Williams v. United States

OPINION & ORDER

LORNA G. SCHOFIELD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Petitioner Steven Williams brings a petition (the “Petition”) pro se for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Petitioner moves to vacate his conviction or set aside his sentence of 150 months' imprisonment due to alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, the Petition is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 20, 2016, Petitioner was charged in a superseding indictment with (1) conspiracy to distribute or possess with the intent to distribute heroin and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A) (“Count One”) and (2) money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (“Count Two”). Over the course of a five-day jury trial, the Government introduced testimony of three cooperating witnesses -- Patrick Edwards, Louis Lombard and Miguel Chavez -- each of whom pleaded guilty to charges relating to their respective roles in the drug-trafficking conspiracy. The evidence at trial showed that the conspiracy consisted of Edwards procuring heroin and cocaine in Los Angeles and shipping those drugs to Petitioner in New York. Like Edwards, Chavez and Lombard were Los Angeles-based drug dealers. They testified to Edwards's activity in the Los Angeles side of the conspiracy. Only Edwards testified to Williams's personal involvement in the conspiracy in New York. See United States v. Williams, 787 Fed.Appx. 8, 9 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order), cert. denied, 140 S.

Ct. 645 (2019). The jury convicted Petitioner on the conspiracy charge and acquitted him on the money laundering charge.

A final presentence investigation report was filed on March 23, 2018. On April 3, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to 150 months' incarceration and sixty months' supervised release.

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioner claimed that the Government improperly bolstered the testimony of the three cooperating witnesses -- by noting provisions in their cooperation agreements requiring them to tell the truth (the “truth-telling provisions”) -- before the defense attacked the credibility of those witnesses. Williams, 787 Fed.Appx. at 9. Petitioner also claimed that the prosecution improperly vouched for those cooperating witnesses by noting, at closing argument, that the cooperators knew they would be caught if they lied at trial. Id. at 11. The Second Circuit rejected both arguments, finding that (1) defense counsel put the cooperating witnesses' credibility at issue during opening statements and (2) several of the prosecutions' statements in closing did not constitute vouching, and that others that potentially were based on non-record materials “did not cause Williams substantial prejudice or rise to the level of flagrant abuse.” Id. at 12.

II. STANDARD

A federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on four grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255:

(1) ‘that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or [ (2) ] that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence or [ (3) ] that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [ (4) ] is otherwise subject to collateral attack.'

United States v. Hoskins, 905 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 55 (2019). “In ruling on a motion under § 2255, the district court is required to hold a hearing ‘unless the motion and the files and records of the case

conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.'” Gonzalez v. United States, 722 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)). “To warrant a hearing, the motion must set forth specific facts supported by competent evidence, raising detailed and controverted issues of fact that, if proved at a hearing, would entitle [the petitioner] to relief.” Id. at 131.

A. Procedural Default

“In general, a [petitioner] is barred from collaterally challenging a conviction under § 2255 on a ground that he failed to raise on direct appeal, ” unless he “establishes (1) cause for the procedural default and ensuing prejudice or (2) actual innocence.” United States v. Thorn, 659 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2011); accord Gupta v. United States, 913 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2019). However, “‘in most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance' because the district court is ‘best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation during an entire trial.'” United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 467-68 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003)); accord United States v. Noble, No. 17 Crim. 123, 2020 WL 487407, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2020).

B. Ineffective Assistance

The Sixth Amendment provides “the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86 (1984). “There is ‘a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of professional assistance.'” Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Lynch v. Dolce, 789 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 2015)). “To overcome that presumption, a petitioner must establish two elements. First, the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient by demonstrating that the representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'” Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 52

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). “Second, the petitioner must show that counsel's deficient representation was prejudicial to the defense by establishing ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

“Actions and/or omissions taken by counsel for strategic purposes generally do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” United States v. Melhuish, 6 F.4th 380, 393 (2d Cir. 2021). Strategic decisions include whether to attack a witness's credibility and, if so, to what extent. See Dunham v. Travis, 313 F.3d 724, 732 (2d Cir. 2002); Dede v. United States, 798 F.Supp.2d 538, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). A reviewing court may not second-guess a reasonable trial strategy simply because it was unsuccessful. See Hightower v. United States, No. 07 Crim. 1111, 2013 WL 3388957, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2013) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

C. Pro Se Pleadings

Courts must liberally construe pleadings and other submissions by pro se litigants “to raise the strongest claims [they] suggest[ ].” Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep't, 879 F.3d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). “Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not exempt from ‘compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.'” Murphy v. Warden of Attica Corr. Facility, No. 20 Civ. 3076, 2020 WL 2521461, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2020) (emphasis in original) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Petition alleges counsel rendered ineffective assistance by: (1) making mistakes relating to the cooperating witnesses' credibility at trial; (2) failing to object to a limiting instruction about Petitioner's 2015 detention and release that did not include the reasons Petitioner was not charged; (3) failing to file a motion to suppress or challenge the quantity of

drugs taken from Edwards; (4) failing to hire a private investigator as requested by Petitioner and (5) failing to file a written motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.

Petitioner has not shown (1) that counsel's allegedly deficient representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged deficiencies, Petitioner's conviction or sentence would have been different. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 52.

A. Counsel's Conduct at Trial

The Petition asserts that Petitioner's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial by: (1) attacking Edwards's credibility in his opening statement, thus opening the door for the Government to emphasize the truth-telling provisions of his testimony; (2) failing to make a timely objection to the Government's emphasis on the truth-telling provisions during questioning and at summation and (3) stating in summation that he would not attack the credibility of Lombard and Chavez. Counsel's decisions do not rise to the level of ineffective assistance, first because they were objectively reasonable strategic choices, and second because they do not establish a reasonable probability of a different trial outcome.

First, in his opening, defense counsel told the jury that, to find Petitioner guilty, they would have to find Edwards was telling the truth beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel then argued that the evidence would show Edwards's testimony to be inconsistent and not credible. Given that Edwards was the...