Williams v. Town of Mansfield

215 Conn.App. 1

281 A.3d 1263

Stephen J. WILLIAMS

v.TOWN OF MANSFIELD

AC 44152

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 23, 2022

Officially released September 6, 2022

Stephen J. Williams, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Mary C. Deneen, with whom was Kevin M. Deneen, Windsor, for the appellee (defendant).

Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Elgo, Js.

PRESCOTT, J.

The self-represented plaintiff, Stephen J. Williams, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing as moot his appeal filed pursuant to General Statutes § 7-152b (g) and Practice Book § 23-51 (a)¹ from an assessment imposed pursuant to § 7-152b (e) by the defendant, the town of Mansfield (town), with respect to a $30 parking ticket, and denying his motion for an order of mandamus to compel the taxation of costs (motion to compel). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider his appeal, which the court concluded was rendered moot after the town elected to void the underlying parking ticket, and (2) determined that he was not the prevailing party on appeal and, thus, not entitled to costs. We conclude that the plaintiff's appeal was not moot and, therefore, that the court improperly dismissed the appeal on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the court should have rendered judgment sustaining the appeal and ordered that the underlying assessment be vacated. We further conclude that the court improperly denied the plaintiff's motion to compel the taxation of costs solely on the ground that the plaintiff was not the prevailing party on appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case with direction to render judgment sustaining the appeal and ordering the town's hearing officer to vacate the assessment, and for further proceedings on the merits of the plaintiff's motion to compel the taxation of costs.²

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff's appeal. On April 4, 2019, the town issued the plaintiff a parking ticket in the amount of $30. On April 15, 2019, the plaintiff filed an appeal with the town. On May 15, 2019, the town held a hearing and, on the same date, issued a notice denying the appeal. On June 18, 2019,³ the plaintiff, pursuant to § 7-152b (g),⁴ appealed the assessment of the parking ticket to the Superior Court. He filed with the court a petition to reopen the assessment in which he requested that the town's assessment against him be "rescinded." On July 3, 2019, he filed an amended petition in which he provided more details about the underlying assessment and appeal to the town.⁵

On December 11, 2019, the town filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal. The town asserted that, because it "ha[d] voided the parking ticket and waived all associated fees and/or fines," the plaintiff's appeal was "moot." Accordingly, the town argued, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. On February 10, 2020, the court held a hearing on the motion and issued an oral ruling dismissing the plaintiff's appeal as moot.⁶

On February 10, 2020, the plaintiff, pursuant to Practice Book § 18-5, filed a bill of costs requesting the clerk of the court to tax costs he had incurred by filing and litigating the appeal. On February 11, 2020, the town filed an objection to the plaintiff's bill of costs, in which it stated that General Statutes § 52-257, which governs the awarding of costs, provides that costs may be awarded only to a " ‘prevailing party.’ " The town argued that, because the plaintiff's appeal was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff was not the prevailing party and, accordingly, was not entitled to costs.

On March 2, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue the judgment of dismissal. The court denied the plaintiff's motion on March 16, 2020. On July 6, 2020, the plaintiff filed the present appeal.

On August 3, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion asking the trial court "for an order of mandamus compelling the clerk to tax the costs in this case." On August 17, 2020, the court issued an order denying that motion, stating: "The plaintiff was not the prevailing party and therefore is not entitled to the taxation of costs." The plaintiff timely moved to reargue the August 17, 2020 order, which the court denied on September 10, 2020. The plaintiff amended the present appeal to include a challenge of this order.

On October 13, 2020, the plaintiff, pursuant to Practice Book § 64-1,⁷ filed with this court and the trial court a notice, "notif[ying] the appellate clerk that no statement of decision has been filed in the trial court ... as [to] the trial court's order finding that ‘[the] plaintiff was not a prevailing party and therefore is not entitled to the taxation of costs.’ " On the same date, the trial court issued a one page memorandum of decision, which stated in relevant part: "To the extent that additional explication is required, the court notes that the taxation of costs in civil actions is governed by ... § 52-257. That statute permits the taxation of costs only to a ‘prevailing party.’ The plaintiff was not a prevailing party. To the contrary, the plaintiff's petition was dismissed ... on February 10, 2020. The plaintiff was, therefore, the losing party. As such, the plaintiff was not entitled to the taxation of costs. There was, therefore, no appropriate basis for the plaintiff's motion for an order of mandamus." (Emphasis added.)

I

The plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the town's motion to dismiss his appeal on mootness grounds after the town voided his parking ticket. We agree.

We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of review and legal principles that govern our analysis. "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mangiafico v. Farmington , 331 Conn. 404, 418, 204 A.3d 1138 (2019). "A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law.... Accordingly, [o]ur review of the court's ultimate legal conclusion[s] and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Great Plains Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking , 339 Conn. 112, 120, 259 A.3d 1128 (2021). "Whether an action is moot implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction .... Our case law firmly establishes that [a] case is considered moot if [a] court cannot grant the [plaintiff] any practical relief through its disposition of the merits ...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Rothermel , 339 Conn. 366, 373, 260 A.3d 1187 (2021).

Section 7-152b delegates to municipalities the authority to issue parking tickets, to conduct hearings to determine the liability of motor vehicle operators or owners who receive those tickets, and to assess fines, penalties, costs, and fees provided for by the municipalities’ applicable ordinances. A parking ticket is an allegation that a vehicle owner has committed a parking violation. Pursuant to § 7-152b (c), a municipality may send notice to the vehicle owner informing him: "(1) Of the allegations against him and the amount of the fines, penalties, costs or fees due; (2) that he may contest his liability before a parking violations hearing officer by delivering in person, by electronic mail or by mail written notice within ten days of the date thereof; (3) that if he does not demand such a hearing, an assessment and judgment shall enter against him; and (4) that such judgment may issue without further notice."

If the vehicle owner contests his liability for the alleged violation, a hearing shall be held before the municipality's hearing officer in accordance with § 7-152b (e). Section 7-152b (e) provides in relevant part: "The hearing officer shall announce his decision at the end of the hearing.... If [the hearing officer] determines that the person is liable for the violation, he shall ... enter and assess the fines, penalties, costs or fees against such person as provided by the applicable ordinances of that [municipality]." Section 7-152b (f) provides in relevant part: "If such assessment is not paid on the date of its entry, the hearing officer shall send ... a notice of the assessment to the person found liable and shall file, not less than thirty days or more than twelve months after such mailing, a certified copy of the notice of assessment with the clerk of a superior court facility designated by the Chief Court Administrator .... The certified copy of the notice of assessment shall constitute a record of assessment.... The clerk shall enter judgment ... against such person in favor of the [municipality].... [T]he hearing officer's assessment, when so entered as a judgment, shall have the effect of a civil money judgment and a levy of execution on such judgment may issue without further notice to such person." Pursuant to § 7-152b (g), the vehicle owner can appeal the hearing officer's assessment to the Superior Court within thirty days of the mailing of the notice of the assessment.⁸

In the present case, a town constable issued the plaintiff a parking ticket, which merely alleged that he violated one of the town's parking ordinances. After a hearing, the town's hearing officer issued an assessment against the plaintiff, which established his liability for the parking violation. The plaintiff argues that, although the town voided the fine associated with the parking ticket, the hearing officer's assessment nevertheless remains in place. Therefore, he argues, the case is not moot because he is seeking to have the hearing officer's decision vacated. The town maintains that, once it voided the parking ticket, there was no practical relief that the court could grant the plaintiff because no justiciable issue...