Williams v. State

ARTEZ WILLIAMS v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 2885

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2018

November 6, 2019

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 118176003

UNREPORTED

Fader, C.J., Wright, Beachley, JJ.

Opinion by Fader, C.J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Artez Williams of several firearms and drug offenses arising from a traffic stop. Mr. Williams contends that the circuit court erred by (1) not excusing or, alternatively, conducting voir dire of a juror who passed a note to the court that expressed concern for a witness; and (2) allowing the State to make improper remarks during rebuttal argument. We conclude that, under the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in its handling of the juror's note. We also conclude that the prosecutor's remarks were not improper. We will therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

On May 29, 2018, during a traffic stop of a car being driven by Mr. Williams, Officer Daisha Simms smelled marijuana. After obtaining backup, Officer Simms searched the car; Mr. Williams; and his passenger, Gabriella Smoot. Officer Simms found marijuana in the center console and inside a bag on the back seat. She also searched a bag recovered from the front passenger area, inside which she found some clothing, paperwork, Ms. Smoot's student-identification card, and a handgun. Ms. Smoot denied that the bag belonged to her. The officers arrested both Mr. Williams and Ms. Smoot.

Testimony of Ms. Smoot

At trial, Ms. Smoot, a key witness for the State, was reluctant to answer questions and, as reflected in comments of the court and attorneys, was visibly uncomfortable. When asked what happened on the day in question, Ms. Smoot broke down crying, causing the court to excuse the jury. During the ensuing bench conference, the court observed that Ms. Smoot was "shaking like a leaf," and attempted to calm and encourage her. At thattime, the State told the court that "Ms. Smoot got word from some girl that there's a price on her head."

As the jury was exiting the courtroom for this break, Juror No. 5 passed a note to the courtroom deputy. During the conference, the court told the parties that it had received the note, but said that it would not address it "until [they] need[ed] to address it." We discuss the note further below.

When the jury returned, Ms. Smoot testified that the bag containing the handgun belonged to her, but that the gun belonged to Mr. Williams and that he had placed it in her bag and later offered her money to "take the charge." Before defense counsel began his cross examination, the court again attempted to calm and encourage Ms. Smoot.

Juror No. 5's Note

After Ms. Smoot finished testifying and the jury retired for the day, the court broached the note, which reads: "Are they going to protect this girl[?]" Defense counsel requested that the court excuse Juror No. 5 or, alternatively, instruct him "that there's been no evidence that she's in any danger." By agreement of both parties, however, the court held the issue under advisement.

The next morning, the State requested that the court respond to the note by admonishing the juror. Defense counsel again requested that the court excuse Juror No. 5 or, in the alternative: (1) voir dire him "to determine why he wrote that note" and whether he had shared his concern with any other jurors; and (2) "give a curative instruction" to the jury that "there ha[d] been no evidence presented in th[e] trial that Ms. Smoot [was] in anydanger."¹ The court declined to give the curative instruction. By that time, the jury had heard Ms. Smoot testify that she had been offered money to "take the charge," and the court stated that it would leave to the jury whether that constituted a threat or intimidation. The court also declined to voir dire Juror No. 5, but instead gave him the following admonishment:

Listen to me very carefully, sir. The note reads, "Are they going to protect this girl?" Without any response from you, the Court's response is that this is not a matter within the jury's province, it's not a matter for the jury or any jury member to be concerned with or even discussed. Thank you.

The court then sent Juror No. 5 back to the jury room.

The State's Rebuttal Argument

During his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor's statement that "[Mr. Williams] tried to intimidate [Ms. Smoot] and influence her not to come here and to say what happened" drew an objection from defense counsel. The court sustained the objection, directed the jury "to disregard the comment involving intimidation," and told the jury that "there'[d] been absolutely no evidence . . . [or] testimony presented that the witness was intimidated."

