Williams v. United States

OPINION

HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI, United States District Judge

Before this Court is Plaintiffs Rufus Williams and Creaghan Harry's (“Plaintiffs”) civil rights amended complaint (“Complaint”), filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiffs are pro se federal pretrial detainees. Plaintiffs' Complaint raises various claims arising out of alleged violations of their speedy trial rights resulting from this Court's COVID-19 related standing orders, as well as various restrictive jail conditions claims, against the Unites States, the United States Department of Justice, the United States Marshals Service, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Chief Judge Freda Wolfson, Governor Phil Murphy, Essex County, Director Alfaro Ortiz, Warden Guy Cirillo, and CFG Medical Services.

At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.

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I. Background

Plaintiffs allege they are federal pretrial detainees, housed at the Essex County Correctional Facility, in Newark, New Jersey. Plaintiffs' Complaint^[1] lists various federal and state law claims. Plaintiffs allege Chief Judge Wolfson and the Government violated their speedy trial rights through Chief Judge Wolfson's issuance of COVID-19 pandemic related standing orders. (ECF No. 9, at 13-17.) In those orders, Chief Judge Wolfson held that the pandemic warranted the exclusion of various periods of time from the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). (See, e.g., Standing Order 20-02, at ¶ 6.)

Plaintiffs also claim Governor Murphy issued “Covid-19 emergency orders that were used by defendants to deprive plaintiff of constitutional rights.” (ECF No. 9, at 10-11.) Plaintiffs assert Director Ortiz issued unspecified “emergency declarations.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiffs also allege this Court and the United States employ some of the Defendants and should be responsible based on that employment and that the Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights. Plaintiffs also complain about various pandemic related restrictions at the jail such as limited visitation, religious services, discovery access, legal research time, and medical care, as well as slow mail, lockdowns, extreme quarantines, and a lack of access to attorneys. (Id. at 17-18.)

Plaintiff's Complaint lacks specificity. The Complaint states only: (1) Chief Judge Wolfson issued the standing orders Plaintiffs believe violated their Speedy Trial rights (2) Governor Murphy issued unspecified “Covid-19 emergency orders”; and (3) Director Ortiz issued

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unspecified “emergency declarations.” The Complaint fails to delineate which Defendants were involved in which alleged violations of his rights. Plaintiffs do not explain the supposed conspiracy they allege deprived them of their rights. Additionally, Plaintiffs request to proceed on a class action basis; however, they do not provide any specific information about how their rights were violated^[2], as opposed to general allegations of restrictive conditions of confinement imposed on detainees at Essex County Correctional Facility. (Id. at 10-51.)

In terms of relief, Plaintiffs seek monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. In particular, they seek to vacate unspecified pandemic related orders and declarations and requests four days of jail credit for every day in detention “during the period of March 15, 2020 to present.” (Id. at 32.)

In January 2021, Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint. (ECF No. 1.) In March 2021, Plaintiffs filed applications to amend their initial complaint.^[3] (ECF Nos. 7 & 8.) In April 2021, they filed the operative Complaint in this matter. (ECF No. 9.)

II. Legal Standard

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A because Plaintiffs are prisoners who are proceeding as indigent.

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

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to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

Therefore, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is the federal counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Walker v. Zenk, 323 Fed.Appx. 144, 145 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 246 (3d Cir. 2004)). To state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation of the right was caused by a person acting under color of federal law. See Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing that Bivens created a right against federal officials parallel to § 1983's right to assert a claim against state officials); see also Collins v. F.B.I., No. 10-3470, 2011 WL 1627025, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2011) (“The Third Circuit has recognized that Bivens actions are simply the federal counterpart to § 1983 claims brought against state officials and thus the analysis established under one type of claim is applicable under the other.”).

III. Decision

A. Immune Defendants

The Court begins with addressing immunity, because it appears Plaintiffs have sued several Defendants who are immune for suit.

1. The United States, the United States Department of Justice, The United States Marshals Service, and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

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“It is well-settled that the United States has sovereign immunity except where it consents to be sued.” Brobst v. United States, 659 Fed.Appx. 135, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)). Stated differently, “the United States is not subject to suit for constitutional torts, including the civil rights claims Plaintiff seeks to raise, and is entitled to absolute sovereign immunity in this matter.” See, e.g., Edward Pittman, v. United States, No. 2110123, 2021 WL 2260518, at *2 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021) (footnote omitted). Sovereign immunity constitutes a jurisdictional bar to claims against the United States and its agencies, unless Congress has specifically waived such immunity. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687 (1949) (finding that sovereign immunity bars suit against the United States either for damages or for injunctive relief requiring government action.) Indeed, “[a]n action against government officials in their official capacities constitutes an action against the United States [and is] barred by sovereign immunity, absent an explicit waiver.” Lewal...