Williams v. State

363 Ga.App. 594

872 S.E.2d 14

WILLIAMS

v.The STATE.

A22A0058

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

April 6, 2022

Greg Howard Bell, Warner Robins, for Appellant.

George Herbert Hartwig III, William Marshall Kendall, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

A jury found D'Andre Montel Williams guilty of two counts of armed robbery. Williams appeals following the denial of his motion for a new trial, contending that: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective (a) for failing to file a motion for a mental evaluation before the filing deadline, and (b) by "cumulatively prejudicing" him with a combined effect of multiple alleged errors; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing on his mental competency and denying his motion for a mental evaluation. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Williams's convictions but instruct the trial court to correct a scrivener's error in the written sentence upon remittitur.

In January 2017, Williams and three others were indicted on two counts of armed robbery. The trial court severed the trials of the defendants. Williams was scheduled to be tried in early February 2018. In preparation for trial, various motions filed by Williams were to be heard on January 29, 2018. On January 25, 2018, after the deadline for filing motions had passed, Williams's trial counsel filed a motion for a mental evaluation. At the January 29 hearing, counsel explained that his concerns about Williams's competency had become "more intense" in the recent weeks preparing for trial, as a result of which he "felt" it was "necessary" to file the motion. The trial court then asked Williams some questions regarding the charges, his counsel, and the trial proceedings. Following the questioning, the trial court denied the motion, finding that Williams did not demonstrate any irrational behavior and understood the nature of the trial, his counsel's role, and the possible consequences of a guilty verdict.

On February 26, 2018, Williams entered a negotiated guilty plea to both counts of armed robbery. As part of his plea agreement, Williams was to testify truthfully against the other defendants. After Williams refused to testify, the State moved to set aside his guilty plea. The trial court granted the motion, and Williams proceeded to a jury trial. At the trial, the State presented evidence of Williams's confession to driving the vehicle during the robberies, and to knowing that the others in the vehicle were planning on committing robberies. Both armed robbery victims also testified, substantially corroborating Williams's confession.

The jury subsequently found Williams guilty of two counts of armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to 20 years with the first 18 years to serve in confinement. Williams filed a motion for a new trial, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. To prevail on this claim, an appellant must show both that his trial counsel's performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III), 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). An appellant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, and if he fails as to one prong, "it is not incumbent upon [an appellate c]ourt to examine the other prong." Smith v. State , 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2), 770 S.E.2d 610 (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

To establish deficient performance, an appellant must overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct and show that his counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way in light of all the circumstances and prevailing norms. To establish prejudice, an appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Jefferson v. State , 360 Ga. App. 869, 872-873 (3), 862 S.E.2d 346 (2021) (citations and punctuation omitted). In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance on appeal, this Court upholds a trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but reviews de novo the trial court's legal conclusions. Walker v. State , 347 Ga. App. 163, 165 (1), 816 S.E.2d 849 (2018).

(a) Williams asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for a mental evaluation before the filing deadline. We disagree.

Pretermitting whether trial counsel's late filing of the motion for a mental evaluation constituted deficient performance, Williams cannot show prejudice. The trial court conducted a preliminary hearing as to whether a mental evaluation was necessary by questioning Williams. At the conclusion of the questioning, the trial court determined that a mental evaluation was not required. Importantly, Williams elaborates no arguments as to how the result of the proceedings would have been different had his counsel filed a timely motion, and he similarly identifies no record evidence that could support any such claim. Consequently, Williams is unable to show prejudice based on the late filing of the motion, and his claim of ineffective assistance fails. See Robinson v. State , 298 Ga. 455, 463 (6), 782 S.E.2d 657 (2016) (the defendant bears the burden of proof on both prongs of an ineffective-assistance claim — if he fails to establish either prong, a reviewing court need not examine the other); Perry v. State , 269 Ga. App. 178, 180-181 (1), 603 S.E.2d 526 (2004) (no ineffective assistance of counsel where plea counsel made late request for mental evaluation and the trial court declined to do so, because the record evidence did not put counsel on notice of the need for an in-depth investigation of the defendant's medical history).

(b) Williams contends that his trial counsel was ineffective by "cumulatively prejudicing" him with a combined effect of multiple alleged errors. Again we disagree.

Williams lists the following complaints about his trial counsel: (1) he failed to object to the prosecutor making comparisons to the O. J. Simpson trial in opening statements; (2) he failed to object to the prosecutor not properly laying a foundation to introduce a surveillance video recording; (3) he failed to object to the prosecutor's reference, when introducing redacted video recordings of Williams's interviews with law enforcement, that there were "other things [on the recordings] that aren't relevant" to the case; (4) he failed to raise a motion for directed verdict; and (5) he failed to object at sentencing when the prosecutor referred to statements made during plea negotiations.

To establish cumulative error, a defendant must show that "at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial[, and] considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury's deliberation that they denied [the defendant] a fundamentally fair trial." State v. Lane , 308 Ga. 10, 21 (4), 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). "[W]hen reviewing a claim of cumulative prejudice, we evaluate only the effects of matters determined to be error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors." Flood v. State , 311 Ga. 800, 808-809 (2) (d), 860 S.E.2d 731 (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted).

At the outset, we note that Williams has not supported his claims in (1), (2), (4), and (5) with any argument or citation to authority to show that trial counsel's performance was deficient. Thus, these claims are deemed abandoned. See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) ("Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned."); Shields v. State , 328 Ga. App. 100, 104 (3) (c), 761 S.E.2d 516 (2014). Even if these claims were not abandoned, Williams cannot show that trial counsel committed two errors in the course of the trial.

(1) Failing to Object to Opening Statement. Contrary to Williams's argument, the prosecutor did not refer to the O. J. Simpson trial during opening statements. This claim thus presents nothing for us to review.

(2) Failing to Object to Foundation. Contrary to Williams's position, trial counsel stated that he would have no objection to the admission of the surveillance video recording "as long as the proper foundation's been laid." Moreover, an eyewitness to the events depicted in the recording testified that it was a fair and accurate representation of the events it depicted; therefore, any objection would have been meritless. See Pearson v. State , 311 Ga. 26, 31 (3) (a), 855 S.E.2d 606 (2021) (a video recording is generally admissible where "one who personally witnessed the events recorded[ ] testifies that the [recording] accurately portrayed what the witness saw take place at the time the events occurred") (citation and punctuation omitted). And the failure to make a meritless objection is not evidence of ineffective assistance. See Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 255 (6) (i), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015).

(3) Failing to Object to Statements Regarding Redacted Video. Williams maintains that the prosecutor's references to redacted video recordings of interviews containing "other things that aren't relevant" to the case were "allusions to improper extrinsic evidence and worse, whatever jurors conjure such evidence to be, thus the comments should have been objected to and a motion for mistrial made." (Punctuation omitted.) "Reasonable decisions as to whether to raise a specific objection are ordinarily matters of trial strategy and provide no ground for reversal." Ballard , 297 Ga. at 254 (6) (h), 773 S.E.2d 254 (citation and punctuation omitted). And again, the failure to make a meritless objection is not evidence of ineffective assistance. See id. at 255 (6) (i), 773 S.E.2d 254. Williams elaborates no arguments as to what allegedly "improper extrinsic evidence" may have been "conjure[d]" in the jurors’...