The State then continued:

But you know what there certainly was? A whole lot of evidence of a young woman who was terrified. And you ask yourself why. Why? Because she lives in Baltimore City, and so do all of us. And we all know what Baltimore is infamous for, this culture, don't snitch, don't tell. And so now she's put in a position of having to come in here—yeah, of course, it's upsetting to her and it's scary and it's terrifying, but she told the truth.

Defense counsel again objected, but this time the court overruled the objection.

Mr. Williams's Motion for a New Trial

The jury convicted Mr. Williams of multiple counts concerning both the marijuana and unlawful possession of the handgun. Approximately one month later, at the disposition hearing, the court heard Mr. Williams's motion for a new trial. As relevant to the issues on appeal, Mr. Williams argued that the court should have (1) excused Juror No. 5 in response to the note and (2) sustained Mr. Williams's objection to the State's comment during its rebuttal argument.

The court denied the motion. Regarding Juror No. 5, the court's recollection of events differed from what the transcript reveals. Specifically, the court recollected that it had "voir dired [Juror No. 5] here in open court," and that the juror "indicated that he had not discussed the content of that note with anyone, . . . agreed not to discuss it with anyone," and "indicated that his inquiry would not affect his ability to be fair and impartial in this matter."² The court also noted that "it was in the back of the [c]ourt's mind" that there remained only one alternate juror at the time it declined to excuse Juror No. 5.

Regarding the State's rebuttal comments, the court stated that the comments "could mean anything. It does not imply . . . that the witness was afraid of the defendant."

DISCUSSION

We review a trial court's handling of allegations of jury bias or misconduct under the "abuse of discretion" standard. Nash v. State, 439 Md. 53, 66-69 (2014). An abuse of discretion exists "'where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,' or when the court acts 'without reference to any guiding rules or principles.' . . . [or] when the ruling is "clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court.'" Alexis v. State, 437 Md. 457, 478 (2014) (internal citations omitted) (quoting North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 13 (1994)). "[A] ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling." Alexis, 437 Md. at 478 (emphasis removed) (quoting North, 102 Md. App. at 14). Instead, "[a] court's decision is an abuse of discretion when it is well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable." Alexis, 437 Md. at 478 (quoting Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 383 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The "abuse of discretion" standard "is not an immutable and invariable criterion in all of its myriad applications." Nash, 439 Md. at 68 (quoting Alexis, 437 Md. at 478). "Rather, the standard represents a flexible model whose range is dependent on the type of discretionary decision a trial judge is called upon to make and the relevant circumstances of the case." Nash, 439 Md. at 68. Where the trial court exercised discretion to "handl[e] the progress of a trial, . . . the range of discretion is very broad and the exercise of discretionwill rarely be reversed." Alexis, 457 Md. at 479 (quoting Canterbury Riding Condo. v. Chesapeake Investors, Inc., 66 Md. App. 635, 648 (1986)).

"The determination whether counsel's 'remarks in closing were improper and prejudicial, or simply a permissible rhetorical flourish, is within the sound discretion of the trial court to decide.'" Sivells v. State, 196 Md. App. 254, 271 (2010) (quoting Jones-Harris v. State, 179 Md. App. 72, 105 (2008)). We "generally will not reverse the trial court 'unless that court clearly abused the exercise of its discretion and prejudiced the accused.'" Sivells, 196 Md. App. at 271 (quoting Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 431 (1999)).

I. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DECLINING TO VOIR DIRE JUROR NO. 5.

The United States Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights ensure "that a defendant's fate will be determined by an impartial fact finder who depends solely on the evidence and argument introduced in open court." Summers v. State, 152 Md. App. 362, 375 (2003) (quoting Allen v. State, 89 Md. App. 25, 42 (1991)). "[T]he trial court has an obligation to resolve questions of impropriety or threats to the integrity of the jury trial." Dillard v. State, 415 Md. 445, 454 (2010). "Where a colorable claim of jury taint surfaces before jury deliberations occur, . . . [t]he judge should investigate the allegation promptly, addressing whether the taint-producing event occurred, and if so, assessing the magnitude and extent of any prejudice caused." Id. at 461 (quoting United...