Williams v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MANISH S. SHAH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Clauzell Williams worked for Union Pacific, operating heavy machinery and handling inventory around active railroad tracks. After the company learned that Williams, who is African American, suffered from a heart condition, it imposed permanent restrictions on him and refused to allow him to return to his job. Williams asked to have the restrictions lifted and sought a transfer to another position, but the company denied those requests and ended his employment. Plaintiff sues Union Pacific for disability and race discrimination in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act. The company moves for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.

I. Legal Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). I construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of Williams, the nonmoving party. Robertson v. Dep't of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 377-78 (7th Cir. 2020). Union Pacific bears the burden of establishing that the summary judgment standard is met, but Williams must put forward enough evidence to establish every element of his claims and show that he can carry his burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

II. Background

Clauzell Williams worked for Union Pacific for twenty years, most recently as a material handler in Chicago. [38] ¶¶ 8-9, 88-92; [1-1] ¶ 4.^[1] Material handlers were required to make deliveries to a locomotive shop, which involved crossing railroad tracks. [38] ¶¶ 11-12. Williams's job also required him, working largely alone, to access shelves more than four feet off the ground, use machinery for at least three hours per shift, and repeatedly lift up to seventy-five pounds. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. Brian Simpson was Williams's direct manager. [41] ¶ 1. The two men worked the same shift for the last year of Williams's employment, and, according to Simpson, plaintiff was always able to perform the work of a material handler. Id. ¶¶ 2-4.

Williams said that in 2016 he suffered a stroke at home while recovering from rotator cuff surgery. [38] ¶¶ 18-19. He received treatment, began taking prescription

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medication, and saw a cardiologist, but didn't tell Union Pacific about the stroke. Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 23-24. He returned to work. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. The company didn't learn about plaintiff's health issues until two years later, when Williams requested medical leave. Id. ¶ 25. The company granted the request after Williams reported being short of breath, starting medication, and having a defibrillator implanted. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Williams's cardiologist found that he had severe cardiomyopathy. Id. ¶ 30. The doctor said that Williams could return to work but recommended that he take a desk job that required only light duty. Id.

Union Pacific's associate medical director conducted his own evaluation of Williams's fitness for duty. [38] ¶¶ 31-41. That doctor found that plaintiff had three conditions: (1) an implantable cardiac defibrillator; (2) left ventrical ejection fraction of twenty to twenty-five percent; and (3) history of stroke. Id. ¶ 38. Because these conditions meant Williams might be suddenly incapacitated, presenting a risk of injury to himself or others, the company's doctor recommended permanent restrictions on Williams's work. Id. ¶¶ 40-41. Among other limits, Williams was prohibited from operating various types of machines; working on or near moving trains, freight cars, or locomotives; work requiring critical decision making; work at unprotected heights over four feet; work with less than two other people; and work requiring him to lift ten pounds more than occasionally. Id. ¶ 41.

Union Pacific decided that Williams couldn't go back to his old job. [38] ¶ 52. To make this decision, Williams's second-level supervisor, Randy Bridge, compared Williams's restrictions with the material handler job description. [38] ¶¶ 43-45.

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Bridge said that the essential features of the material handler position included (1) operating highway vehicles, trucks, tractors, on-track or mobile equipment, and forklifts; (2) operating cranes, hoists, or other machinery; (3) working near moving trains, freight cars, or locomotives; (4) working at unprotected heights over four feet above the work surface; (5) working with less than two other people; and (6) lifting seventy pounds regularly. Id. ¶¶ 47-48. Without knowing about Williams's heart conditions, id. ¶ 50; [41] ¶ 19, Bridge found that the restrictions interfered with essential functions of the position, and that no accommodations would make it possible for Williams to return to the material handler job because accommodation would require “removal of an essential function” and “lowering of performance or production standards.” [38] ¶¶ 45-46. Bridge never spoke with Williams or his direct supervisor about the restrictions or possible accommodations, and didn't look into whether Williams could be moved into another position. [41] ¶¶ 19-20.

Two other Union Pacific employees-a director and an assistant vice president-agreed that no reasonable accommodations were available that would allow Williams to return to the material handler position. [38] ¶ 49. None of the Union Pacific employees who made the decision that Williams couldn't go back to his job had regularly worked with or evaluated him. [41] ¶¶ 13, 17, 23-24. Williams's direct manager (Simpson) received notice of his work restrictions, id. ¶ 5, but never analyzed whether Williams could return to work with accommodations. Id. ¶¶ 9-12, 14-15, 18-19.

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Union Pacific referred Williams to its disability management department. [38] ¶ 53. He accepted vocational counseling services, and said that he was interested in being reassigned to a bridge tender position. Id. ¶¶ 54-56. But Union Pacific decided that Williams couldn't work that job, either. Id. ¶¶ 57-72. Knowing only Williams's work restrictions, id. ¶ 58; [41] ¶ 36, the manager of the bridge tender job determined that the restrictions interfered with essential functions of that position, and that no reasonable accommodations were available. [38] ¶¶ 59, 63-71.

Williams repeatedly asked Union Pacific to remove his work restrictions, but the company refused, requiring “objective testing and documentation” showing an improvement in Williams's condition. [38] ¶¶ 73-74. He submitted more records, but none of Williams's diagnoses changed and the company's doctor declined to review most of the restrictions. Id. ¶¶ 75-82. Williams also worked with Union Pacific's career counselor to look for other jobs in the company. Id. ¶¶ 83-85. The search was limited, however, because Williams told her “that he did not wish to leave the Chicago area.” Id. When the company counselor offered to help him find work outside Union Pacific, Williams said he wasn't interested. Id. ¶¶ 86-87. Union Pacific's counselor did not explore other positions in the Chicago area with Williams because he only indicated interest in the bridge tender position. [41] ¶ 33. As Williams was unwilling to relocate or work outside the company, the counselor decided that there was nothing more that she could do to help. [38] ¶ 91.

Williams said he knew of two white employees who were allowed to return to work at Union Pacific despite having a pacemaker or a defibrillator. [41] ¶ 39. He

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asserts that these two employees were treated better than he was because of their race, id. ¶ 40; [38] ¶ 100, but he never met with or spoke to either of them, had no personal knowledge of their health conditions or work restrictions, and was merely repeating what others had told him. Id. ¶¶ 100-107.

Union Pacific terminated Williams's employment in March 2019. [38] ¶ 88; [1-1] ¶ 4. Williams filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights a month later, [38] ¶ 6, and then this lawsuit. Id. ¶ 3; [1-1].

III. Analysis

The Illinois Human Rights Act prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of race or disability. 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A). The parties agree that plaintiff's claims should be reviewed using analogous federal standards. See [30] at 4; [37] at 1, 14-15. Courts use the Americans with Disabilities Act approach to assess claims for disability discrimination, see Bilinsky v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2019), and the Title VII framework for claims of race discrimination. See Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 866, 879 (7th Cir. 2016); Zaderaka v. Illinois Hum. Rts. Comm'n, 131 Ill.2d 172, 178 (1989).

The key question here is “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that” Williams's race or disability caused Union Pacific to take an adverse action against him. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765-66 (7th Cir. 2016); see Igasaki v. Illinois Dep't of Fin. and Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021); Castetter v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 953 F.3d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2020).

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One way of proving employment discrimination under either Title VII or the ADA is the burden-shifting framework created by McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Id. Under that approach, Williams must make a prima facie case of discrimination. See Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 957. If he does, Union Pacific must then offer a nondiscriminatory motive for its...