N.W.2d 137, 139 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 2011).

A. The defendant has the burden of proof on a rule 27.03 motion to correct sentence filed after the time to appeal the sentence.

At sentencing, the state has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts "necessary to justify consideration of out-of-state convictions in determining a defendant's criminal history score." State v. Outlaw , 748 N.W.2d 349, 355 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2008). But whether the state or the defendant has the burden of proof when the defendant brings a rule 27.03 motion to correct sentence in a collateral proceeding brought after the time to appeal the sentence is a matter of first impression. Williams argues that the state bears the burden of proving that his sentences were authorized by law; the state argues that Williams has the burden of proving that his sentences were unauthorized by law. The question of burden of proof is particularly important with respect to the appeal from Otter Tail County because the state did not respond to Williams's motion. We review questions regarding the applicable burden of proof de novo. Savig v. First Nat'l Bank , 781 N.W.2d...